A Free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks and the Battle Over the Soul of the Networked Fourth Estate by Benkler, Yochai
 
A Free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks and the Battle Over the Soul
of the Networked Fourth Estate
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Yochai Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks and the
Battle Over the Soul of the Networked Fourth Estate, 46 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 311 (2011).
Published Version http://harvardcrcl.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/Benkler.pdf
Accessed February 19, 2015 1:10:58 PM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:10900863
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#OAP\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\46-2\HLC209.txt unknown Seq: 1  6-JUN-11 13:54
A Free Irresponsible Press:  Wikileaks and the
Battle over the Soul of the Networked
Fourth Estate
Yochai Benkler*
[I]t is very necessary that we should not flinch from seeing what is vile and
debasing.  There is filth on the floor, and it must be scraped up with the muck-
rake; and there are times and places where this service is the most needed of all
the services that can be performed.  But the man who never does anything else,
who never thinks or speaks or writes, save of his feats with the muck-rake,
speedily becomes, not a help but one of the most potent forces for evil.
There are in the body politic, economic and social, many and grave evils,
and there is urgent necessity for the sternest war upon them.  There should be
relentless exposure of and attack upon every evil man, whether politician or
business man, every evil practice, whether in politics, business, or social life.  I
hail as a benefactor every writer or speaker, every man who, on the platform or
in a book, magazine, or newspaper, with merciless severity makes such attack,
provided always that he in his turn remembers that the attack is of use only if it
is absolutely truthful.1
Wikileaks was born a century after President Theodore Roosevelt deliv-
ered the speech that gave muckraking journalism its name, and both hailed
investigative journalism and called upon it to be undertaken responsibly.  In
2010, four years after its first document release, Wikileaks became the
center of an international storm surrounding the role of the individual in the
networked public sphere.  It forces us to ask how comfortable we are with
the actual shape of democratization created by the Internet.  The freedom
that the Internet provides to networked individuals and cooperative associa-
tions to speak their minds and organize around their causes has been
deployed over the past decade to develop new, networked models of the
fourth estate.  These models circumvent the social and organizational
frameworks of traditional media, which played a large role in framing the
balance between freedom and responsibility of the press.  At the same time,
the Wikileaks episode forces us to confront the fact that the members of the
networked fourth estate turn out to be both more susceptible to new forms of
attack than those of the old, and to possess different sources of resilience in
the face of these attacks.  In particular, commercial owners of the critical
* Jack N. and Lillian R. Berkman Professor for Entrepreneurial Legal Studies, Harvard
Law School; Faculty Co-Director, Berkman Center for Internet and Society, Harvard Univer-
sity.  I am grateful to Bruce Ackerman, Marvin Ammori, Jack Balkin, David Barron, Fernando
Bermejo, David Isenberg, Susan Landau, Micah Sifry, Jonathan Zittrain, and Ethan Zuckerman
for comments and criticisms.
1 Theodore Roosevelt, Address of President Roosevelt at the Laying of the Corner Stone of
the Office Building of the House of Representatives: The Man with the Muck-Rake (Apr. 14,
1906),  available at VOICES OF D EMOCRACY, http://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/theodore-
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infrastructures of the networked environment can deny service to controver-
sial speakers, and some appear to be willing to do so at a mere whiff of
public controversy.  The United States government, in turn, can use this vul-
nerability to bring to bear new kinds of pressure on undesired disclosures in
extralegal partnership with these private infrastructure providers.
The year of Wikileaks began with the release of a video taken by a U.S.
attack helicopter, showing what sounded like a trigger-happy crew killing
civilians alongside their intended targets.  It continued with two large-scale
document releases from Iraq and Afghanistan, about which Defense Secre-
tary Robert Gates wrote to the Senate, representing that “the review to date
has not revealed any sensitive intelligence sources and methods compro-
mised by this disclosure.”2  The year ended with the very careful release of a
few hundred (as of this writing, it has risen to over 1900) cables from U.S.
embassies in cooperation with five traditional media organizations.  At the
time of the embassy cable release, about two-thirds of news reports incor-
rectly reported that Wikileaks had simply dumped over 250,000 classified
cables onto the Net.3  In fact, Wikileaks made that large number of cables
available only privately, to the New York Times, the Guardian, Der Spiegel,
Le Monde, and El Pa´ ıs , and later to other media organizations.  These orga-
nizations put their own teams to work to sift through the cables and selected
only a few, often in redacted form, to publish.  Wikileaks then published
almost solely those cables selected by these traditional organizations, and
only in the redacted form released by those organizations.4  Of this release,
Secretary Gates stated:  “Is this embarrassing?  Yes.  Is it awkward?  Yes.
Consequences for U.S. foreign policy?  I think fairly modest.”5
Despite the steadily more cautious and responsible practices Wikileaks
came to adopt over the course of the year, and despite the apparent absence
2 Adam Levine, Gates: Leaked Documents Don’t Reveal Key Intel, But Risks Remain, CNN
(Oct. 16, 2010, 8:25 AM), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-10-16/us/wikileaks.assessment_1_
julian-assange-wikileaks-documents.
3 See media analysis infra, text accompanying notes 108–124. R
4 See detailed description and sourcing infra, notes 53–55. R
5 U.S. Dep’t of Defense, News Transcript, DOD News Briefing with Secretary Gates and
Adm. Mullen from the Pentagon (Nov. 30, 2010), available at http://www.defense.gov/
Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=4728.  Gates said at a Pentagon press briefing on the
day of the release:
Now, I’ve heard the impact of these releases on our foreign policy described as a
meltdown, as a game-changer, and so on. I think -- I think those descriptions are
fairly significantly overwrought.  The fact is, governments deal with the United
States because it’s in their interest, not because they like us, not because they trust us,
and not because they believe we can keep secrets.  Many governments -- some gov-
ernments deal with us because they fear us, some because they respect us, most
because they need us.  We are still essentially, as has been said before, the indispen-
sable nation.  So other nations will continue to deal with us.  They will continue to
work with us.  We will continue to share sensitive information with one another. Is
this embarrassing?  Yes.  Is it awkward?  Yes.  Consequences for U.S. foreign pol-
icy?  I think fairly modest.
Id.\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\46-2\HLC209.txt unknown Seq: 3  6-JUN-11 13:54
2011] A Free Irresponsible Press 313
of evidence of harm, the steady flow of confidential materials through an
organization that was not part of the familiar “responsible press” was met
by increasing levels of angry vitriol from the Administration, politicians, and
media commentators.  By the end of the year, U.S. Vice President Joseph
Biden responded to the quite limited and careful release of the embassy
cables by stating that Wikileaks founder Julian Assange is “more like a high-
tech terrorist than the Pentagon Papers,”6 leading to predictable calls for his
assassination—on the model of targeted killings of Al Qaeda and Taliban
leaders in Afghanistan—by Fox News commentators and likely Republican
presidential candidate Sarah Palin.7  The New York Times’ flagship opinion
author, Thomas Friedman, declared Wikileaks one of the two major threats
to a peaceful world under U.S. leadership, parallel to the threat of an ascen-
dant China.8
The rhetorical framing of Wikileaks in the socio-political frame of
global threat and terrorism, in turn, facilitated and interacted with a range of
responses that would have been inconceivable in the more factually appro-
priate frame of reference, such as what counts as responsible journalism, or
how we understand the costs and benefits of the demise of more traditional
models of journalistic self-regulation in the age of the networked public
sphere.  On the legal front, the Department of Justice responded to public
calls from Senator Dianne Feinstein and others and began to explore prose-
cution of Julian Assange under the Espionage Act.  The military held (and
continues to hold as of this writing) the suspected source of the leak in soli-
tary confinement for over eight months, while the leading Republican presi-
dential candidate at that time, Mike Huckabee, called for his execution.9
The sociopolitical framing makes more comprehensible the vigilante
responses in other subsystems of the information environment.  Responding
to a call from Senate Homeland Security Committee Chairman Joe Lieber-
man, several commercial organizations tried to shut down Wikileaks by de-
nial of service of the basic systems under their respective control.
Wikileaks’ domain name server provider, EveryDNS, stopped pointing at the
6 Biden Makes Case For Assange As A ‘High-Tech Terrorist,’ THE H UFFINGTON P OST
(Dec. 19, 2010, 3:51 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/19/joe-biden-wikileaks-
assange-high-tech-terrorist_n_798838.html (“If he conspired, to get these classified docu-
ments, with a member of the US military, that’s fundamentally different than if somebody
drops in your lap, ‘Here David, you’re a press person, here is classified materials . . . .’ I would
argue that it’s closer to being a high tech terrorist than the Pentagon Papers.”).
7 See infra, notes 101–103 (describing comments of Bob Beckel, William Kristol, and R
Sarah Palin).
8 Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed., We’ve Only Got America A, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2010, at
A31,  available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/15/opinion/15friedman.html; see infra,
notes 335–378. R
9 Haroon Siddique & Matthew Weaver, US Embassy Cables Culprit Should Be Executed,
Says Mike Huckabee, GUARDIAN.CO.UK, Dec. 1, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/
dec/01/us-embassy-cables-executed-mike-huckabee; Nick Collins, WikiLeaks: Guilty Parties
‘Should Face Death Penalty,’ THE T ELEGRAPH, Dec. 1, 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/worldnews/wikileaks/8172916/WikiLeaks-guilty-parties-should-face-death-penalty.html.\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\46-2\HLC209.txt unknown Seq: 4  6-JUN-11 13:54
314 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 46
domain “wikileaks.org,” trying to make it unreachable.  Amazon, whose
cloud computing platform was hosting Wikileaks data, cut off hosting ser-
vices for the site, and Apple pulled a Wikileaks App from its App Store.
Banks and payment companies, like MasterCard, Visa, PayPal, and Bank of
America, as well as the Swiss postal bank, cut off payment service to
Wikileaks in an effort to put pressure on the site’s ability to raise money
from supporters around the world.  These private company actions likely
responded to concerns about being associated publicly with “undesirables.”
There is no clear evidence that these acts were done at the direction of a
government official with authority to coerce them.  The sole acknowledged
direct action was a public appeal for and subsequent praise of these actions
by Senator Joe Lieberman.  In that regard, these acts represent a direct vul-
nerability in the private infrastructure system and a potential pathway of
public censorship.  It is impossible to ignore the role that a diffuse, even if
uncoordinated, set of acts by government officials—beginning with the
phrasing of Harold Koh’s letter to Wikileaks on November 27, cited by
PayPal as its reason for closure, and extending to numerous other public
statements and organizational actions—played in triggering the commercial
services’ denial-of-service attack.10  In combination, the feedback from pub-
lic to private action presents the risk of a government able to circumvent
normal constitutional protections to crack down on critics who use the
networked public sphere.  This occurs through the influence of informal sys-
tems of pressure and approval on market actors who are not themselves sub-
ject to the constitutional constraints.  This extralegal public-private
partnership allows an administration to achieve, through a multi-system at-
tack on critics, results that would have been practically impossible to
achieve within the bounds of the Constitution and the requirements of
legality.
Parts I and II tell the story of Wikileaks, the release of the documents,
and the multi-system attack on the organization, the site, and Julian Assange
by both public and private actors.  Part III explains the constitutional frame-
work and why it is not, as a matter of law, sustainable to treat Wikileaks or
Assange any differently than the New York Times and its reporters, for pur-
poses of prior restraint or ex post criminal prosecution consistent with the
First Amendment’s protection of freedom of the press.  Prosecution of
Wikileaks or Assange will almost certainly falter under present First Amend-
ment doctrine.  In the unlikely event that prosecution succeeds, it will only
do so at the expense of making very bad First Amendment law from the
perspective of freedom of the press in the networked age.  Part III concludes
with what causes of action, if any, may be open for future members of the
fourth estate against government officials who instigate extralegal attacks on
critics, and what responses in private law, against the private partners in the
10 See infra section II.A, II.D.2, II.D.3. See infra Koh, note 75; as well as organizational R
attack.\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\46-2\HLC209.txt unknown Seq: 5  6-JUN-11 13:54
2011] A Free Irresponsible Press 315
public-private partnership, can to some extent replace the First Amendment
protections available against direct action by their public partners.  Part IV
explores the ways in which the Wikileaks case intersects with larger trends
in the news industry.  It describes the economic challenges faced by tradi-
tional media and the emerging pattern of the networked fourth estate.  In
particular, what we see is that the new, networked fourth estate will likely
combine elements of both traditional and novel forms of news media; and
that “professionalism” and “responsibility” can be found on both sides of
the divide, as can unprofessionalism and irresponsibility.  The traditional
news industry’s treatment of Wikileaks throughout this episode can best be
seen as an effort by older media to preserve their own identity against the
perceived threat posed by the new, networked model.  As a practical result,
the traditional media in the United States effectively collaborated with parts
of the Administration in painting Wikileaks and Assange in terms that made
them more susceptible to both extralegal and legal attack.  More systemati-
cally, this part suggests that the new, relatively more socially-politically vul-
nerable members of the networked fourth estate are needlessly being put at
risk by the more established outlets’ efforts to denigrate the journalistic iden-
tity of the new kids on the block to preserve their own identity.
As I write these words, the story is ongoing.  It is too soon to tell how
this specific debate will progress.  The experience of the music industry sug-
gests that the conflict over the shape of the fourth estate will continue well
into the coming decade.  It may well impose serious collateral damage on
some citizen journalists.  And it will likely end up with an improved watch-
dog function, reaching some accommodation between the more traditional
representatives of the fourth estate, like the New York Times, and the more
edgy, muckraking elements of the networked environment.  As we will see
over the course of looking at this one major event, each party will sometimes
be responsible and sometimes irresponsible, sometimes professional, and
sometimes not, each in its own special way.
I. THE PROVOCATION: WIKILEAKS EMERGES AS A NEW
ELEMENT OF THE F OURTH ESTATE
A. 2006–2009: Award-Winning Site Exposing Corruption and
Abuse Around the World
Wikileaks registered its domain name in October of 2006 and released
its first set of documents in December of that year.11  The first two sets of
documents related to Africa.12  In December 2006, the site released a copy of
11 See WikiLeaks, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikileaks (last visited Feb. 23,
2011).  I use this source advisedly; following the citation lists in the article suggests that it is a
particularly good entry point into the history of Wikileaks.
12 WikiLeaks Timeline, THE G LOBE AND M AIL, Dec. 14, 2010, http://www.theglobeand
mail.com/news/technology/wikileaks-timeline/article1837131.\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\46-2\HLC209.txt unknown Seq: 6  6-JUN-11 13:54
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a decision by the rebel leader in Somalia to assassinate Somali government
officials.  In August 2007, it released another document identifying corrup-
tion by Kenyan leader Daniel Arap Moi.13  November of 2007 was the first
time that Wikileaks published information relating to the U.S.:  a copy of
Standard Operating Procedures for Camp Delta, exposing a formal source
outlining the details of how the Guantanamo Bay detention camp was run.
In 2008, Wikileaks released a wide range of documents related to illegal
activities of public and private bodies.  On the private side, these included a
Swiss bank’s Cayman Islands account, internal documents of the Church of
Scientology, and Apple’s iPhone application developer contract, which had
included an agreement not to discuss the restrictive terms.14  On the public
side, it included U.S. military rules of engagement in Iraq permitting pursuit
of former members of Saddam Hussein’s government across the border into
Iran and Syria,15 an early draft of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
(“ACTA”),16 emails from Sarah Palin’s Yahoo! accounts while she was a
candidate for Vice President, and a membership list of the far-right British
National Party.  Most prominently, Wikileaks released documents pertaining
to extra-judicial killings and disappearances in Kenya, for which it won Am-
nesty International’s New Media award in 2009.17  Wikileaks also received
the Freedom of Expression Award from the British magazine Index of Cen-
sorship in the category of new media.18  Wikileaks’ activity increased in
2009.  The pattern of releasing information relating to a range of very differ-
ent countries, and to potential corruption, malfeasance, or ineptitude contin-
ued, including oil-related corruption in Peru, banking abuses in Iceland, and
a nuclear accident in Iran.19  Most prominent that year was Wikileaks’ release
of copies of e-mail correspondence between climate scientists, which was
13 Id.
14 See WikiLeaks Timeline, supra note 12, at 2008 tab; see also Thomas Claburn, Apple’s R
Controversial iPhone Developer Agreement Published, INFORMATIONWEEK (Oct. 28, 2008,
3:50 PM), http://www.informationweek.com/news/personal-tech/smart-phones/showArticle.j
html?articleID=211601121.
15 Eric Schmitt & Michael R. Gordon, Cross-Border Chases From Iraq O.K., Document
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2008, at A10.
16 Mike Mesnick, Debunking The Faulty Premises Of The Pirate Bay-Criminalization
Treaty, TECHDIRT (May 23 2008, 6:21 PM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20080523/1203
101212.shtml.
17 Amnesty Announces Media Awards 2009 Winners, AMNESTY INT’L UK (June 6, 2009),
http://amnesty.org.uk/news_details.asp?NewsID=18227.
18 Winners of Index on Censorship Freedom of Expression Awards Announced, INDEX ON
CENSORSHIP (Apr. 22, 2008), http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2008/04/winners-of-index-
on-censorship-freedom-of-expression-award-announced.
19 WikiLeaks Timeline, supra note 12, at 2009 tab.  The list includes: in January, telephone R
intercepts of Peruvian politicians and businessmen involved in an oil scandal; in February,
6,780 Congressional Research Service reports; in March, a set of documents belonging to
Barclay’s Bank; in July, a report relating to a nuclear accident at the Iranian Natanz nuclear
facility; and in September, internal documents from Kaupthing Bank of Iceland, showing what
appeared to be self-dealing of bank owners.\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\46-2\HLC209.txt unknown Seq: 7  6-JUN-11 13:54
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the basis of what right-wing U.S. media tried to turn into “Climategate.”20
What seems fairly clear from this brief overview of activities prior to 2010 is
that Wikileaks was an organization that seems to have functioned very much
as it described itself:  a place where documents that shed light on powerful
governments or corporations anywhere in the world, or, in the case of the
climate scientists’ emails, on a matter of enormous global public concern,
could be aired publicly.
B. March 2010:  Leaking the 2008 Pentagon Report on the
Threat of Wikileaks
Things changed in 2010.  In March 2010, Wikileaks released a 2008
Pentagon report arguing that Wikileaks is a threat, while recognizing the site
as a source of investigative journalism critical of U.S. military procurement
and its conduct in war.21  The New York Times, describing Wikileaks as “a
tiny online source of information and documents that governments and cor-
porations around the world would prefer to keep secret,”22 reported that the
Army confirmed the authenticity of the report.23  The Pentagon Report pro-
vides significant insight into what Wikileaks was doing by 2008, and why
the military was concerned about it.  The Report was dated about six weeks
after Wikileaks had published the document revealing the rules of engage-
ment and permission for cross-border pursuit.24  The Executive Summary
opens with the words:  “Wikileaks.org, a publicly accessible Internet Web
site, represents a potential force protection, counterintelligence, operational
security (OPSEC), and information security (INFOSEC) threat to the US
Army.”25
Mixing its own assessments with Wikileaks self-descriptions taken at
face value, the Report describes Wikileaks as founded by “Chinese dissi-
20 See Ben Dimiero, FOXLEAKS: Fox Boss Ordered Staff to Cast Doubt on Climate Sci-
ence, COUNTY FAIR (MEDIA MATTERS FOR AMERICA) (Dec. 15, 2010, 8:08 AM), http://media-
matters.org/blog/201012150004; Andrew C. Revkin, Climategate Fever Breaks, DOT EARTH
(N.Y. TIMES) (July 7, 2010, 9:02 AM), http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/07/gate-
fever-breaks.
21 The report was originally available on Wikileaks itself.  Julian Assange, U.S. Intelli-
gence Planned to Destroy WikiLeaks,  WIKILEAKS (Mar. 15, 2010).  Since the assault on
Wikileaks has made access to the site difficult, that particular report can more easily be ac-
cessed elsewhere as of February 19, 2011:  Michael D. Horvath, U.S. Army Counterintel-
ligence Ctr., Wikileaks.org—An Online Reference to Foreign Intelligence Services,
Insurgents, or Terrorist Groups? 2 (Mar. 18, 2008) [hereinafter Pentagon Report], available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/28385794/Us-Intel-Wikileaks, or in PDF format at http://www.
wuala.com/WikiLeaks/new/us-intel-wikileaks.pdf.
22 Stephanie Strom, Pentagon Sees a Threat from Online Muckrakers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
17, 2010, at A18.
23 Id.
24 That report was apparently an early instance of collaboration between Wikileaks and a
major news outlet; Assange explains that the report was published in collaboration with New
York Times reporter Eric Schmitt.  Annotations by Julian Assange to Feb. 8, 2011 draft of this
Article (Mar. 10, 2011) (on file with author) [hereinafter Assange Annotations].
25 Pentagon Report, supra note 21, at 2. R\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\46-2\HLC209.txt unknown Seq: 8  6-JUN-11 13:54
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dents, journalists, mathematicians, and technologists from the United States,
China, Taiwan, Europe, Australia, and South Africa,”26 and dedicated “to
expos[ing] unethical practices, illegal behavior, and wrongdoing within cor-
rupt corporations and oppressive regimes in Asia, the former Soviet bloc,
Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East.”27  The Report clearly identified
the potential status of Wikileaks as a journalistic outlet protected by the First
Amendment, subject to potential legal threats over privacy, disclosure of
classified materials, or libel.28  As an example, the report identifies a suit
brought by the Cayman Islands branch of the Swiss bank Julius Baer that
shut down U.S. access to Wikileaks documents, which a judicial order later
lifted.  In what would become a prescient statement, the 2008 Pentagon Re-
port states:
Efforts by some domestic and foreign personnel and organizations
to discredit the Wikileaks.org Web site include allegations that it
wittingly allows the posting of uncorroborated information, serves
as an instrument of propaganda, and is a front organization of the
US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).  The governments of
China, Israel, North Korea, Russia, Thailand, Zimbabwe, and sev-
eral other countries have blocked access to Wikileaks.org-type
Web sites, claimed they have the right to investigate and prosecute
Wikileaks.org and associated whistleblowers, or insisted they re-
move false, sensitive, or classified government information, propa-
ganda, or malicious content from the Internet.29
The Report states that “Wikileaks.org supports the US Supreme Court ruling
regarding the unauthorized release of the Pentagon Papers by Daniel Ell-
sberg, which stated that ‘only a free and unrestrained press can effectively
expose deception in government.’”30
The recognition of the journalistic role Wikileaks plays is clear in the
discussion of several examples of Wikileaks publications, which the Report
repeatedly describes as “news article[s]” and in the description of Julian
Assange as the organization’s “foreign staff writer.”31  In the process of
describing what the Report’s authors consider a risk of misinformation cam-
paigns, they identify several articles that Wikileaks published that rely on
leaked Pentagon documents about equipment deployed in Afghanistan and
Iraq.  A major part of the concern is that opponents of the U.S. could use
26 Id. at 5.  These are descriptions that largely appear to take Wikileaks’ own self-descrip-
tion as true.
27 Id. at 2.
28 Id. at 3.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 6 (quoting New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971)).
31 Id. at 9 (“The foreign staff writer for Wikileaks.org, Julian Assange, wrote several news
articles, coauthored other articles, and developed an interactive data base for the leaked docu-
ments.  In addition, other Wikileaks.org writers and various writers for other media publica-
tions wrote separate news articles based on the leaked information posted to the Web site.”).\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\46-2\HLC209.txt unknown Seq: 9  6-JUN-11 13:54
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some of this information, released in 2007, to plan attacks on U.S. troops.
There is no mention of any evidence of such actual use or feasible action in
the Report.  Instead, the Report mentions several disclosures and arguments
about weapons systems deployed in Iraq and critiques of their high expense,
low effectiveness, and in the case of chemical weapons, illegality.32  It is
harder to imagine a clearer case of investigative journalism critical of the
Pentagon’s procurement policy than when the report says:
The author of the above-mentioned article incorrectly interprets
the leaked data regarding the components and fielding of the War-
lock system, resulting in unsupportable and faulty conclusions to
allege war profiteering, price gouging and increased revenues by
DoD contractors involved in counter-IED development efforts.
This article provides an example of how the leaked TOE informa-
tion can be manipulated and misinterpreted to produce inaccurate
information for a news article.  (S//NF) The author of the article
then argues that the US Army receives a poor return on its invest-
ment in counter-IEDs.33
Note that the claim carefully avoids stating that the documents or data are
false.  The complaint is over interpretation of facts accepted as true.  The
report follows up with other items it calls variously “news article[s],” or
“report[s],” related to abuses in Guantanamo Bay, based on the leaked
Camp Delta Operating Procedures, and in one case states:  “A variety of
newspapers, wire services, and other news and media organizations wrote
numerous articles based on the original Wikileaks.org news article and ac-
tual classified document posted to their Web site.”34
The 2008 Pentagon Report, then, sees Wikileaks as a journalistic organ-
ization whose structure and organization make it dangerous to the U.S. mili-
tary.  A review of all news stories in the Lexis-Nexis database in 2007 and
2008 reveals, however, that Wikileaks’ analysis (as opposed to documents)
was not reported on in media covered by that dataset; instead, the roughly
400 reports present during that period referenced the materials themselves,
with occasional references to the brief overview offered by the site.  There
are only 10 mentions of Assange over this period; none refer to the kind of
writing the Pentagon Report identifies.35  The absence of significant contem-
poraneous news reports on Wikileaks’ or Assange’s analysis, as opposed to
the documents revealed, may reflect a lack of willingness of more traditional
media to recognize the writing, but may also represent an overstatement in
32 Id. at 11.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 15.
35 A search in the Lexis-Nexis “News, All” database for articles published from January
1, 2007 until December 31, 2008 using the term “Wikileaks” yielded 407 results.  A “focus”
search for “Assange” yielded ten results.\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\46-2\HLC209.txt unknown Seq: 10  6-JUN-11 13:54
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the Pentagon Report as to the importance of this aspect of the site’s
operation.
The Report locates the danger that Wikileaks presents in its nontradi-
tional organizational structure:  “Anyone can post information to the
Wikileaks.org Web site, and there is no editorial review or oversight to ver-
ify the accuracy of any information posted to the Web site. Persons acces-
sing the Web site can form their own opinions regarding the accuracy of the
information posted, and they are allowed to post comments.”36  This makes
the site particularly susceptible to “misinformation, disinformation, and
propaganda; or to conduct perception management and influence operations
designed to convey a negative message to those who view or retrieve infor-
mation from the Web site.”37
This characterization of the threat of excessive openness appears to be
either a misunderstanding driven by the “Wiki” part of the name or deliber-
ate mischaracterization.  Promiscuous publication by anyone of anything
was not the model that Wikileaks adopted, although that model was far from
unheard of at the time.  A contemporaneous report by the Los Angeles Times
compares Wikileaks to another then-operating site, Liveleak:  “LiveLeak has
a simple editorial philosophy: Anyone can post anything that does not vio-
late the site’s rules.  Essentially, no pornography and nothing overtly crimi-
nal.”38  By contrast, “Wikileaks . . . goes out of its way to make sure the
documents it posts are authentic, saying fewer than 1% of its newly posted
documents ‘fail verification.’”39  From the vantage point of early 2011, this
policy seems to have been consistently followed and remarkably successful.
After over four years in operation, Wikileaks has been criticized for many
faults, but none of its significant postings were found to be inauthentic.
The report concludes with a recommendation for attacking the site:
cracking down very heavily on whistleblowers so as to make Wikileaks
seem less safe as a point of distribution:
Wikileaks.org uses trust as a center of gravity by assuring insiders,
leakers, and whistleblowers who pass information to
Wikileaks.org personnel or who post information to the Web site
that they will remain anonymous. The identification, exposure, or
termination of employment of or legal actions against current or
former insiders, leakers, or whistleblowers could damage or de-
stroy this center of gravity and deter others from using
Wikileaks.org to make such information public.40
36 Pentagon Report, supra note 21, at 2. R
37 Id.
38 David Sarno, Burst of Leaks Getting Slippery, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2008, at E1.
39 Pentagon Report, supra note 21, at 3.  Assange notes that this is an overstatement of R
inaccuracy; his annotations suggest that 1% of received documents fail verification and are not
posted, while no documents posted to date on Wikileaks have failed verification.  Assange
Annotations, supra note 24. R
40 Pentagon Report, supra note 21, at 3. R\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\46-2\HLC209.txt unknown Seq: 11  6-JUN-11 13:54
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C. April-October 2010: Collateral Murder, Afghanistan, and Iraq
April 2010 marked the beginning of a series of four releases of docu-
ments embarrassing to the U.S. government.  All four releases are thought to
originate from a single major transfer of documents, allegedly provided by a
twenty-two-year-old Private First Class in the U.S. Army, Bradley Man-
ning.41  The first release was a video entitled “Collateral Murder.”  On July
12, 2007, two Apache attack helicopters fired on a group of individuals in
Iraq, killing about twelve.  Among the dead were two Reuters employees: a
photographer and a driver.  Reuters tried to get access to the video footage
from the helicopter itself, so as to investigate what had happened and
whether there was indeed a threat to the helicopters that would have ex-
plained the shooting.  The U.S. government successfully resisted information
requests for recordings of the events.42  Wikileaks made available both the
full, raw video and an edited version on April 5, 2010.43  In it, and in its
soundtrack, the helicopter pilots exhibit trigger-happy behavior and sound as
though they took pleasure in hunting down their targets, some of whom ap-
pear to be unarmed civilians.  The video and its contents became front-page
news in the major papers.44  The release of the video was swiftly followed by
identification of Manning as the source of the leak, based on selectively-
released chat messages he allegedly wrote to Adrian Lamo, a hacker con-
victed of felony hacking in 2004, who had longstanding contacts with a
Wired Magazine reporter to whom he conveyed these chat messages.45  As of
this writing, Manning has been in solitary confinement for over eight
months, denied pillows and sheets, and locked in a cell for twenty-three
41 Wikileaks itself has provided no public statement about the source.  Manning was
charged by the Army only with the first release.  Glenn Greenwald of Salon makes a powerful
case that the evidence against Manning originates in a highly unreliable source.  Glenn Green-
wald, The Strange and Consequential Case of Bradley Manning, Adrian Lamo and Wikileaks,
SALON (June 18, 2010, 8:20 AM), http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/2010/
06/18/wikileaks [hereinafter Greenwald, Strange and Consequential].  For the background
story, see Chris McGreal, Hacker Turns in US Soldier over WikiLeaks Iraq Video, THE GUARD-
IAN, June 8, 2010, at 15, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jun/07/hacker-
wikileaks-iraq-video-manning.  The underlying materials Greenwald discusses include Kevin
Poulsen & Kim Zetter, Suspected Wikileaks Source Described Crisis of Conscience Leading to
Leaks, THREAT LEVEL (WIRED) (June 10, 2010, 8:41 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/
2010/06/conscience.
42 Elizabeth Bumiller, Video Shows U.S. Killing of Reuters Employees, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
5, 2010, at A13, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/06/world/middleeast/06bagh
dad.html?hp.
43 Collateral Murder, WIKILEAKS (Apr. 5, 2010).  Full version available at http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=IS9sxRfU-ik [hereinafter Collateral Murder, full version].  Edited
version available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5rXPrfnU3G0 [hereinafter Collateral
Murder, edited version].
44 See Chris McGreal, Wikileaks Reveals Video Showing US Air Crew Shooting Down
Iraqi Civilians, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 6, 2010, at 2, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2010/apr/05/wikileaks-us-army-iraq-attack; WikiLeaks Posts Video of ‘US Military Kill-
ings’ in Iraq, BBC (Apr. 6, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8603938.stm.
45 Greenwald, Strange and Consequential, supra note 41. R\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\46-2\HLC209.txt unknown Seq: 12  6-JUN-11 13:54
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hours a day.46  The treatment seems consistent with the Pentagon Report’s
emphasis on deterrence against potential sources of leaks as the core tactic to
undermine Wikileaks.
The Collateral Murder video was released at a news conference in the
National Press Club in Washington, D.C.  This was the first move that
Wikileaks made toward the cooperation with traditional media that would
mark its operation in the following eight months.  At that early stage, how-
ever, Wikileaks was only using the established press as a mechanism for
amplifying its message.  The second element of this episode was a flirtation
with advocacy journalism.47  The edited version of the video came under
attack; Fox News in particular emphasized the claim that the video was ed-
ited to highlight the killed journalists, but not the presence of a person with a
rocket-propelled grenade.48  A careful review of both videos—the uncut
original and the edited version—side by side suggests that the editing prima-
rily did three things.  First, it excluded many minutes of irrelevant periods in
which no action was taking place, just as any video journalist would do.
Second, it added text slides that gave information about the Reuters photog-
rapher and driver, as well as contemporaneous quotations from news reports,
to give context to what was being seen.  And third, it emphasized shots that
made the point about collateral damage—shots that highlight that the
Reuters cameraman’s cameras were clearly visible, or that suggest that the
children who were injured in the helicopter attack were visible from the
helicopter’s gun camera through the side window of the van in which they
were sitting, a van that the helicopter shot so as to prevent its occupants from
evacuating an injured individual that the helicopter crew clearly saw was
unarmed,49 possibly one of the Reuters employees.  Both the edited and
unedited versions show, with soundtrack, that there were at least two indi-
viduals who had AK-47s; both the edited and unedited versions show that
the pilot thought he saw an RPG peeking around a corner, and that is when
he asked for permission to shoot, although in both versions it appears that
the RPG may have been the zoom lens of one of the cameras used by the
46 Glenn Greenwald, The Inhumane Conditions of Bradley Manning’s Detention, SALON
(Dec. 15, 2010, 1:15 AM), http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/2010/12/14/
manning/index.html [hereinafter Greenwald, Inhumane Conditions]; Joshua Norman, Bradley
Manning, Alleged WikiLeaks Source, in Solitary Confinement, CBS NEWS (Dec. 15, 2010),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-20025724-503543.html.
47 See Radio Berkman 171: Wikileaks and the Information Wars, BERKMAN CTR. FOR IN-
TERNET & SOC’YA T  HARVARD UNIV. (Dec. 8, 2010), http://wilkins.law.harvard.edu/podcasts/
mediaberkman/radioberkman/_files/2010-12-09_004JZLESSIGTRANSCRIPT.pdf (transcript
of podcast).
48 Justin Fishel, Military Raises Questions About Credibility of Leaked Iraq Shooting
Video, FOX NEWS (Apr. 7, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/04/07/military-raises-
questions-credibility-leaked-iraq-shooting-video.
49 The helicopter circled the struggling, injured man, as one of the pilots is heard saying,
“Come on buddy, all you gotta do is pick up a weapon.” Collateral Murder, full version,
supra note 43, at 6:55–7:03. R\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\46-2\HLC209.txt unknown Seq: 13  6-JUN-11 13:54
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Reuters cameraman.50  The editing did nothing to obscure any of this, or to
highlight the possible mistake.  There were several damning parts of the un-
cut version that were not included in the edited version,51 and two ambigu-
ous references to the RPG that might confirm that there was indeed one, but
not necessarily that it was where the pilot thought it was.52
In July 2010, Wikileaks released a new cache of documents—war logs
from the field in Afghanistan.  The technique here represented a completely
new model.53  Before publication, Wikileaks teamed up with three major in-
ternational news organizations:  the New York Times, the Guardian, and Der
Spiegel.  The major organizations were then given a period to verify the
contents, analyze them, and prepare them for presentation.54  All four organi-
zations published on the same day: Wikileaks, a much larger portion of the
full database of documents, and the news organizations, their analysis.55  The
reporting on these documents found nothing that, in broad terms, was not
50 Collateral Murder, full version, supra note 43, at 2:30–2:42; Collateral Murder, edited R
version, supra note 43, at 4:05–4:17. R
51 The edited version excludes the moment when the pilot hears that the ground troops
have found a wounded girl and says, “Ah, damn, oh well,” in an aural shrug. Collateral
Murder, full version, supra note 43, at 17:11.  Similarly, an unrelated incident, fifteen minutes R
later and caught as part of the full cut, clearly displays the same gunship’s crew shooting
hellfire missiles into a building just as an unarmed civilian walks by the house, and again
describes in conversation among the pilots another missile hitting the same building as three
apparently unarmed civilians walk through the rubble looking for survivors. Collateral Mur-
der, full version, supra note 43, at 34:00.  At least some individuals walking into the building R
before that point appear unarmed.  These much more damning images were not part of the
edited version, presumably because they were not part of the story about shooting the Reuters
crew.  An advocacy piece aiming to besmirch the U.S. military would clearly have highlighted
those unambiguous examples of callous disregard for human life by the same gun crew, min-
utes after they had seen that they shot and injured two children in the course of trying to
prevent the evacuation of an unarmed person they had injured in their prior volley.
52 At minute 16:00 of the full video, the pilot reiterates seeing the RPG as the reason to
ask for permission to fire; at minute 19:22–26 of that video, one of the ground troops is heard
saying, “I got one individual looks like he’s got an RPG round laying underneath him.” Col-
lateral Murder, full version, supra note 43, at 16:00, 19:22–26. R
53 See David Leigh, Afghanistan War Logs: How the Guardian Got the Story,  THE
GUARDIAN, July 26, 2010, at 2, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/25/
afghanistan-war-logs-explained-video.
54 See David Leigh & Luke Harding, WikiLeaks: Strained Relations, Accusations—and
Crucial Revelations, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 1, 2011, at 16, available at http://www.guardian.
co.uk/world/2011/jan/31/wikileaks-embassy-cables-publication; Bill Keller, Dealing with As-
sange and the WikiLeaks Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2011, at MM32, later online version of
article available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/30/magazine/30Wikileaks-t.html?_r=1
&pagewanted=all; Marcel Rosenbach & Holger Stark, An Inside Look at Difficult Negotia-
tions with Julian Assange, SPIEGEL, Jan. 28, 2010, available at http://www.spiegel.de/
international/world/0,1518,742163,00.html.
55 Assange explains that posting the materials included removing about one-fifth of the
materials to prevent potential harm to individuals mentioned in them, processing to provide
distribution and statistical analyses, and in particular that he himself identified the documents
relating to one of the most significant finds, the description of Taskforce 373, a force that
undertook targeted assassinations in Afghanistan.  Assange Annotations, supra note 24.  For a R
publication of this story, see Nick Davies, Afghanistan War Logs: Task Force 373—Special
Forces Hunting Top Taliban, THE G UARDIAN, July 25, 2010, at 4, available at http://www.
guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/25/task-force-373-secret-afghanistan-taliban.\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\46-2\HLC209.txt unknown Seq: 14  6-JUN-11 13:54
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already publicly known:  the degree to which the U.S. was deploying
targeted assassinations against Taliban leaders, and the large number of ci-
vilian casualties caused by drone attacks and other coalition activities.  The
drudgery of war, low levels of trust between U.S. and Afghan officials and
forces—all of this was on display.  The precision and detail of the incident
descriptions—such as the shooting of eight children in a school bus by
French troops, or of fifteen civilians on a bus by U.S. troops—added con-
crete evidence and meaning to a background sense of futility and amorphous
knowledge of civilian casualties.56  The Afghanistan war logs release ini-
tially included about 77,000 documents; another 15,000 documents later fol-
lowed after they were initially held back to allow time for Wikileaks to
redact names of people who might be put in danger.57  The release was
treated with consternation by the Administration, and the New York Times’
initial story quoted National Security Advisor General James Jones as saying
that the U.S.
strongly condemns the disclosure of classified information by indi-
viduals and organizations which could put the lives of Americans
and our partners at risk, and threaten our national security.
WikiLeaks made no effort to contact us about these documents—
the United States government learned from news organizations
that these documents would be posted.58
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral McMullen, was reported as
having said that Wikileaks would have blood on its hands.59  Following a full
review, however, and in response to a direct request from Senator Carl
Levin, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary Gates
later represented that “the review to date has not revealed any sensitive in-
telligence sources and methods compromised by the disclosure.”60
McClatchy later quoted an unnamed Pentagon source confirming that three
months later there was still no evidence that anyone had been harmed by
information in the Afghan war logs released.61
56 C. J. Chivers et al., View is Bleaker than Official Portrayal of War in Afghanistan, N.Y.
TIMES, July 25, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/26/world/asia/
26warlogs.html; Nick Davies & David Leigh, Afghanistan War Logs: Massive Leak of Secret
Files Exposes Truth of Occupation, THE GUARDIAN, July 26, 2010, at 1, available at http://
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-military-leaks.
57 Eric Schmitt, In Disclosing Secret Documents, WikiLeaks Seeks ‘Transparency,’ N.Y.
TIMES, July 26, 2010, at A11.
58 Terence Burlij, The Morning Line: Leaked Afghanistan Field Reports to Shape Political
War Debate At Home, THE R UNDOWN (PBS NEWSHOUR) (July 26, 2010, 9:30 AM), http://
www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2010/07/the-morning-line-leaked-afghanistan-field-reports-
to-shape-political-war-debate-at-home.html.
59 Adam Brookes, Huge Wikileaks Release Shows US ‘Ignored Iraq Torture,’ BBC NEWS
(Oct. 23, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11611319.
60 Levine, supra note 2. R
61 Nancy A. Youssef, Officials May be Overstating the Danger from WikiLeaks,
MCCLATCHY (Nov. 28, 2010), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/11/28/104404/officials-
may-be-overstating-the.html.\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\46-2\HLC209.txt unknown Seq: 15  6-JUN-11 13:54
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In October, Wikileaks added one more major release.  It consisted of
war logs similar to those released in July, this time pertaining to the Iraq
war.  Here, Wikileaks posted close to 400,000 field reports from Iraq in what
the BBC described as “a heavily censored form.”62  The New York Times
framed the documents as having relatively low significance:  “Like the first
release, some 77,000 reports covering six years of the war in Afghanistan,
the Iraq documents provide no earthshaking revelations, but they offer in-
sight, texture and context from the people actually fighting the war.”63
Other news organizations framed the reports quite differently. Der Spiegel
entitled the reports A Protocol of Barbarity.64  The BBC used the headline:
Huge Wikileaks release shows US ‘ignored Iraq torture.’65  Regardless of
framing differences, the organizations agreed on the core facts established
by the reports:  Iraqi civilian casualties were higher than previously reported;
the U.S. military was well aware that Iraq’s military and police were system-
atically torturing prisoners; and while discrete units intervened to stop such
torture on the ground, there was no systematic effort to stop the practice.66
The Pentagon denounced the release as a “travesty” and demanded the re-
turn of the documents.67  Secretary of State Clinton was quoted as saying,
“We should condemn in the most clear terms the disclosure.”68
This round of document release was also done by release to media out-
lets first, but one way in which this round was different was the introduction
of personal attacks on Julian Assange.  The day after the release, the New
York Times published a derogatory profile of Assange entitled, Wikileaks
Founder on the Run, Trailed by Notoreity.69  The opening paragraph conveys
the tone of the piece:
Julian Assange moves like a hunted man.  In a noisy Ethiopian
restaurant in London’s rundown Paddington district, he pitches his
voice barely above a whisper to foil the Western intelligence agen-
cies he fears.  He demands that his dwindling number of loyalists
62 See Adam Levine, Top Military Official: WikiLeaks Founder May Have ‘Blood’ on His
Hands,  CNN (July 29, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/07/29/wikileaks.mullen.gates/
index.html.  A BBC report attributed a similar statement to Defense Secretary Robert Gates.
Brookes, supra note 59. R
63 The Iraq Archive: The Strands of a War, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2010, at A1.
64 Hans Hoyng et al., The WikiLeaks Iraq Logs: A Protocol of Barbarity, SPIEGEL ONLINE,
Oct. 25, 2010, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,724026,00.html.
65 Brookes, supra note 59. R
66 For an example, see Sabrina Tavernise & Andrew W. Lehren, Detainees Fared Worse in
Iraqi Hands, Logs Say, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2010, at A8.
67 “Mr. Morrell, of the Pentagon, told the BBC that the leak was a ‘travesty’ which pro-
vided enemies of the West with an ‘extraordinary database to figure out how we operate’.  He
said the cache of documents contained ‘nothing new’ with regards to fundamental policy is-
sues.  And he once again asked Wikileaks to remove the documents from the web and return
them to the Department of Defense.”  Brookes, supra note 59. R
68 Id.
69 John F. Burns & Ravi Somaiya, WikiLeaks Founder on the Run, Trailed by Notoriety,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/24/world/24assange.
html.\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\46-2\HLC209.txt unknown Seq: 16  6-JUN-11 13:54
326 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 46
use expensive encrypted cellphones and swaps his own the way
other men change shirts.  He checks into hotels under false names,
dyes his hair, sleeps on sofas and floors, and uses cash instead of
credit cards, often borrowed from friends.70
All the elements of the profile of an untrustworthy, shifty character are
presented in a breathless tone.  Here perhaps is the first textual evidence of
the major transition in the perception of Wikileaks in mainstream U.S. me-
dia.  In March 2010, the Times had described Wikileaks as The Little Engine
That Could of new media muckraking journalism.71  By mid-December,
Wikileaks would come to be described by Tom Friedman on the Times’ op-ed
page as one of two threatening alternatives to a strong, democratic America,
alongside an authoritarian China.72  In between these two descriptions of
Wikileaks, the Times’ profile of Assange marks the transition point.
D. The Last Straw:  The Embassy Cables
November 28, 2010 ushered in the next document release.  This release
was more careful and selective than any of the prior releases.  Apparently,
the caution came too late.  The release of the final batch was followed by a
massive escalation of attacks on Wikileaks as an organization and website
and on Assange as an individual.  It is the mismatch between what Wikileaks
in fact did in this final round and the multi-system attack on it that drives the
need for a deeper explanation.
The release of the State Department embassy cables (confidential inter-
nal communications from embassies to Washington) was the most profes-
sionally-mediated, conservatively-controlled release Wikileaks had
undertaken.  The document set included 251,287 cables.73  Unlike the previ-
ous document releases, this time Wikileaks worked almost exclusively
through established media organizations.  It made the documents available to
the Guardian, Der Spiegel, Le Monde, and El Pa´ ıs; the Guardian made the
documents available to the New York Times.74  Wikileaks also sought advice
from the U.S. State Department, just as the New York Times had, to aid in
redaction and to help it avoid causing damage.  Unlike the State Depart-
ment’s response to the traditional media organizations, Wikileaks’ letter was
met with a strongly-worded letter from the Department’s legal advisor, Har-
70 Id.
71 See Strom, supra note 22 (“[A] tiny online source of information and documents that R
governments and corporations around the world would prefer to keep secret.”).
72 Friedman, supra note 8. R
73 Scott Shane, Keeping Secrets WikiSafe, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2010, at WK1; US Em-
bassy Cables: The Background, BBC NEWS (Nov. 29, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-us-canada-11862320.
74 Shane, supra note 73; David Leigh, How 250,000 US Embassy Cables Were Leaked, R
THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 28, 2010, at 2, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/
28/how-us-embassy-cables-leaked.\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\46-2\HLC209.txt unknown Seq: 17  6-JUN-11 13:54
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old Koh, stating, “We will not engage in a negotiation regarding the further
release or dissemination of illegally obtained U.S. Government classified
materials” and demanding that Wikileaks simply not publish anything, re-
turn all documents, and destroy all copies in its possession.75  This, despite
the fact that the date of the letter is one day before revelation, and the text of
the letter explicitly states that the State Department knew of and consulted
with the mainstream news organizations that were about to publish the
materials, and therefore that if Wikileaks were to return all the materials, the
other media entities would have the freedom and professional obligation to
publish the materials.  The claim of illegality, coupled with a demand for
return of the documents, appears to reflect drafting that is grounded in the
Espionage Act, which applies to one who “willfully retains [any document
which] [the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of
the United States] and fails to deliver it on demand to the officer or em-
ployee of the United States entitled to receive it.”76  This legal strategy ap-
pears to have followed the model already set by the Pentagon during the
Afghan war logs release.77  Later reports from Wikileaks’ media partners
support the observation that the Obama Administration treated Wikileaks as
though it were in a fundamentally different category than it did the newspa-
pers.78  Wikileaks then proceeded to make publicly accessible on its own
website cables that had been published by at least one of these media organi-
zations, in the redacted form that those outlets had published.79  Despite the
actual care and coordinated release model that Wikileaks in fact practiced,
over 60% of print news reports at the time explicitly stated that Wikileaks
had released thousands of documents (usually over 250,000), and another
20% implied that it did so.80  In fact, over the course of the first month and
more, the site released a few hundred documents, limited almost exclusively
to those published and redacted by other organizations.
The contents of the overwhelming majority of released cables ranged
from the genuinely important (e.g., Saudi and Gulf state support for a U.S.
led attack on Iran to prevent proliferation; Yemeni acquiescence in U.S.
75 Letter from Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Jennifer Robin-
son, attorney for Julian Assange (Nov. 27, 2010), available at http://media.washingtonpost.
com/wpsrv/politics/documents/Dept_of_State_Assange_letter.pdf.
76 18 U.S.C. § 793(d) (2006).
77 Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell used language very similar to that which would be
used by the State Department’s legal counsel a few months later, claiming that the documents
threaten our forces and Afghan civilians, and demanding their return.  U.S. Dep’t of Defense,
News Transcript, DOD News Briefing with Geoff Morrell from the Pentagon (Aug. 5, 2010),
available at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=53001.
78 See infra note 149; Keller, supra note 54; Marcel Rosenbach & Holger Stark, Lifting R
the Lid on WikiLeaks: An Inside Look at Difficult Negotiations with Julian Assange, SPIEGEL
ONLINE, Jan. 28, 2011, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,742163,00.html.
79 Brett J. Blackledge & Jamey Keaten, Respected Media Outlets Collaborate with
WikiLeaks, ABC NEWS (Dec. 3, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=12302
107; Shane, supra note 73. R
80 See infra text accompanying notes 108–124. R\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\46-2\HLC209.txt unknown Seq: 18  6-JUN-11 13:54
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bombing on its own territory; U.S. spying on UN staff; U.S. intervention in
Spanish, German, and Italian prosecution processes aimed at U.S. military
and CIA personnel over human rights abuses of citizens of those countries;
the known corruption and ineptitude of Afghan President Hamid Karzai) to
the merely titillating (Libyan leader Muammar Gadaffi’s Ukrainian nurse de-
scribed as “voluptuous blonde”).  Although none broke ground in a way that
was likely to influence U.S. policy in a fundamental way, this was not al-
ways true of other countries.81  The most ambitious speculations, in the New
York Times and Foreign Policy, suggested that Wikileaks’ cables’ blunt de-
scriptions of the corruption of Tunisian President Ben Ali helped fuel the
revolution that ousted him in January 2011.82  Whether anything so funda-
mental can indeed be attributed to the embassy cables leak is doubtful, but
the sheer range of issues and countries touched, and continuous media atten-
tion for two months, make it undeniable that the Wikileaks U.S. embassy
cable release was a major news event that captured headlines all over the
world for weeks, providing a steady flow of small to mid-sized revelations
about the U.S. in particular and the world of high diplomacy more generally.
It was a major scoop, or, as the Guardian put it proudly, “the world’s biggest
leak.”83
Despite the generally benign character of the cables, one cable, one
response to a cable, and one threat to release all raise particular concerns
about potential damage.  The cable that raised the greatest concern was a
February 2009 cable listing “Critical Foreign Dependencies Initiative List,”
which listed specific facilities whose disruption would harm U.S. interests.84
These ranged from a Manganese mine in Gabon and undersea communica-
tions cables in China, to a pharmaceutical plant in Melbourne, Australia and
a Danish supplier of pediatric form insulin.85  Unlike the overwhelming ma-
jority of cables, this one appears to have been released initially by
81 Lists of the relevant cables are maintained by several news organizations.  One that
tracks releases by a wide range of organizations is the Guardian. See WikiLeaks Embassy
Cables, The Key Points at a Glance, GUARDIAN.CO.UK, Dec. 7, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.
uk/world/2010/nov/29/wikileaks-embassy-cables-key-points.  A shorter list is maintained by
the BBC. See At a Glance: Wikileaks Cables, BBC NEWS (Dec. 18, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.
uk/news/world-us-canada-11914040.
82 Elizabeth Dickinson, The First WikiLeaks Revolution?, FOREIGN POLICY (Jan. 13, 2011),
http://wikileaks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/13/wikileaks_and_the_tunisia_protests; Scott
Shane, Cables from American Diplomats Portray U.S. Ambivalence on Tunisia, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 16, 2011, at A14.
83 Leigh & Harding, supra note 54, at 16. R
84 See, e.g.,  At a Glance: Wikileaks Cables,  supra  note 81; Cable 09STATE15113, R
WIKILEAKS, http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/02/09STATE15113.html#par15 (last visited
Feb. 19, 2011).
85 In his annotations to the February 8, 2011 draft of this article, Julian Assange explained
that the “[n]ews value of this cable was two fold 1) to further show that US diplomats were
being illegally used to conduct foreign spying (it is explicitly stated in the cable to keep such
inquiries secret from the host government), and to reveal ‘assets’ the US might fight a war over
or otherwise use its diplomatic muscle to control.”  Assange Annotations, supra note 24. R\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\46-2\HLC209.txt unknown Seq: 19  6-JUN-11 13:54
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Wikileaks.86  The argument against this release, made at the time by the U.S.
government, was that it offered a target list for terrorists seeking to disrupt
critical global supplies by rendering critical dependencies transparent.87  The
second cable, or rather response to a cable, included a reference to
Zimbabwe Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai’s private support for sanctions
against the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe, providing an excuse for the
Mugabe regime to explore prosecuting Tsvangirai for treason.88  It appears
that this cable, like the majority of cables, was published at the same time
(and likely in coordination with) the Guardian.89  Furthermore, it is unclear
whether use of the cable as an excuse by a repressive regime to prosecute or
threaten its lead opponent is equivalent to revealing names of unknown
human rights workers, much less undercover operatives, who would not oth-
erwise be known to the regime.  Finally, in anticipation of the pressure, ar-
rest, and potential threats of assassination, Julian Assange threatened to
release a “poison pill,” a large cache of encrypted documents that is widely
replicated around the Net and that would be decrypted, presumably with
harmful consequences to the U.S., should he be arrested or assassinated.
This latter of the three events is the one most foreign to the normal course of
democratic investigation and publication.90  Depending on the contents of
the file, it could be a genuinely distinct, threatening event, and publication of
86 In his annotations to the February 8, 2011 draft of this article, Julian Assange reports
that this release was done in coordination with the Times of London, rather than with one of
the five main organizations that collaborated on the release. Id.
87 WikiLeaks Publishes List of Worldwide Infrastructure ‘Critical’ to Security of U.S.,
MSNBC.COM (Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40526224/ns/us_news-wikileaks
_in_security.
88 David Smith, Morgan Tsvangirai Faces Possible Zimbabwe Treason Charge, GUARD-
IAN.CO.UK,  Dec. 27, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/27/wikileaks-morgan-
tsvangirai-zimbabwe-sanctions.
89 The cable was posted to the Guardian on December 8, 2010 at 21:30 GMT. See US
Embassy Cables: Tsvangirai Tells US Mugabe Is Increasingly ‘Old, Tired and Poorly Briefed,’
GUARDIAN.CO.UK, Dec. 8, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-docu
ments/241595.  It was posted to Wikileaks that same day, apparently about an hour later. See
Cable 09HARARE1004, WIKILEAKS (Dec. 8, 2010, 22:31 GMT), http://213.251.145.96/cable/
2009/12/09HARARE1004.html.  Assange confirms that the release was coordinated and si-
multaneous.  Assange Annotations, supra note 24.  The release appears to fall within the prac- R
tice of following the judgment of the mainstream media organizations rather than releasing
independently.
90 In his annotations to the February 8, 2011 draft of this article, Assange explains:
This is absolutely false.  I have never used “poison pill,” nor ever made a threat.  I
have stated on many times that we have distributed backups, to insure that history
will not be destroyed.  If we are not in a position to continue publishing ourselves,
we, in understanding the significance of history, will release the passwords to these
backups of future publications to ensure that others can take up the work.  The disin-
centive is not of a threatening nature, but rather to make mass arrests, sabotage or
assassinations pointless exercises in prior restraint.
Assange Annotations, supra note 24.  This annotation suggests no misunderstanding.  The term R
“poison pill” implies a measure taken by a potential target of hostile action (originally, a
shareholder plan intended to dilute the holdings of the winner in a potential hostile corporate
takeovers battle in the 1980s) to make itself toxic to the predator consuming it.  This appears to
be the implication of this explanation as well.\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\46-2\HLC209.txt unknown Seq: 20  6-JUN-11 13:54
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the decryption key may be an appropriate target for suppression consistent
with First Amendment doctrine that permits constraining disclosure of “the
sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops.”91  It is
doubtful, however, that the contents of the insurance file would fall under
that category, assuming that the entire set of cables is not fundamentally
different from those that were released and recognizing that none of the
cables were classified in top-secret categories.
II. THE RESPONSE: A MULTI-SYSTEM ATTACK ON WIKILEAKS
The response to the Wikileaks embassy cable release in the United
States was dramatic and sharp.  The integrated, cross-system attack on
Wikileaks, led by the U.S. government with support from other govern-
ments, private companies, and online vigilantes, provides an unusually crisp
window into the multi-system structure of freedom and constraint in the
networked environment and helps us to map the emerging networked fourth
estate.  The attack’s failure provides us with insight into how freedom of
action is preserved primarily by bobbing and weaving between systems to
avoid the constraints of those subsystems under attack and harness the af-
fordances of those that are out of reach of the attacker.  The response also
highlights the challenges that a radically decentralized global networked
public sphere poses for those systems of control that developed in the second
half of the twentieth century to tame the fourth estate—to make the press not
only “free,” but also “responsible.”  Doing so allows us to understand that
the threat represented by Wikileaks was not any single cable, but the fraying
of the relatively loyal and safe relationship between the U.S. government
and its watchdog.  Nothing captures that threat more ironically than the spec-
tacle of Judith Miller, the disgraced New York Times reporter who yoked that
newspaper’s credibility to the Bush Administration’s propaganda campaign
regarding Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction in the run-up to the Iraq War,92
using Fox News as a platform to criticize Julian Assange for neglecting the
journalist’s duty of checking his sources and instead providing raw cables to
the public.93  The criticism is particularly ironic in light of the fact that de-
spite all the attacks on the cables’ release, the arguments were never that the
cables were inauthentic.
It is important to emphasize that the myriad forms of attack on
Wikileaks that I describe in the coming pages are unlikely to represent a
single coordinated response by an all-knowing Administration bent on cen-
sorship.  Mostly, they appear to represent a series of acts by agents, both
91 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
92 See Jack Shafer, The Exorcism of the New York Times, SLATE (Oct. 20, 2010, 6:52 PM),
http://www.slate.com/id/2128429.
93 Judith Miller Criticizes Julian Assange For Not Verifying Sources, VIDEO CAF´ E (Jan.
2, 2011, 7:59 AM), http://videocafe.crooksandliars.com/scarce/judith-miller-criticizes-julian-
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public and private, that feed into each other to produce an effect that is
decidedly inconsistent with the kind of freedom of the press and freedom of
speech to which the United States is committed.  That no distinct attack pat-
tern that I describe clearly violates Wikileaks’ constitutional rights as against
the state is no salve; indeed, it is precisely the vulnerability to destructive
attacks, none of which is in itself illegal but that together effectively circum-
vent the purposes of constitutionality and legality that requires our attention.
A. Sociopolitical Framing: Situating Wikileaks in the
Frame of the War on Terror
The political attack on Wikileaks as an organization and on Julian As-
sange as its public face was launched almost immediately upon release of
the cables.  Their defining feature was to frame the event not as journalism,
irresponsible or otherwise, but as a dangerous, anarchic attack on the model
of the super-empowered networks of terrorism out to attack the U.S.  The
first salvo was fired by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who stated, “Let’s
be clear: This disclosure is not just an attack on America’s foreign policy
interests. . . .  It is an attack on the international community—the alliances
and partnerships, the conversations and negotiations, that safeguard global
security and advance economic prosperity.”94  The trope of an attack on the
international community provided the backdrop for a series of comments
aimed at delegitimizing Wikileaks and locating it in the same corner, in
terms of threats to the United States, as global terrorism.  This was the back-
drop for Vice President Biden’s statement that Wikileaks founder Julian As-
sange is “more like a high-tech terrorist than the Pentagon Papers.”95  This
assessment was not uniformly supported by the Administration.  Defense
Secretary Robert Gates called the public response “overwrought,” and con-
cluded with:  “Is this embarrassing?  Yes.  Is it awkward?  Yes.  Conse-
quences for U.S. foreign policy?  I think fairly modest.”96  Echoing this
sentiment, the German Interior Minister described the revelations as “annoy-
ing for Germany, but not a threat.”97  These measured voices did not prevail
in the first few weeks after the disclosures began.
The invitation by Secretary Clinton and Vice President Biden to re-
spond to dissemination of confidential information as an assault on our na-
tional pride and integrity, on par with terrorism, was complemented by calls
to use the techniques that the U.S. has adopted in its “War on Terror”
against Julian Assange or Wikileaks as a site.  Bob Beckel, the Fox News
94 Glenn Kessler, Clinton, in Kazakhstan for Summit, Will Face Leaders Unhappy over
WikiLeaks Cables, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/30/AR2010113001095.html.
95 Biden Makes Case For Assange As A ‘High-Tech Terrorist,’ supra note 6. R
96 DOD News Briefing, supra note 5. R
97 Holger Stark & Marcel Rosenbach, ‘WikiLeaks Is Annoying, But Not a Threat,’SPIEGEL
ONLINE, Dec. 20, 2010, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,735587,00.html.\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\46-2\HLC209.txt unknown Seq: 22  6-JUN-11 13:54
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commentator who had been a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the
Carter Administration and had been campaign manager to Walter Mondale,
said, “‘A dead man can’t leak stuff . . . . This guy’s a traitor, he’s treasonous,
and he has broken every law of the United States.  And I’m not for the death
penalty, so . . . there’s only one way to do it: illegally shoot the son of a
bitch.’” 98  This proposal was met with universal agreement by the panel on
the program.99  Republican Representative Pete King, then-incoming Chair-
man of the House Homeland Security Committee, sought to have Wikileaks
declared a foreign terrorist organization.100  Right-wing commentators
picked up this line.  William Kristol wrote in the Weekly Standard:
Why can’t we act forcefully against WikiLeaks?  Why can’t we use
our various assets to harass, snatch or neutralize Julian Assange
and his collaborators, wherever they are?  Why can’t we disrupt
and destroy WikiLeaks in both cyberspace and physical space, to
the extent possible?  Why can’t we warn others of repercussions
from assisting this criminal enterprise hostile to the United
States?101
He concludes with the remarkable statement: “Acting together to degrade,
defeat, and destroy WikiLeaks should be the first topic discussed at today’s
White House meeting between the president and the congressional leader-
ship.”102  Sarah Palin linked to this commentary on her Twitter feed, and on
her Facebook page stated that Assange “is an anti-American operative with
blood on his hands.  His past posting of classified documents revealed the
identity of more than 100 Afghan sources to the Taliban.  Why was he not
pursued with the same urgency we pursue Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders?”103
By the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, these statements
show that we in the United States know quite well what to do to terrorists or
suspected terrorists.  Whether one uses the euphemisms of “targeted kill-
ings,” “extraordinary renditions,” and “enhanced interrogations,” or simply
calls things by their names—assassination, kidnapping, and torture—these
practices have become a standard, if controversial, part of the U.S. arsenal in
its war on terror since the early days after September 11th.  While the
98 Fox News’ Bob Beckel Calls For ‘Illegally’ Killing Assange: ‘A Dead Man Can’t Leak
Stuff’ (VIDEO), THE HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 7, 2010, 5:50 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2010/12/07/fox-news-bob-beckel-calls_n_793467.html.
99 See id.
100 Michael O’Brien, Republican Wants WikiLeaks Labeled As Terrorist Group, THE HILL
(Nov. 29, 2010, 8:38 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/130863-top-
republican-designate-wikileaks-as-a-terrorist-org.
101 William Kristol, Whack Wikileaks, THE WEEKLY STANDARD (Nov. 30, 2010, 8:25 AM),
http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/whack-wikileaks_520462.html.
102 Id.
103 Peter Grier, WikiLeaks’ Julian Assange, Does Sarah Palin Think CIA Should ‘Neutral-
ize’ Him?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 30, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/
The-Vote/2010/1130/WikiLeaks-Julian-Assange-Does-Sarah-Palin-think-CIA-should-neutral
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Obama Administration has renounced torture, it has embraced targeted kill-
ings as a legitimate part of its own war on terror,104 and chosen as a matter of
stated policy to turn a blind eye to the illegality of the Bush Administration’s
torture program.105  As a result, these continue to be options that can be pub-
licly proposed by major public outlets and speakers.  They remain part of the
legitimate range of options for discussion.
It is unthinkable that the U.S. will in fact assassinate Assange.  But the
range of actions open to both government and non-government actors is in
important ways constrained by our understanding of the social frame, or so-
cial context in which we find ourselves.106  The legal options that the Justice
Department thinks about when confronted with a case of a journalist who
publishes sensitive materials are fundamentally different than those it thinks
about when it is developing a prosecution strategy against terrorism sus-
pects.  The pressure to cut off payment systems flows is fundamentally dif-
ferent when considering whether to cut off payments to a politically odious
group than when considering cutting off payments to a terrorist organization.
It is very difficult to understand the political and market dynamics that could
have led to the decision by MasterCard and Visa to cut off payments to
Wikileaks except against the background of the framing efforts that located
Wikileaks in the same rubric as the Taliban, rather than the same rubric as
the New York Times or the Progressive.107
B. Media Misinformation and Misdirection
Traditional media outlets provided substantial support for the Adminis-
tration’s framing by exaggerating the number of cables and implying a care-
less approach to their release.  A study of major print newspaper stories that
mentioned the quantity of cables during the first two weeks after the Novem-
ber 28th release shows that a substantial majority of newspapers stated as
fact that Wikileaks had “released,” “published,” or “posted on its site,”
“thousands” or “over 250,000” cables.108  About 20% of the stories in major
104 Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Address at the Annual Meeting of the
American Society of International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/
releases/remarks/139119.htm.
105 As the President put it explicitly, in response to questions about investigating the tor-
ture of Spanish citizens at Guantanamo:  “I’m a strong believer that it’s important to look
forward and not backwards, and to remind ourselves that we do have very real security threats
out there.”  Sam Stein, Obama On Spanish Torture Investigation: I Prefer To Look Forward,
THE HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 16, 2009, 11:51 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04/
16/obama-on-spanish-torture_n_187710.html (reporting on a CNN en Espanol interview with
President Obama on April 15, 2009).
106 See, e.g., ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS (1974).
107 United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979); Howard Mor-
land, The H-bomb Secret, THE PROGRESSIVE, Nov. 1979, at 3, available at http://www.progres
sive.org/images/pdf/1179.pdf.
108 The data was collected from the Lexis-Nexis database on January 29, 2011.  The date
range searched was November 28, 2010 to January 14, 2011.  The dataset was “Major News-
papers.”  The search string was purposefully broad:  “wikileaks w/25 ((thousands or 250,000)\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\46-2\HLC209.txt unknown Seq: 24  6-JUN-11 13:54
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newspapers were clear and accurate on the question of how many cables
were released at that time and how vetted and redacted the published cables
were.  Typical of this type of story are Chicago Tribune and Los Angeles
Times reports from November 30, 2010:  “WikiLeaks released 272 diplo-
matic cables from a trove of more than 250,000.  The remainder are to be
dribbled out for maximum impact, group members say.”109
The existence of a substantial minority of accurate reports underscores
the degree of misleading information published in the majority of stories
during the initial period after release, when public perceptions of Wikileaks
and Assange were being framed.  Reports categorized as being unambigu-
ously misleading included sentences such as “WikiLeaks showed relatively
little such discretion in its online posting of more than 250,000 diplomatic
cables,”110 or “thousands of State Department cables, just released by
WikiLeaks, were providing a glimpse into what U.S. diplomats really
thought.”111  Sixty-eight out of 111 stories coded made these kinds of claims.
Another twenty stories were more ambiguous.  These stories used characteri-
zations that were truthful but easily misinterpreted as describing a full
release.112
Reporting of the events at the time suggests not so much a conspiracy
but confusion and lack of clarity about the facts.  Some papers published
reports that contradicted each other from one day to the next, sometimes
even in the same edition.  For example, on November 29, 2010, the Chicago
Tribune published three stories:  in one it accurately said that hundreds of
thousands of cables were “obtained” by Wikileaks,113 in another it misstated
“more than 250,000 U.S. diplomatic cables released Sunday by the Web site
WikiLeaks,”114 and in a third it ambiguously wrote:  “The online whistle-
blower site WikiLeaks began publishing more than 250,000 diplomatic
cables from U.S. embassies around the world Sunday.”115  On November
/7 cables).”  The resulting 353 reports were manually coded to exclude non-U.S. publications,
and then identified as “thousands” or “250,000” released; “correct” or “ambiguous.”
109 Paul Richter, U.S. Tries to Contain Damage; WikiLeaks Cables Reverberate in Global
Hot Spots, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 30, 2010, at C12; U.S. Rushes to Reassure Edgy Allies, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 30, 2010, at A1.
110 Editorial, Undiplomatic Tales; On the WikiLeaks Revelations, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 30,
2010, at A17.
111 Clinton Treads Carefully in Leading Massive Damage-Control Campaign,  WASH.
POST, Nov. 30, 2010, at A13.
112 The Associated Press in particular was careful not to say that 250,000 cables were
released, but rather said that Wikileaks “began publishing” the 250,000 documents.  This was
true at the time, but was coded in this study as “ambiguous” relative to the much clearer
stories explaining the limited nature of the release. See, e.g., David Stringer, British Court
Grants Bail to WikiLeaks’ Julian Assange, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 14, 2010.
113 Kristen Schorsch, Leak: Afghan President’s Brother Loves Lakeview, CHI. TRIB., Nov.
29, 2010, at C3 (correctly categorized in the data set).
114 Cable Leaks: U.S. Urged to Hit Iran; Latest WikiLeaks Release Also Says U.S. Envoys
Spied on Counterparts, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 29, 2010, at C1 (incorrectly categorized in the dataset
as “thousands”).
115 Return of WikiLeaks; White House Says New Round of Document Releases Puts Lives
at Risk, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 29, 2010, at 3 (categorized as ambiguous).\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\46-2\HLC209.txt unknown Seq: 25  6-JUN-11 13:54
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30th, the Christian Science Monitor misleadingly referred to “hundreds of
thousands of cables released by Wikileaks,”116 but in other stories used a
more ambiguous phrasing117 and an accurate description.118
Capturing the treatment of television is less comprehensive and much
can be missed.  Conclusions made here about television coverage are thus
more tentative.  An identical search of transcripts available in the Lexis-
Nexis database suggests that Fox News and CBS News consistently misre-
ported the number of cables released.  For example, CBS Evening News in-
cluded a statement that “Assange and WikiLeaks deny that their publication
of 250,000 State Department cables put the lives of spies or diplomats at
risk;”119 the CBS News show Sunday Morning stated, “A week after pub-
lishing those thousands of secret U.S. diplomatic cables, WikiLeaks is strug-
gling to stay online;”120 and The Early Show included the statement, “Those
classified cables over two hundred and fifty thousand of them were released
by the whistle-blowing website WikiLeaks.  In a move that White House
calls reckless . . . .”121  NBC had a more mixed record. NBC Nightly News
stated: “Now to the latest on Wikileaks.  One week after the release of hun-
dreds of thousands of State Department cables, after companies in this coun-
try and France took down the Wikileaks Web site, Sweden and Switzerland
became the main access points.  As for the man behind Wikileaks, he says he
continues to receive death threats.”122  Three weeks later, however, the To-
day show explicitly stated that “WikiLeaks has so far released less than 1
percent of the classified documents it claims to have [obtained].”123  ABC
had fewer reports, but the December 1st episode of Good Morning America
stated that “We’re gonna turn now to more fallout from the WikiLeaks re-
lease of thousands of diplomatic cables.”124  CNN had many more reports,
and, like the print newspapers, included descriptions regarding the number
116 Marisa L. Porges, ‘We Cannot Deal with These People’: WikiLeaks Shows True Feel-
ings on Guant´ anamo, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 30, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/
Commentary/Opinion/2010/1130/We-cannot-deal-with-these-people-WikiLeaks-shows-true-
feelings-on-Guantanamo.
117 Sara Miller Llana, Ecuador and Venezuela Compete to Praise WikiLeaks’ Julian As-
sange, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 30, 2010 (“The Venezuelan president seems to seize
every chance to criticize the United States, and he didn’t miss a beat by praising the ‘bravery’
of controversial website WikiLeaks—which is releasing a cache of 250,000 classified US dip-
lomatic cables—and calling for the resignation of US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.”).
That is, Christian Science Monitor continued to use the “this hurts America” frame.
118 Ariel Zirulnick, WikiLeaks: What the World is Saying, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov.
30, 2010 (“The latest WikiLeaks trove of 250,000 diplomatic cables, obtained in advance by
five news outlets, has generated enough fodder in the US alone to occupy American readers.
But people all over, from Germany to Lebanon to Australia, are also talking about the some-
times troubling, sometimes mundane cables that WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange is gradu-
ally releasing for public consumption.”).
119 CBS Evening News, Saturday Edition (CBS television broadcast Jan. 8, 2011).
120 Sunday Morning (CBS television broadcast Dec. 5, 2010).
121 The Early Show (CBS television broadcast Nov. 29, 2010).
122 NBC Nightly News (NBC television broadcast Dec. 5, 2010).
123 Today (NBC television broadcast Dec. 24, 2010).
124 Good Morning America (ABC television broadcast Dec. 1, 2010).\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\46-2\HLC209.txt unknown Seq: 26  6-JUN-11 13:54
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of cables actually released, ranging from precise reports to claims of profli-
gate release.
FIGURE 1: FREQUENCY OF TERMS USED IN STORIES MENTIONING WIKILEAKS
AUGUST 2010-JANUARY 2011
2010-10-01 2011-01-02
embassy
molestation
rape
Iraq
A second dimension of media coverage that merits note is the relatively
heavy emphasis on the sexual molestation charges against Assange in Swe-
den.  It is not difficult to understand why media outlets that need to sell copy
would add sex and violence to politics and diplomacy.  The Swedish prose-
cution made for a salacious story too reminiscent of what Bill Keller, execu-
tive editor of the New York Times, would later call “a missing Stieg Larsson
novel”125 to pass up.  One need not hold the position that there was a con-
spiracy involved in reporting on the rape investigation to see that it is what
formed the foundation for the depiction of Assange as a “hunted man.”126
At an aggregate level, it is possible to observe an interference pattern created
by the rape or molestation charge in media coverage of Wikileaks.  The in-
terference pattern is neither perfectly matched nor completely effective, but
is clearly identifiable in a timeline of the frequency, in twenty-five top main-
stream media outlets in the U.S., of the terms “Iraq,” “embassy,” “rape,”
and “molestation” in stories that mention “Wikileaks” between August
2010 and January 2011.127
125 Keller, supra note 54. R
126 Burns & Somaiya, supra note 69. R
127 Data collected and analyzed using Media Cloud.  See MEDIA C LOUD, http://www.
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C. Direct Legal Action: Espionage Act, Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, and Conspiracy
Within a week of the initial release of the cables, Democratic Senator
and Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee Dianne Feinstein called
for Assange’s prosecution under the Espionage Act of 1917.128  The call for
using the Espionage Act of 1917 is a remarkable exercise in historical amne-
sia.  It is consistent, however, with the wording of both the Pentagon’s re-
sponse in August and the State Department’s letter in November.129  The Act
was the primary legal tool developed in what was “one of the most fiercely
repressive periods in American history.”130  Efforts by judges, most promi-
nently Learned Hand in the Masses case,131 to constrain its use to preserve
press freedom failed, and courts of appeals followed the approach that the
government had the power to punish publication of materials that had a
“natural and probable tendency” to produce the result that the Act was in-
tended to prevent.132  Under the Act, Rose Pastor Stokes was convicted to ten
years imprisonment for saying in a public meeting, “I am for the people and
the government is for the profiteers”133; although her conviction was over-
turned on appeal.134  Others were not as fortunate.  A film director, Robert
Goldstein, received a ten-year term for producing a movie about the Revolu-
tionary War that portrayed not only the Midnight Ride, the signing of the
Declaration of Independence, and Valley Forge, but also the Wyoming Val-
ley Massacre, showing British soldiers bayoneting women and children.135
The trial court found that these depictions “may have a tendency or effect of
sowing . . . animosity or want of confidence between us and our allies.”136
Goldstein’s ten-year prison term was not overturned, but was later commuted
by Woodrow Wilson.137  Eugene V. Debs would have to wait for President
Warren G. Harding to be released, alongside other “political prisoners”
128 Dianne Feinstein, Op-Ed., Prosecute Assange under the Espionage Act, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 7, 2010, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870398900457565
3280626335258.html.
129 See supra, notes 76-77 and text accompanying notes (describing how the language R
used in both the Pentagon and State Department documents, concerning threat to U.S. forces,
illegality of origin, and demand for return are consistent with laying the foundations of the
elements of an offense under the Espionage Act against a person possessing documents).
130 GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIMES FROM THE SEDITION
ACT OF 1789 TO THE W AR ON T ERRORISM 153 (2004).
131 Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 542–43 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
132 See STONE, supra note 130, at 171 (quoting Shaffer v. United States, 255 F. 886 (9th R
Cir. 1919)).
133 Id. at 171–72.
134 Stokes v. United States, 264 F. 18, 26 (8th Cir. 1920).
135 STONE, supra note 130, at 173. R
136 Id. (citing United States v. Motion Picture Film “The Spirit of ‘76,” 252 F. 946,
947–48 (D. Cal. 1918)).
137 Revive “Spirit of ‘76,” Film Barred in 1917, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1921, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=F50D14FD3C5A1B7A93C6A8178CD8
5F458285F9; see also Timothy Noah, The Unluckiest Man in Movie History, SLATE (June 13,
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prosecuted under the Act during World War I.138  As a matter of law, parts of
the Act are indeed on the books.  As a matter of constitutional culture, in-
voking the Espionage Act against an act of public expression is more akin to
calling for the prosecution of dissenters under the Sedition Act of 1789.
News reports suggest that the Justice Department is considering prosecution,
but likely under a theory of conspiracy to violate one of several other provi-
sions, like the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.139  As I discuss in Part III,
this path of attack is effectively blocked by the First Amendment.  Here, in
painting the dimensions of the attack on Wikileaks, I note only the most
obvious form of government action:  prosecution, subject to the require-
ments of legality, due process, and constitutional protections for free speech.
D. Will no one rid me of this turbulent priest?  Denial-of-Service Attacks
by an Extralegal Public-Private Partnership
i. Technical Infrastructure Denial of Service
Beginning a few hours after the release of the first embassy cables, the
Wikileaks site came under a distributed-denial-of-service (“DDoS”) at-
tack.140  A pattern of denial-of-service attacks continued over the next few
weeks.  It is difficult to pin down whether these attacks came from govern-
ment bodies, and if so, whether from one of the countries fearing embarrass-
ing revelations or from the United States.141  News reports about the initial
set of attacks emphasized the self-congratulatory tweets of a hacker who
took the name “Jester” and claimed responsibility for some of these attacks:
because Wikileaks is “attempting to endanger the lives of our troops, ‘other
assets’ & foreign relations.”142  The sheer scale of the attacks, on the one
hand, and the technique adopted by the Jester, which was not DDoS, on the
other hand, suggest that the Jester was merely taking responsibility for the
acts of other sources of attack that have not been identified or reported upon,
138 Harding Frees Debs and 23 Others Held for War Violations, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24,
1921, available at http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9B0DE2D71539E133
A25757C2A9649D946095D6CF.
139 Charlie Savage, Building A Case For Conspiracy By Wikileaks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,
2010, at A1.
140 Charles Arthur, WikiLeaks Under Attack: The Definitive Timeline,  GUARDIAN.CO.UK,
Jan. 8, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/dec/07/wikileaks-under-attack-definitive-
timeline.
141 The 2008 Pentagon report identified China, Israel, and Russia as having developed and
deployed denial-of-service attack capabilities against terrorist or dissident websites.  Pentagon
Report, supra note 21, at 21.  In his annotations to the February 8, 2010 version of this article, R
Assange expresses the belief that the scale of the attack, together with the fact that “ [t]here is
almost no-one in the capable computer underground that is opposed to WikiLeaks on political
or philosophical grounds” supports the inference that the attacks were state-based.  Assange
Annotations, supra note 24. R
142 Nathan Olivarez-Giles, ‘Hacktivist’ Takes Credit for WikiLeaks Attacks via Twitter,
L.A. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2011, 6:19 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2010/11/
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at least in the early stages, using a relatively small number of machines
located in Russia, eastern Europe, and Thailand.143  In describing any DDoS
attack, identifying the culprits is extremely difficult, if not impossible.  What
is quite clear is that one response Wikileaks adopted was to move its data to
Amazon’s cloud hosting services, where it would be safe from such attacks
because of the sheer size and sophistication of the hosting site.144  This move,
in turn, made it vulnerable to a new threat.
On December 1, 2010 Senator Joe Lieberman, Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Homeland Security, launched a different kind of denial-of-
service attack.  Lieberman released a statement in which he stated:
I call on any other company or organization that is hosting
Wikileaks to immediately terminate its relationship with them.
Wikileaks’ illegal, outrageous, and reckless acts have compro-
mised our national security and put lives at risk around the world.
No responsible company—whether American or foreign—should
assist Wikileaks in its efforts to disseminate these stolen
materials.145
The response to Lieberman’s call was swift and wide ranging.  That
same day, Amazon, which hosted Wikileaks’ embassy cables on its cloud
computing platform, removed Wikileaks’ content.146  Amazon denied that it
had acted under government pressure, but its own denial notice clearly stated
that it made a judgment that the content did not belong to Amazon, was
likely damaging, could not have been properly redacted, and therefore vio-
lated the company’s terms of service.147  In other words, Amazon was mak-
ing precisely the determination that a government official making a decision
to impose prior restraint would have to make.  Because the company appar-
143 Craig Labovitz, Wikileaks Cablegate Attack, ARBOR NETWORKS (Nov. 29, 2010, 1:17
PM), http://asert.arbornetworks.com/2010/11/wikileaks-cablegate-attack; Craig Labovitz,
Round 2 DDoS against Wikileaks, ARBOR NETWORKS (Nov. 30, 2010, 4:51 PM), http://asert.
arbornetworks.com/2010/11/round2-ddos-versus-wikileaks; Ethan Zuckerman, If Amazon Has
Silenced Wikileaks . . ., MY H EART’SI N  A CCRA (Dec. 01, 2010, 6:38 PM), http://www.
ethanzuckerman.com/blog/2010/12/01/if-amazon-has-silenced-wikileaks.
144 Zuckerman, supra note 143. R
145 Arthur, supra note 140. R
146 Ewen MacAskill, WikiLeaks Website Pulled by Amazon after US Political Pressure,
THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 2, 2010, at 11, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/dec/
01/wikileaks-website-cables-servers-amazon.  Most readers will know Amazon from its e-
commerce site; Amazon is also a major provider of consumer-grade cloud computing platform
services, and Wikileaks was using its platform to host the cables.
147 AMAZON W EB SERVICES, http://aws.amazon.com/message/65348:
It’s clear that WikiLeaks doesn’t own or otherwise control all the rights to this classi-
fied content.  Further, it is not credible that the extraordinary volume of 250,000
classified documents that WikiLeaks is publishing could have been carefully re-
dacted in such a way as to ensure that they weren’t putting innocent people in jeop-
ardy. . . . [W]hen companies or people go about securing and storing large quantities
of data that isn’t rightfully theirs, and publishing this data without ensuring it won’t
injure others, it’s a violation of our terms of service . . . .\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\46-2\HLC209.txt unknown Seq: 30  6-JUN-11 13:54
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ently acted without direct order from the government, this decision is unre-
viewable by a court.  Given what we know of the materials as they have
come out to this point, there is little likelihood that an official order to re-
move the materials would have succeeded in surmounting the high barriers
erected by First Amendment doctrine in cases of prior restraint.  The fact that
the same effect was sought to be achieved through a public statement by an
official, executed by voluntary action of a private company, suggests a deep
vulnerability of the checks imposed by the First Amendment in the context
of a public sphere built entirely of privately-owned infrastructure.148
The next private infrastructure to deny service to Wikileaks was Ever-
yDNS, the registration company that provided domain name service to
Wikileaks.  The company ceased to point the domain name “wikileaks.org”
to the site.  When EveryDNS removed service, Internet users who would
type “www.wikileaks.org” into their URL bar, or users who clicked on on-
line links to the main Wikileaks site would come up with nothing.  The site
was quickly up and running again, however, using the Swiss domain name
wikileaks.ch.  The content itself was hosted on servers in Sweden and
France.149  EveryDNS issued a notice claiming that they cut off Wikileaks
because the site was subject to massive DDoS attacks that adversely affected
its other clients.  In an amusing “protest too much” moment, the company’s
notice ended with:  “Lastly, regardless of what people say about the actions
of EveryDNS.net, we know this much is true—we believe in our New
Hampshire state motto, ‘Live Free or Die.’”150  When it became clear that the
materials were now hosted by a French firm, the French Industry Minister,
Eric Bresson, called upon Internet companies to deny service and not to host
the cables.151  Two days later, the French company OVH, which was hosting
the embassy cables, went offline.  The cables were moved to a server hosted
by the Pirate Party in Sweden, a political party dedicated to digital copyright
reform in Sweden.  Beginning the next day, the party’s server, on which the
cables were hosted, came under massive DDoS attacks.  These were not,
however, sufficient to disrupt service significantly.  The last major distribu-
tion infrastructure company to deny service to Wikileaks content (albeit indi-
rectly) was Apple, which removed an iPhone App, developed and sold by a
developer with no connections to Wikileaks, providing access to the infor-
mation Wikileaks made available free online.  Apple’s formal reason was the
claimed illegality and harm caused by the materials.152
148 See Michael D. Birnhack & Niva Elkin-Koren, The Invisible Handshake: The
Reemergence of the State in the Digital Environment, 8 VA. J.L. & TECH. 6, 48–53 (2003).
149 Arthur, supra note 140. R
150 Id.
151 Josh Halliday & Angelique Chrisafis, WikiLeaks: France Adds to US Pressure to Ban
Website,  GUARDIAN.CO.UK, Dec. 3, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/dec/03/
wikileaks-france-ban-website.
152 Andy Greenberg, Apple Nixes Wikileaks iPhone App. Will Google Follow?, FORBES
(Dec. 21, 2010, 6:33 AM), http://blogs.forbes.com/andygreenberg/2010/12/21/apple-nixes-
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ii. Payment Systems Disruption
Wikileaks is a nonprofit that depends on donations from around the
world to fund its operation.  A second system that came under attack on a
model parallel to the attack on technical infrastructure was the payment sys-
tem.  The first platform to go was PayPal, which suspended service to
Wikileaks on Saturday, December 4, 2010.  That Wednesday, the company’s
vice president of platform, mobile, and new ventures stated:
What happened is that on November 27th [the day before
Wikileaks began releasing cables] the State Department, the U.S.
government basically, wrote a letter saying that the Wikileaks ac-
tivities were deemed illegal in the United States.  And so our pol-
icy group had to take a decision to suspend the account. . . . It was
straightforward from our point of view.153
The letter was not necessarily evidence of direct pressure from the State
Department on PayPal, however, but rather a reference by PayPal to the
letter sent by Harold Koh to Wikileaks as evidence that Wikileaks engaged
in illegality, and hence violated the company’s terms of service.154  That let-
ter, however, stated that the materials were provided to Wikileaks illegally,
not that their publication by Wikileaks was illegal.  It was a careful piece of
lawyering, insinuating, but not asserting, illegality on the part of Wikileaks
itself.155  That PayPal would act so swiftly against a client, misstating the
illegality and identifying the State Department as its source all strongly sug-
gest that even if the action was not directly coordinated with the U.S. gov-
ernment, the company certainly thought it was implementing the policy that
Senator Lieberman had called for and was the course of action desired by the
government.
The other major payment systems followed soon thereafter.  On Mon-
day, December 6th, MasterCard announced that “MasterCard is taking ac-
tion to ensure that WikiLeaks can no longer accept MasterCard-branded
products.”156  That same day, the Swiss postal bank shut down Julian As-
sange’s personal bank account because, the bank’s announcement stated, he
“provided false information regarding his place of residence during the ac-
count opening process.”157  The irony of a Swiss bank shutting a bank ac-
app was removed because “[a]pps must comply with all local laws and may not put an indi-
vidual or targeted group in harms way”); Alexis Tsotsis, Apple Removes Wikileaks App from
App Store, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 20, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/12/20/apple-removes-
wikileaks-app-from-app-store.
153 Arthur, supra note 140 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). R
154 See Letter from Harold Hongju Koh, supra note 75. R
155 See infra, Part IV.  The demand made in the letter, coupled with the assertion of injury,
may itself have been crafted to create a potential violation of the Espionage Act.  See supra
notes 76-77 and accompanying text. R
156 Arthur, supra note 140. R
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count because its owner provided less-than-transparent information about his
residential address is practically more revealing than a frank admission of a
political decision.  Visa followed suit the next day, and Bank of America ten
days after that.158
The pattern of attack through the payment system was similar to the
pattern of the attack on the technical system.  The initial impetus from the
rhetoric equating Wikileaks with global terrorism was followed by Senator
Lieberman’s express request that U.S. companies cut Wikileaks off.  The
companies then complied, and the U.S. government did nothing to distance
itself from these acts.  Indeed, when MasterCard came under attack for its
actions, Senator Lieberman publicly came to its support.159  If we were to
consider what judicial process would be required for the government to exert
this kind of force directly—cutting off technical infrastructures and exclud-
ing an organization from the payment systems—because of the content of
information that organization disseminated, the barriers in law would have
been practically insurmountable.  However, the implicit alliance—a public-
private partnership between the firms that operate the infrastructure and the
government that encourages them to help in its war on terror, embodied by
this particularly irritating organization—was able to achieve extra-legally
much more than law would have allowed the state to do by itself.
iii. Organizational Power
On December 3, 2010, the Office of Management and Budget issued a
memorandum to the various government departments, emphasizing that the
Wikileaks documents were still classified, and that access to them remained
subject to all the legal limitations appropriate to their classification.160  As a
result, a wide range of federal agencies prohibited or technically blocked
their employees from reading the Wikileaks materials online from their fed-
eral computers.
Perhaps the most symbolic of these was that patrons of the Library of
Congress could not read materials available everywhere else in the world
“because applicable law obligates federal agencies to protect classified in-
158 Tom Murphy, Bank of America Stops Handling WikiLeaks Payments, YAHOO! FINANCE
(Dec. 18, 2010), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/Bank-of-America-stops-apf-3526927234.html.
A statement from the bank said that “[t]his decision is based upon our reasonable belief that
WikiLeaks may be engaged in activities that are, among other things, inconsistent with our
internal policies for processing payments.” Id.  In the case of Bank of America, since it was
rumored at the time to be the potential target of leaked materials held by WikiLeaks, the other
financial institutions’ decision probably gave cover to the bank’s own need to see WikiLeaks
deterred and shut down, rather than response to pressure.
159 Ryan Singel, Key Lawmakers Up Pressure on WikiLeaks and Defend Visa and Master-
Card, THREAT L EVEL (WIRED) (Dec. 9, 2010, 3:27 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/
2010/12/wikileaks-congress-pressure.
160 David de Sola, U.S. Agencies Warn Unauthorized Employees Not to Look at
WikiLeaks, CNN (Dec. 4, 2010, 3:05 AM), http://edition.cnn.com/2010/US/12/03/wikileaks.
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formation.  Unauthorized disclosures of classified documents do not alter the
documents’ classified status or automatically result in declassification of the
documents.”161  One wonders whether this meant that congressional staff or
the Congressional Research Service, too, were disabled from reaching the
cables to make their own independent judgment about the events.  At least as
ironic was the result that employees in the U.S. Department of Defense were
not permitted to read cables available to every terrorist and foreign intelli-
gence analyst with a computer and a terminal.162  Plainly, these blocks could
not possibly do anything to limit further leakage of already-leaked docu-
ments.  It also seems highly implausible that these blocks represented an
effort to prevent federal employees from seeing the paucity of the threat—
and the exaggerated nature of the response—for themselves.  Much more
likely is that these were uncoordinated acts intended as public performances
of allegiance in the face of threat to the national pride.  More than most other
acts we have seen, these public announcements suggest a futile panic
response.
The internal moves within the government translated through other or-
ganizational systems into constraints on reading and accessing the materials
elsewhere.  Most clearly, these are represented in a series of memoranda that
university offices of career services throughout the country sent to their stu-
dents, warning them that reading the Wikileaks cables could endanger their
future employment prospects in the U.S. government.163  This becomes a se-
rious exercise of power over speech through the power of the government to
hire or refuse to hire.  As such, it is a direct and effective constraint on
reading publicly available truthful information with clear political import.
And, as with the case of the companies, here university career services of-
fices provided accreditation and dissemination services to the initial move
by the government, so that the chilling effect was amplified through the
organizational power of recruitment and hiring in the country’s institutes of
higher education.
One particularly interesting source of accreditation was the Washington
Post, which published a career advice column on the threat that reading the
cables presented to one’s eligibility to get a government job.164  The article,
161 Id. (quoting Library of Congress spokesman Matthew Raymond).
162 Id. (“‘We have put out a policy saying Department of Defense military, civilian and
contractor personnel should not access the WikiLeaks website to view or download the publi-
cized classified information,’ Department of Defense spokesman Maj. Chris Perrine told
CNN.”).
163 Emanuella Grinberg, Will Reading WikiLeaks Cost Students Jobs With the Federal
Government?,  CNN (Dec. 8, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-12-08/justice/wikileaks.
students_1_wikileaks-security-clearance-students.
164 See Derrick T. Dortch, Job Hunters Should Steer Clear of WikiLeaks Site, WASH. POST,
Dec. 9, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/08/
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authored by the Post’s leading expert on federal career placement,165 opens
with the following sentences:
You have always had an interest in the U.S. government and the
missions of the agencies that deal with national security and inter-
national affairs.  You even hope to work for the feds or serve in the
military one day.  Then you find yourself—an avid reader and
seeker of knowledge—face-to-face with the WikiLeaks Web site.
This rare look inside government operations could also cost you a
potential security clearance.166
It is hard to imagine a more effective way to prevent young people aspiring
to a career in politics or public service from reading the materials that the
government would prefer they not read.
iv. Indirect Legal Assault
The multi-system attack on Wikileaks employs the legal system on two
dimensions that are not directly aimed at the actions of Wikileaks in leaking
the cables.  Each attack is likely to put pressure on the continued ability of
the organization to function.
The first of these is the actual legal action against the soldier who is
accused of having leaked the materials:  a 22-year-old army intelligence ana-
lyst named Bradley Manning.  As of this writing, little is known about Man-
ning or his motivations beyond a series of articles in Wired Magazine, based
on materials provided by the hacker who turned Manning in, Adrian
Lamo.167  That Manning can be prosecuted under military or civilian crimi-
nal law is certainly true.  It is clear, however, from what little is available,
that while Manning was under stress and self-medicating, he was operating
at least in part from motives that we would normally consider the paradigm
case of whistleblowing:  moral and political disagreement with the course of
action of the state.168  Whether the actions exposed in the documents are
indeed illegal or immoral in a manner that would justify blowing the whistle
is not obvious.  After almost a year of revelations from this set of materials,
they seem more a broad affirmation of what is widely believed to be the case
than offering any new smoking guns.  Their disclosure largely serves to con-
firm readers’ views—both positive and negative—of U.S. policy.  The con-
tours of what protection, if any, is due federal employees generally, and
military personnel in particular, who engage in whistleblowing under these
165 Our Leadership: Derrick T. Dortch, President,  THE D IVERSA G ROUP, http://www.
diversagroup.com/DerrickTDortchBio.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2011).
166 Dortch, supra note 164. R
167 Kevin Poulsen & Kim Zetter, I Can’t Believe What I’m Confessing to You, THREAT
LEVEL ( WIRED) (June 10, 2010, 9:01 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/06/
wikileaks-chat.
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circumstances or where unambiguous illegality is exposed is beyond the
scope of this article.169 From the perspective of the assault on Wikileaks, the
important aspect of Manning’s treatment is the effort to use him to deter
future whistleblowers and the question of whether his culpability could serve
to anchor conspiracy liability against Assange and Wikileaks.  Given the
Pentagon Report’s focus on disrupting the trust of whistleblowers in
Wikileaks by exposing them,170 Manning’s long-term solitary confinement
seems clearly intended as a warning171 and possibly as a lever to obtain his
cooperation in bringing a conspiracy charge against Assange.  However, the
long confinement may undermine a court’s willingness to credit his testi-
mony in such a case.
The second dimension of indirect legal attack on Wikileaks is the
Swedish investigation into accusations of sexual assault by Julian Assange
against two women during an August 2010 visit to Sweden.  On August 20,
2010, after release of the Collateral Murder video and the Afghanistan docu-
ments, the Swedish prosecutor’s office issued an arrest warrant against As-
sange in an investigation of allegations of rape stemming from accusations
by two women whom he had met at a conference in Sweden on August 14th
and 17th.  The accusations and issuance of the arrest warrant were leaked to
the press.  The next day, the arrest warrant was withdrawn, and a chief pros-
ecutor in the Swedish prosecutor’s office stated, “I don’t think there is reason
to suspect that he has committed rape.”172  On September 1st, the Director of
Prosecutions decided to overturn the investigating prosecutor’s decision, and
reopen the rape investigation.173  On November 18th, three weeks after re-
lease of the Iraq documents, the Director of Prosecutions obtained a warrant
to detain Assange for questioning.  Assange, then in the United Kingdom,
offered to come to the Swedish embassy or Scotland Yard for the interview.
On November 20th, Sweden issued an international arrest warrant.  On No-
vember 30th, Interpol issued a “red notice” against Assange, and on Decem-
ber 7th, Assange gave himself up to London police and was denied bail until
169 See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, First Amendment Ctr., Government Secrecy vs. Freedom
of the Press 1–10 (2006), available at http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/PDF/Govt.
Secrecy.Stone.pdf.
170 See Pentagon Report, supra note 21. R
171 See Greenwald, Inhumane Conditions, supra note 46; see also The Law Offices of R
David E. Coombs, Manning Case, http://www.armycourtmartialdefense.info/search/label/
Manning%20Case (providing updates from Manning’s counsel); Jeffrey L. Meltzner & Jamie
Fellner, Solitary Confinement and Mental Illness in U.S. Prisons: A Challenge for Medical
Ethics,3 8  J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 104, 104 (2010) (“Solitary confinement is recog-
nized as difficult to withstand; indeed, psychological stressors such as isolation can be as
clinically distressing as physical torture.”).  On the psychological effects, see P. S. Smith, The
Effects of Solitary Confinement on Prison Inmates: A Brief History and Review of the Litera-
ture, 34 CRIME & JUST. 441 (2006).
172 Timeline: Sexual Allegations Against Assange in Sweden, BBC NEWS (Dec. 16, 2010),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11949341.
173 Sweden Reopens Wikileaks Founder Rape Investigation, BBC NEWS (Sept. 1, 2010),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11151277.\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\46-2\HLC209.txt unknown Seq: 36  6-JUN-11 13:54
346 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 46
the extradition hearing.174  While the U.K. government did not comment on
the arrest, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates responded that it was
“good news,”175 lending support to concerns raised by observers from the
moment of the initial issuance of the arrest warrant and its retraction that the
charges were part of a campaign to undermine Wikileaks.176  On December
14th, the judge awarded bail, but the prosecution appealed the grant of bail
so that Assange’s release was delayed.177  The decision to appeal may have
been requested by the Swedish prosecutor’s office.178
The facts underlying the effort to extradite Assange before charging
him raise questions about the relationship between the aggressive pursuit of
the extradition request and appeals over bail and the general assault on
Wikileaks.  According to a report in the Guardian, based on police reports
leaked to the newspaper,179 the accusers suggested that Assange behaved ag-
gressively with at least one of the two accusers, and inconsiderately with
both.180  It is entirely possible that under Sweden’s definition of rape and
sexual molestation laws, reflecting significant respect for women’s right to
refuse at any point in the interaction,181 that Assange committed an of-
fense.182  The treatment of the case—issuance of the warrant, its retraction
and reissuance, the leaks to the press, and most importantly the issuance of
an international arrest warrant, requesting extradition without consenting to
an initial interview at the embassy or Scotland Yard, and repeated efforts to
seek denial of bail and appeal of the bail decision—suggests that the manner
of pursuit was a political act, rather than purely standard procedure in such a
case.183  Whether the politics were about Wikileaks or simply using the name
recognition of the accused to make a point about sexual assault law in Swe-
174 Wikileaks Founder Julian Assange Refused Bail, BBC NEWS (Dec. 7, 2010), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11937110.
175 Id.
176 See, e.g., Alan Nothnagle, Swedes Question Rape Accusations Against Wikileaks
Founder, LOST IN BERLIN (Aug. 21, 2010, 1:13 PM), http://open.salon.com/blog/lost_in_berlin/
2010/08/21/swedes_question_rape_accusations_against_wikileaks_founder.
177 Wikileaks Founder Assange Bailed, but Release Delayed, BBC NEWS (Dec. 14, 2010),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11989216.
178 Wikileaks Founder Julian Assange Freed on Bail, BBC NEWS (Dec. 16, 2010), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-12005930.
179 Nick Davies, 10 days in Sweden: The Full Allegations Against Julian Assange,
GUARDIAN.CO.UK,  Dec. 17, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/dec/17/julian-ass
ange-sweden.
180 See id.
181 Id.
182 See Wikileaks: Julian Assange v Sweden’s Broad Sexual Laws, BBC NEWS (Dec. 8,
2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11946652.
183 The only statistics I have been able to obtain state that in 2009–2010, Sweden made a
total of six extradition requests from the United Kingdom under a European Arrest Warrant,
which is not the same as an Interpol Red Notice.  Nick Herbert, House of Commons Written
Answers: European Arrest Warrants,  PARLIAMENT OF THE U NITED K INGDOM, Nov. 9,
2010, http://services.parliament.uk/hansard/Commons/ByDate/20101109/writtenanswers/
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den is unclear.184  Certainly, it created the materials for the media interfer-
ence pattern described above.
E. Sources of Resilience of the Networked Fourth
Estate, and Their Limits
Despite the multi-system assaults it sustained, Wikileaks continued to
operate throughout the period following release of the cables, and its sup-
porters continued to function and indeed respond to the attack along many
dimensions.  Just as the attacks provide insight into the ways in which
human practice involves action in and through multiple intersecting systems,
so, too, do the responses.
Jurisdictional arbitrage.  The first and most obvious feature of the op-
eration of Wikileaks is its presence outside the jurisdiction of the affected
country—the United States.  Even if U.S. law were to permit shutting down
the site or arresting Julian Assange, that alone would be insufficient.  The
fact that the actors and servers are in other countries, and in particular, in
countries with strong rights protecting whistleblowers—initially Iceland and
later Sweden—provided Wikileaks with a degree of robustness against the
most predictable legal attacks.  The defense is, of course, only as strong as
the self-imposed limits of potentially offended countries on applying extra-
territorial jurisdiction, and the degree to which the host countries are, or are
not, susceptible to legal process or diplomatic pressure.
Shifting to redundant backup technical systems.  When EveryDNS, a
California company, cut off domain name service, Wikileaks used a Swiss
domain name service, Switch, and a Swiss domain name—Wikileaks.ch—to
remain reachable.  Despite U.S. and French pressure to shut down the Swiss
domain name, the Swiss DNS registrar refused to do so.185  Wikileaks then
used Twitter to disseminate the new URL.  The redundancy of naming plat-
forms, and the availability of uncontrolled pathways to disseminate informa-
tion necessary to coordinate on the alternative platform, meant that
Wikileaks was again available within hours.  Combining jurisdictional arbi-
trage with technical system redundancy, Wikileaks quickly set up fourteen
domain servers, in multiple countries, to respond to searches for its do-
main.186  Similarly, when Amazon denied Wikileaks service, the organiza-
tion was able to quickly shift to copies hosted on servers provided by OVH
in France; and when the French government cracked down on that backup
184 The accusers’ lawyer is a Swedish politician whose signature issue is gender equality.
It was apparently he who advised the accusers that they could challenge and reverse the
prosecutorial decision not to pursue Assange. See DAVID L EIGH & LUKE H ARDING,
WIKILEAKS: INSIDE JULIAN ASSANGE’S W AR ON SECRECY 162–63 (2011).
185 Josh Halliday, WikiLeaks Site’s Swiss Registry Dismisses Pressure to Take it Offline,
GUARDIAN.CO.UK, Dec. 4, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/dec/04/wikileaks-site-
swiss-host-switch.
186 Jane Wakefield, Wikileaks’ Struggle to Stay Online, BBC NEWS (Dec. 7, 2010), http://
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system, Wikileaks moved to pointing at copies hosted in Sweden, which has
stronger press freedom and whistleblower protection laws.
Shifting to backup payment systems.  When payment systems were de-
nied to Wikileaks by PayPal, MasterCard, and Visa, several pathways re-
mained.  These included a German bank, an Icelandic bank, Datacell (a
Swiss-Icelandic online payment system processing money transfers from
banks in several European countries), as well as simply using PayPal to pay
Julian Assange’s U.K. lawyer directly (instead of sending the payments to
Wikileaks’ account).187  Unlike the technical backup solutions, these are ob-
viously less efficient avenues, and the need to resort to them inflicted real
damage on Wikileaks.188
Socio-political framing as journalism.  Throughout the events, Assange
and Wikileaks emphasized their role as journalists.  Inverting the practices of
those who sought to analogize Wikileaks to terrorists, some commentators
and reporters emphasized the basic argument that Wikileaks is a reporting
organization, fulfilling a reporting function.  In particular, Glenn Greenwald
of Salon provided the most detailed and systematic coverage in support of
Wikileaks.189
Backup organizational systems.  Perhaps the most important strategic
choice of Wikileaks in this case was to release through several established
news sites in different jurisdictions and markets.  This approach achieved
several things.  First, it provided accreditation for the materials themselves.
Second, offering the materials to several organizations meant that no single
organization could, acting alone, suppress the cables.  Competition for the
scoop drove publication.  Third, it located Wikileaks squarely within the
“journalist,” and even “responsible established media” rubric.  This effort
failed, at least in the public framing of the release, although it may yet play a
role in the decision as to whether to prosecute anyone at Wikileaks.  By
harnessing the established fourth estate to its materials, Wikileaks received
accreditation and attention, and was able to exercise power over the public
sphere well beyond what it could have commanded by a single document
dump on its own site, or an edited set of its own.  By releasing an exclusive
scoop to major outlets in different global markets, it was able to create
enough exclusivity to make publication commercially valuable to each of the
187 For a time-sensitive snapshot, see Arthur, supra note 140; see also WIKILEAKS - DO- R
NATE, http://wikileaks.ch/support.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2011).
188 Assange notes that it is true that the back-up payment systems did function, “but by
knocking out the most popular payments systems, some 80 to 90% of revenue stream was lost,
at least $5M dollars.  We have since worked around this, and can now take PayPal, Visa and
Mastercard through the appropriate proxies, but the Bank of America interdiction remains.”
Assange Annotations, supra note 24. R
189 See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald, Attempts to Prosecute WikiLeaks Endanger Press Free-
doms,  SALON (Dec. 14, 2010, 6:15 AM), http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_green
wald/2010/12/14/wikileaks/index.html [hereinafter Greenwald, Attempts to Prosecute]; Clint
Hendler, The WikiLeaks Equation: Secrets, Free Speech, and the Law, COLUM. JOURNALISM
REV. (Dec. 28, 2010), http://www.cjr.org/behind_the_news/the_wikileaks_equation.php;
Shane, supra note 73. R\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\46-2\HLC209.txt unknown Seq: 39  6-JUN-11 13:54
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news organizations in their respective markets, and enough competition to
prevent any organization from deciding, in the name of responsibility, not to
publish at all, or, as the Times did in the case of the NSA eavesdropping
report, to delay publication for a year.190  Doing so also solved the problem
of how to sift through these vast amounts of data without having to harness a
large army of volunteers, thereby defeating the purpose of releasing care-
fully so as not to harm innocent bystanders.191
DDoS attacks by supporters.  In the days following the denial-of-ser-
vice attacks by the payment systems companies, a network of online activ-
ists called Anonymous launched a series of DDoS attacks against PayPal.192
The group knew that its combined power was insufficient to cause substan-
tial damage, and its members responded in an interview that they were
mounting the attacks “to raise awareness,” “to show the prosecutor that we
have the ability to act.”193  The attacks were investigated by the FBI, and
they lead to a backlash concerned with anarchic protests aimed at major
components of the market system.194  Rather than providing support to
Wikileaks, as they clearly were intended to do, these attacks helped to under-
score and legitimate the framing of Wikileaks as a dangerous and anarchic
actor.  Participants rapidly abandoned this strategy.195
Threat of major embarrassment:  the “insurance” file.  In anticipation
of arrest or assassination, Assange posted on Wikileaks as early as July a 1.4
GB file, much larger than all the available materials, which was available for
download.  It was also made available as a torrent peer-to-peer sharing
file.196  The file is encrypted, apparently with sufficiently secure encryption
190 Paul Farhi, At the Times, a Scoop Deferred, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2005, at A7, availa-
ble at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/16/AR200512160171
6.html.
191 Of less importance, but worth noting nonetheless, was the role of the Pirate Party in
Sweden, which hosted the data, and the Swiss Pirate Party, which had registered wikileaks.ch
months earlier and made it immediately available as the backup domain name that has pro-
vided access since the shutdown by EveryDNS.  These parties are registered in their national
systems as political parties; the Swedish Pirate Party actually has two members of parliament
in the European Parliament.  They reflect the beginnings of the institutionalization of the anti-
authoritarian culture of peer-to-peer file sharing and its conversion into a more established part
of the European political system.
192 B.G., The 24-Hour Athenian Democracy, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 8, 2010, 11:48 AM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2010/12/more_wikileaks.
193 Id.
194 FBI in Hunt for Pro-WikiLeaks Hackers: Report, AGENCE F RANCE PRESSE, Dec. 31,
2010, available at 12/31/10 Agence Fr.-Presse 19:50:53 (Westlaw).
195 B.G., supra note 192.  Assange’s annotations to this article suggest that at least As- R
sange disagrees with my assessment of the effect, and he believes that “[i]t appears that the
supportive attacks won us more popular support than we lost and possibly also as a ‘social
discipline’ mechanism, these ‘online protests’ may be valuable in policing future extrajudicial
censorship attacks.”  Assange Annotations, supra note 24. R
196 Kim Zetter, WikiLeaks Posts Mysterious ‘Insurance’ File,  THREAT L EVEL ( WIRED)
(July 30, 2010, 3:09 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/07/wikileaks-insurance-file.\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\46-2\HLC209.txt unknown Seq: 40  6-JUN-11 13:54
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to assure that it will not be broken.197  The threat was clear:  if Assange is
arrested or harmed, or Wikileaks attacked, the decryption key will be re-
leased.  Of all the actions by Wikileaks or Assange, this was the one that
most conformed to the profile of a dangerous activist.  The file remains at
large; the decryption code remains secret; it was not released despite As-
sange’s arrest.
Mutation and replication.  On the larger, longer-term scale, another im-
portant response during the first month following the release of the embassy
cables was mutation and replication.  Some former Wikileaks members an-
nounced creation of a parallel organization, OpenLeaks, intended to receive
leaks and release them solely to subscribing NGOs and media organiza-
tions.198  A completely separate organization, Brussels Leaks, was launched
to provide leaks specifically regarding the EU Commission.199  Both organi-
zations plan to institutionalize in their structure the strategy that Wikileaks
rapidly evolved over the course of 2010—the dedication to release through
the mediation of “legitimate” real world organizations, both media and
NGOs.  A month later, Al Jazeera launched (and the New York Times was
considering launching) its own copy of Wikileaks, a secure platform for de-
centralized submission of leaked documents.200  Al Jazeera’s Transparency
Unit201 was launched with the leaked “Palestine Papers.”202  To the extent
that the campaign against Wikileaks was intended not to quash the specific
documents, but to tame the beast of distributed online systems providing
avenues for leaking documents outside of the traditional responsible media
system, the emergence of these new sites suggests that the social and cultural
phenomenon of distributed leaking is too resilient to be defeated by this type
of attack.  Just as the closure of Napster was merely the invitation for the
development of more litigation-proof systems like Gnutella and KaZaa, so,
too, here it appears that even the destruction of Wikileaks itself is unlikely to
lead to the abandonment of this new model of provisioning one important
aspect of the fourth estate.  Reporting based on documents leaked securely
online and using multiple overlapping systems to reach the public and evade
efforts at suppressing their publication is here to stay.
197 Ashley Fantz, Assange’s ‘Poison Pill’ File Impossible to Stop, Expert Says,  CNN
(Dec. 8, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-12-08/us/wikileaks.poison.pill_1_julian-assange-
wikileaks-key-encryption.
198 Ossi Carp, “A New WikiLeaks” Revolts Against Assange, DN.SE, Dec. 9, 2010 (Majsan
Bostr¨ om, trans.), http://www.dn.se/nyheter/varlden/a-new-wikileaks-revolts-against-assange-1.
1224764.
199 Id. (describing OpenLeaks); BRUSSELS L EAKS A BOUT, http://brusselsleaks.com/about
(last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
200 Michael Calderone, NY Times Considers Creating an ‘EZ Pass Lane for Leakers,’THE
CUTLINE (YAHOO!) (Jan. 25, 2011, 8:38 AM), http://news.yahoo.com/s/yblog_thecutline/
20110125/ts_yblog_thecutline/ny-times-considers-creating-an-ez-pass-lane-for-leakers.
201 About the Transparency Unit, AL J AZEERA T RANSPARENCY U NIT, http://www.ajtrans
parency.com (last visited Feb. 19, 2011).
202 The Palestine Papers, AL J AZEERA, http://english.aljazeera.net/palestinepapers (last
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F. The Response to Wikileaks:  Wrap Up.
The response to Wikileaks was dramatic, extensive, overwrought, and
ineffective.  If the purpose was to stop access to the cables, it failed.  If the
effort was to cast a doubt on the credibility of the cables, it failed.  If the
purpose was to divert attention from the cables, it failed.  And if the effort
was to prevent the future availability of decentralized dissemination of
leaked documents outside of the confines of the responsible press, it failed.
Indeed, it is possible that, had Secretary Clinton adopted the same stance as
Secretary Gates and shrugged off the events as embarrassing, but not funda-
mentally destructive, a measured response to Wikileaks could have signifi-
cantly advanced the State Department’s Internet freedom agenda by allowing
the United States to exhibit integrity and congruence between its public
statements in support of Internet freedom and its actions.203  The actual re-
sponse will create a visible incongruity should the State Department con-
tinue to assert Internet freedom as a major policy agenda.
Part III will be dedicated to outlining the constitutional limits on the
State’s ability to prevent such dissemination directly through law, and the
legal avenues open to constraining the capacity of the State to use extralegal
avenues to achieve what it cannot do directly within those confines.  Part IV
will use the event to outline the emerging shape of the networked public
sphere, the emerging structure of the networked fourth estate, and the new
challenges it faces and affordances it has relative to those of the mass-medi-
ated fourth estate.
III. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. Baseline:  Freedom of the Press and the National Interest
To anchor our understanding of the Wikileaks case, it is useful first to
provide a baseline of what law is relevant for more traditional media.  Con-
sider the release of the embassy cables by the New York Times and the
Guardian.  Each of these newspapers received a cache of classified cables it
(correctly) believed to be authentic.  Each spent time negotiating the details
of receipt and publication of these documents with its source (Wikileaks).
Each ultimately released over one thousand cables, some in redacted form,
others without redaction where it deemed release in full to be safe.  What is
the legal framework governing the government’s response to the actions of
these organizations in this very case?
The basic framework for this question is provided by New York Times v.
United States,204 the Pentagon Papers case.  The United States was at war.
203 Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec’y of State, Remarks on Internet Freedom at the Newseum
(Jan. 21, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm.
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Daniel Ellsberg, a Defense Department employee, leaked to the New York
Times a copy of a forty-seven volume internal study commissioned by Rob-
ert McNamara in 1967 on the Vietnam War, including details of military
operations and secret diplomatic negotiations.205  As soon as the Times began
publishing the papers, the Attorney General of the United States, John
Mitchell, sent a telegram to the New York Times worded very much like the
letter Harold Koh sent to Wikileaks, claiming that publication would “cause
irreparable injury to the defense interests of the United States,” and demand-
ing that the Times show that it had “made arrangements for the return of
these documents to the Department of Defense.”206  The government sought
an injunction against publication.  Within seventeen days of the original pub-
lication, the case reached the Supreme Court and was decided in favor of the
Times and freedom of publication.  As Justice Stewart, with whom Justice
White joined to provide the fifth and sixth votes for the decision, put it:
We are asked, quite simply, to prevent the publication by two
newspapers of material that the Executive Branch insists should
not, in the national interest, be published.  I am convinced that the
Executive is correct with respect to some of the documents in-
volved.  But I cannot say that disclosure of any of them will surely
result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation
or its people.  That being so, there can under the First Amendment
be but one judicial resolution of the issues before us.207
It is particularly pertinent to the question of Wikileaks that Justice Stewart
was well aware of the consequences of disclosure.  Writing as though for the
Wikileaks cable embassies case itself, Justice Stewart writes:
[I]t is elementary that the successful conduct of international di-
plomacy and the maintenance of an effective national defense re-
quire both confidentiality and secrecy.  Other nations can hardly
deal with this Nation in an atmosphere of mutual trust unless they
can be assured that their confidences will be kept.  And within our
own executive departments, the development of considered and in-
telligent international policies would be impossible if those
charged with their formulation could not communicate with each
other freely, frankly, and in confidence.208
Indeed, Justice Stewart opened his opinion by emphasizing that in areas
of national defense and international relations the Executive has relatively
205 See generally Neil Sheehan et al., THE PENTAGON PAPERS: AS PUBLISHED BY THE NEW
YORK TIMES (1971).
206 STONE, supra note 169, at 11; see also Hedrick Smith, Mitchell Seeks to Halt Series on R
Vietnam, but Times Refuses, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1971, http://www.nytimes.com/books/97/04/
13/reviews/papers-mitchell.html.
207 New York Times, 403 U.S. at 730 (emphasis added).
208 Id. at 728.\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\46-2\HLC209.txt unknown Seq: 43  6-JUN-11 13:54
2011] A Free Irresponsible Press 353
unchecked powers, by comparison to other areas of policy where Congress
and the Judiciary are more closely engaged, making a robust, critical, free
press all the more important as the only foundation for a critical and enlight-
ened public that could act as a check on abuse of Executive power.209  This
very powerful executive had the responsibility of maintaining its own opera-
tions with enough security and wisdom to make sure that only what needs
classifying is indeed classified, and that that which is classified does not get
leaked.  But it could not, consistent with the First Amendment, call upon the
courts to enjoin publication of leaked materials.  That messy balance be-
tween the administration’s need for secrecy and the public’s right and need to
know, while far from perfect, means that the administration continues to
function under normal conditions, subject to occasional disclosures to keep it
honest.210  The rare exceptions would require a combination of high likeli-
hood, magnitude, and immediacy of harm to justify suppression.  In the area
of national defense, this is captured by the phrase, “the sailing dates of trans-
ports or the number and location of troops.”211  Or, as Justice Stewart put it,
to justify suppression, the publication must “surely result in direct, immedi-
ate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people.”212
But the Pentagon Papers case concerned prior restraint, which the Court
recognized as requiring extraordinary care.  What of prosecution ex post?  In
the first instance, imagine what would have happened had the Justice De-
partment turned around and brought criminal charges against the editors and
journalists of the New York Times and the Washington Post after publication
of the Pentagon Papers.  Do we think that a court that held that the First
Amendment requires that the newspapers be permitted to publish them
would have simply allowed the government to charge and imprison the jour-
nalists after the fact?  That would make a mockery of the protection and
impose a much greater chill on publication than the risk of an injunction.
The long history from the Masses case,213 Schenck v. United States,214 and
the “bad tendency” era to Brandenburg v. Ohio’s215 overturning of Whitney
v. California216 to embrace the “clear and present danger” framework ended
up requiring a similar combination of high damage, high probability, and
immediacy for prosecutions, as well as for prior restraints.  As the Supreme
209 Id. at 727–28 (“In the absence of the governmental checks and balances present in
other areas of our national life, the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power in
the areas of national defense and international affairs may lie in an enlightened citizenry—in
an informed and critical public opinion which alone can here protect the values of democratic
government. For this reason, it is perhaps here that a press that is alert, aware, and free most
vitally serves the basic purpose of the First Amendment. For without an informed and free
press there cannot be an enlightened people.”).
210 See Stone, supra note 130.
211 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
212 New York Times, 403 U.S. at 729.
213 Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
214 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
215 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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Court put it in the context of considering criminal liability of a broadcaster
who had broadcast illegal materials, the First Amendment does not permit
prosecution of a journalist transmitting truthful information of public interest
“absent a need of the highest order.”217  The distinction, then, is minimal in
practice.  The standard for prior restraint and the standard for criminal prose-
cution over the publication of truthful materials of public concern seems to
be largely the same, and exceedingly stringent.218  On the background of this
extremely high barrier to both prior restraint and to criminal prosecution, it
is perhaps not surprising that efforts by the Bush Administration to prosecute
the New York Times for its revelations of the National Security Agency’s
program of domestic eavesdropping, and the Washington Post for its report-
ing on the existence of CIA-operated black sites in Eastern Europe, were
abandoned.219
Against the background of this legal regime, and what we know of the
contents of the embassy cables eight weeks after their initial publication, it is
for all practical purposes impossible to imagine that the New York Times
would be prosecuted, or that if such an ill-advised prosecution were to be
brought, that it could survive judicial scrutiny under prevailing First Amend-
ment doctrine.  Now, what of the Guardian?  Could it be that U.S. statutory
law—say, the Espionage Act or the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act—ex-
tends to noncitizens’ actions outside of the United States, but the protections
afforded by the First Amendment do not apply to such defendants?  In that
case, non-U.S. defendants who publish materials that harm the interests of
the United States in ways that are legal in their own jurisdiction could be
prosecuted under U.S. law without either legal system’s protections.  That
non-citizens are “persons” covered by the substantive guarantees of the Bill
of Rights is long-settled law.220  That a range of provisions of United States
criminal law can apply extra-territorially is similarly settled,221 and that the
extension of constitutional protections and limitations does not necessarily
travel with the extra-territorial reach of the criminal law is also quite clear.
The intuition, and the area of primary application, is criminal procedure:
217 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 528 (2001) (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g
Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)).
218 See, e.g., Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Va., 435 U.S. 829 (1978); Worrell Newspapers
of Ind. v. Westhafer, 739 F.2d 1219, 1223 (7th Cir. 1984), aff’d 469 U.S. 1200 (1985); GEOF-
FREY R. STONE, PERILIOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798
TO THE W AR ON T ERRORISM (2004); Stone, supra note 169, at 14 (citing David A. Strauss, R
Freedom of Speech and the Common-Law Constitution,  in ETERNALLY V IGILANT: FREE
SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 32, 57–59 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone ed., 2002)
(arguing that “it is difficult to believe that the Court would have allowed newspaper editors to
be punished, criminally, after they published the [Pentagon] Papers”).
219 See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Lapdogs, Watchdogs and Scapegoats, 83 IND. L.J. 233,
234–35 (2007); see also Stone, supra note 169, at 27 n.2.
220 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553
U.S. 723 (2008).
221 See Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution? 100 YALE L.J. 909 (1991); see also Jose
A. Cabranes, Our Imperial Criminal Procedure: Problems in the Extraterritorial Application
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questions such as how to deal with the criminal procedure owed foreign
nationals in trials carried out abroad.222  In the past decade, post-9/11 deten-
tion of enemy combatants has placed significant pressure by the executive,
on courts, to limit extra-territorial application of constitutional guarantees.
The Supreme Court, however, has not taken the formalist path argued to it
(that the Constitution stops at the border), holding instead that even non-
citizens designated as enemy combatants and held in Guantanamo can assert
habeas corpus.223  The Court reemphasized that “[e]ven when the United
States acts outside its borders, its powers are not ‘absolute and unlimited’ but
are subject ‘to such restrictions as are expressed in the Constitution.’”224
A hypothetical suit against the Guardian or, for that matter, Assange,
for publishing the embassy cables would be vastly simpler than the post-9/11
cases.  First, it would proceed within the United States, not abroad.  Even the
absolutist version would not deny protection in trials conducted here.  Sec-
ond, the rights to be asserted are those involving the First Amendment’s free-
doms of expression and of the press.  Over one hundred years ago the
Supreme Court, in one of the most important precedents limiting the exten-
sion of constitutional protections beyond the borders of the United States,
nonetheless specifically stated that “freedom of speech and of the press”
were among those rights so “indispensable to a free government” that they
would apply abroad.225  Do we imagine, for example, that if the Guardian
were to publish a report making revelations about a U.S. political figure, that
person could sue the Guardian for libel in the United States without having
to comport with the constraints of New York Times v. Sullivan?226  Indeed,
Congress is pushing to have our own constitutional constraints protect our
citizens from libel suits in perfectly democratic countries that give less def-
erence to press freedom in the area of libel.227  It seems highly unlikely, then,
that the mere fact of a publisher being a company or person who is not a
U.S. citizen or resident, or of the publication being disseminated outside the
United States, as would be the case were the government to prosecute the
Guardian, would entail a lower level of First Amendment protection than the
New York Times itself would receive.  This conclusion is made even clearer
when we remember that the core purpose driving freedom of the press is the
democratic necessity of an informed citizenry, to avoid the “farce, or trag-
edy, or both” that James Madison warned of.228  Functionally, whether the
American public learns of official misconduct from a U.S.-based publication
222 Id.
223 Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723.
224 Id. at 765 (quoting Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 44 (1885)).
225 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 282–83 (1901).
226 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
227 See SECURING T HE P ROTECTION O F O UR E NDURING A ND E STABLISHED C ONSTITU-
TIONAL HERITAGE (“SPEECH”) ACT OF 2010, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 4101–4105 (West 2010).
228 James Madison, Letter to W. T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF J AMES
MADISON 103, 103–09 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) (1822) (“A popular Government, without
popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or,\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\46-2\HLC209.txt unknown Seq: 46  6-JUN-11 13:54
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or a foreign publication is immaterial to the real beneficiaries of robust First
Amendment freedom of the press—these are always and foremost the Amer-
ican public and American democracy.
Looking at both the Guardian and the New York Times, then, any effort
on the part of the U.S. government to prosecute either of these two publica-
tions for their publication of the embassy cables would founder on the bul-
warks of the First Amendment.  What, if anything, would make Wikileaks
sufficiently different from the Guardian or the Times to justify treating its
publications under a different standard?
B. Does the First Amendment Treat Wikileaks and Julian Assange as
Less Protected than the New York Times and Its
Editors and Reporters?
The most obvious difference between Wikileaks and the more tradi-
tional media outlets is the organizational identity.  The latter are culturally
familiar as major media outlets; they have established editors and boards,
and we have a general cultural assumption about their organizational culture:
they care about getting the facts right, and being “responsible” in presenting
the news.  Perhaps, then, the important dividing line is between established
media and journalists, on the one hand, and the decentralized, informal, and
quasi-formal culture of speech on the Internet?
What might account for such a difference?  The intuition would likely
take the form of what Jonathan Klein said just before taking over as presi-
dent of CNN/U.S.:  that “you couldn’t have a starker contrast between the
multiple layers of checks and balances, and a guy sitting in his living room
in his pajamas writing what he thinks.”229  He was speaking of the bloggers
who had exposed the fact that a 60 Minutes report by Dan Rather on Presi-
dent George Bush’s military record was based on inauthentic documents.
While Klein no longer leads CNN/U.S.,230 the disdainful treatment of the
blogosphere by traditional media has not disappeared.  The New York Times’
own coverage of Wikileaks paired coverage of the substance of the materials
that Wikileaks made public with unflattering portraits of Julian Assange,
describing him variously as a “hunted man” who “checks into hotels under
false names, dyes his hair, sleeps on sofas and floors, and uses cash instead
perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their
own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.”).
229 Special Report w/ Brit Hume: How the Blogosphere Took on CBS’ Docs (Fox News
television broadcast Sept. 14, 2004), available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,
132494,00.html (transcript).
230 Brian Stelter, Jonathan Klein to Leave CNN, MEDIA DECODER (N.Y. TIMES) (Sept. 24,
2010, 10:12 AM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/24/jonathan-klein-to-leave-
cnn; Catherine Taylor, With Jonathan Klein Dismissal, CNN Finally Pushes the Panic Button,
BNET (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.bnet.com/blog/new-media/with-jonathan-klein-dismissal-
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of credit cards, often borrowed from friends,”231 or “like a bag lady walking
in off the street, wearing a dingy, light-colored sport coat and cargo pants,
dirty white shirt, beat-up sneakers and filthy white socks that collapsed
around his ankles.  He smelled as if he hadn’t bathed in days.”232  These
descriptions seem to represent a deep anxiety and identity crisis of the tradi-
tional media; perhaps they exhibit existential fear that the glory days of their
profession are past, perhaps simple envy over the fact that the biggest scoop
of 2010, a scoop that dominated the front pages of all the major outlets for
weeks, was generated by someone who was not a member of the club.
Whatever the reason for this unflattering portrait, it cannot form the basis of
a constitutional principle.
If Manning had walked off a military base in Oklahoma and handed the
disc with the files to the editor of a tiny local newspaper of a small town 100
miles away, and that newspaper had published the materials, we would not
conceivably have treated that local newspaper, even if it were a two-person
operation, as categorically different from the New York Times.  Indeed, we
lionize the local newspaperman as a bulwark against local corruption.233  The
Progressive does not have the organizational heft of the New York Times, but
this lack does not affect its constitutional protections.  As the Supreme Court
put it, “Liberty of the press is the right of the lonely pamphleteer who uses
carbon paper or a mimeograph just as much as of the large metropolitan
publisher who utilizes the latest photocomposition methods.”234  Organiza-
tionally, the tiny local newspaper cannot possibly institute the kinds of insti-
tutional-procedural “checks and balances” that Klein spoke of.  Their
presence or absence cannot sustain a distinction that makes a constitutional
difference if we are not willing to leave the small local newspaper out of the
protective umbrella of freedom of the press.
The difference between the constituents of the networked fourth estate
and the mass media cannot, then, be organizational size or complexity.
Functionally, it is more important to provide robust constitutional protection
to the weaker members of the fourth estate, who have less public visibility
and wherewithal to withstand pressure from government officials, than it is
to emphasize the rights of the organizationally and economically stronger
members of the press.  When Senator Bunning and Representative King
called the New York Times’ disclosure of the NSA domestic eavesdropping
agenda “treason,”235 there was little risk that the Times could successfully be
prosecuted criminally, or that its editor would find himself under house ar-
rest wearing an ankle bracelet.  The sheer economic, social, and cultural
231 Burns & Somaiya, supra note 69. R
232 Keller, supra note 54. R
233 Paul Starr, Goodbye to the Age of Newspapers (Hello to a New Era of Corruption),
THE NEW REPUBLIC, March 4, 2009, at 28, available at http://www.tnr.com/article/goodbye-
the-age-newspapers-hello-new-era-corruption.
234 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972).
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power of the Times meant that the constitutional limitations will not have to
kick in to prevent such an eventuality.  The same is not necessarily true of a
man whom the Vice President of the United States describes as a “high-tech
terrorist,”236 and whom the New York Times publicly describes as “a hunted
man,”237 while its executive editor emphasizes that he sees him as “a
source,” emphatically not a partner, and not really a journalist.238  Recall that
in this case, the source, Manning, is in solitary confinement precisely be-
cause he is a source.239  It is possible that the Times’ efforts to distance itself
from Assange were driven by a concern to insulate itself from prosecution,
should the Department of Justice decide to proceed on a conspiracy theory.
But, the emphatic rejection of the idea of a partnership with Wikileaks is
equally likely to be an assertion of identity by the flagship of an industry and
profession that feels itself to be under threat.  Whatever the reason, it in-
creases the threat level to members of the networked fourth estate.  The em-
phatic denial of membership in the club does not make a formal
constitutional difference, but, as a matter of constitutional culture, it puts the
practitioners of the networked fourth estate at greater risks than fringe jour-
nalists have been in the United States for almost a century.
The difference is not organizational complexity or formal membership
in the Press Club, but the difference also certainly cannot be technology.
The portions of the New York Times that are published only online are no
less protected from those published in print; nor would anyone argue that the
online-only publication launched by legendary magazine editor Tina Brown,
The Daily Beast, or Glenn Greenwald’s coverage of Wikileaks over the
course of 2010 in the online-only publication, Salon, count for less, constitu-
tionally, than does the New York Times.  Repeatedly, over the course of this
past decade, we have seen Internet-only publications, primarily in what we
currently see as the blogopshere, take on investigative reporting and critical
opinion-writing and evaluation that are at the very heart of the function of
the fourth estate.240  Whether it is the role that bloggers played in exposing
Dan Rather’s error, the central role that Josh Marshall’s Talking Points Memo
played in exposing the U.S. Attorney scandal,241 or Sheri Fink’s Pulitzer-
236 Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast Dec. 19, 2010), available at http://www.
msnbc.msn.com/id/40720643 (transcript).
237 Burns & Somaiva, supra note 69, at A1. R
238 Keller, supra note 54. R
239 Greenwald, Strange and Consequential, supra note 41. R
240 See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE W EALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS M ARKETS AND F REEDOM ch. 7 (2006); see generally Clay Shirky, COGNITIVE
SURPLUS (2010); Dan Gilmore, WE THE MEDIA: GRASSROOTS JOURNALISM BY THE PEOPLE, FOR
THE PEOPLE (2006).
241 Paul McLeary, How TalkingPointsMemo Beat the Big Boys on the U.S. Attorney Story,
COLUM. JOURNALISM R EV. (Mar. 15, 2007, 1:53 PM), http://www.cjr.org/behind_the_news/
how_talkingpointsmemo_beat_the.php.\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\46-2\HLC209.txt unknown Seq: 49  6-JUN-11 13:54
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Prize-winning work for ProPublica,242 it is by 2011 beyond cavil that these
outlets deserve as much First Amendment protection as do traditional media.
In law, the area where the efforts to define the line between “journal-
ist” and “just a guy in his pajamas” have come to a head has been in the
definition of eligibility for the journalist’s privilege under state laws.  Here,
the need for a definition is obvious, because law offers much more than the
First Amendment’s core protection from criminal prosecution for what one
has published.  In von Bulow v. von Bulow, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that “the individual claiming the privilege must demon-
strate . . . the intent to use material—sought, gathered or received—to dis-
seminate information to the public and that such intent existed at the
inception of the newsgathering process.”243  “The intended manner of dis-
semination may be by newspaper, magazine, book, public or private broad-
cast medium, handbill or the like, for ‘[t]he press in its historic connotation
comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of informa-
tion and opinion.’”244  The court concluded by emphasizing that membership
in the club of established journalists is not required for protection:
Although prior experience as a professional journalist may be
persuasive evidence of present intent to gather for the purpose of
dissemination, it is not the sine qua non.  The burden indeed may
be sustained by one who is a novice in the field.
Further, the protection from disclosure may be sought by one
not traditionally associated with the institutionalized press because
“[t]he informative function asserted by representatives of the or-
ganized press . . . is also performed by lecturers, political pollsters,
novelists, academic researchers, and dramatists.”245
In following the Second Circuit, and integrating it with the Ninth Cir-
cuit,246 the Third Circuit in In re Madden summarized:  “We hold that indi-
viduals are journalists when engaged in investigative reporting, gathering
news, and have the intent at the beginning of the news-gathering process to
disseminate this information to the public.”247  The critical definitional ele-
ment here is intent at the time of gathering and function, the intent to gather
for public dissemination, not mode of dissemination.  There simply cannot
242 Pulitzer Prize in Investigative Reporting: Deadly Choices at Memorial, PROPUBLICA,
http://www.propublica.org/awards/item/pulitzer-prize-in-investigative-reporting-deadly-choic
es-at-memorial (last visited Feb. 19, 2011).
243 von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1987).
244 Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,
452 (1938)).  The Third Circuit, in In re Madden, interpreted this as “the Supreme Court’s
recognition that the ‘press’ includes all publications that contribute to the free flow of informa-
tion.” 151 F.3d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1998).
245 von Bulow, 811 F.2d at 144–45 (alteration in original) (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665, 705 (1972), and later quoting Branzburg language on the lonely pamphleteer).
246 See Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1993).
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be the remotest doubt that the entire purpose of Wikileaks is the gathering of
information for public dissemination.  The use of traditional media outlets as
the primary pathway emphasizes this fact, although it is not constitutive or a
necessary element of the defense.  The professionalism, niceness, or per-
sonal hygiene of the reporter are not germane to the inquiry.  The interest
concerned is not individual, but systemic; it is “society’s interest in protect-
ing the integrity of the newsgathering process, and in ensuring the free flow
of information to the public.”248
Perhaps, though, there is nonetheless something about the “intent” test
required by the courts of appeal in the journalists’ privilege cases that allows
us to separate Assange and Wikileaks from Talking Points Memo’s role in
exposing the U.S. Attorney’s scandal, or from Free Republic249 and Power
Line,250 the main movers of the Dan Rather scandal.  Most relevant here is a
memorandum apparently authored by Julian Assange in 2006, which was
posted by Cryptome, a much older website that was already publishing ma-
terial uncomfortable to someone in power a decade before Wikileaks was
founded.  Assange opens the 2006 paper, State and Terrorist Conspiracies,
with a quote from Theodore Roosevelt:  “Behind the ostensible government
sits enthroned an invisible government owing no allegiance and acknowl-
edging no responsibility to the people.  To destroy this invisible government,
to befoul this unholy alliance between corrupt business and corrupt politics
is the first task of statesmanship.”251  The core of the paper’s claim includes
three elements:  (1) authoritarian regimes depend on secret internal commu-
nications to organize their functioning suppression of opposition; (2) secrecy
is necessary for these regimes to function because if these internal communi-
cations were publicly known, they would induce more resistance than the
regime can effectively deal with; and (3) exposing the internal communica-
tions of authoritarian regimes will drive these regimes to clamp down on
their internal communications, and by slowing internal communications, will
lead these regimes to function less effectively and weaken them.252  The pur-
pose of transparency, in this ideological framework, is to decrease the effec-
tive functioning of its targets, not through the criticism that sunlight will
induce, but through the decline in internal information flows caused by the
effort to evade that sunlight.  Now, nowhere in the essays does Assange say
that the “conspiratorial regime” he is talking about is the U.S. govern-
ment.253  At the time of this memorandum, recall from the Pentagon Re-
248 Id. at 128.
249 FREE REPUBLIC, http://www.freerepublic.com (last visited Apr. 3, 2011).
250 POWER LINE, http://www.powerlineblog.com (last visited Apr. 3, 2011).
251 Julian Assange, State and Terrorist Conspiracies, IQ.ORG, Nov. 10, 2006, available at
http://cryptome.org/0002/ja-conspiracies.pdf.
252 Id.
253 The closest he comes to it is the implication, in the second version of the essay, that the
Republican and Democratic parties would fit his definition of “conspiracy.” See Julian As-
sange,  Conspiracy as Governance,  IQ.ORG, Jul. 31, 2010, available at http://cryptome.org/
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port,254 Wikileaks was focused on providing a platform for exposing
communications of regimes whose designation as authoritarian or at least
non-democratic and oppressive would be mainstream.  Yet the quote from
Roosevelt, and the current context of disclosure of U.S. documents, certainly
lends itself to a reasonable interpretation that the secret functioning of the
U.S. government, and the powerful role that corporate interests are seen to
play in defining U.S. policy, all out of the public eye, fall under the umbrella
of targets of this strategy.
So, imagine that we were satisfied by these essays from 2006, in the
context of these revelations, that Assange’s primary purpose for exposing the
embassy cables was to force the administration to limit the sharing of infor-
mation across agencies and increase the difficulty of information spreading
into and across the government, and that the ultimate motivation is specifi-
cally to make the government’s functioning less effective, so that it can op-
press its own people less.255  Would that motivation change the constitutional
analysis—particularly given the role of “intent” in defining who is a jour-
nalist?  The answer seems to be quite clearly not.  The “intent” entailed by
the constitutional analysis is intent to a certain action:  dissemination to the
public, as distinguished from research for private use.  The purpose of pro-
tecting the press is systemic and functional—to serve a more enlightened
public, which is a precondition to a well functioning democracy.  The moti-
vation driving any given individual to advance that goal is entirely irrelevant
to the core question.  A journalist is not measured by whether she investi-
gates and publishes in order to serve democracy, aggrandize her name, or
make money; Fox News would be no less deserving of freedom of the press
if we were to find a set of internal memos revealing that its prime motive
were to undermine the capacity of President Obama to govern, rather than to
inform the public.  Inquiring into the political or personal motivations of
speakers opens the door to the most pernicious form of censorship—the def-
inition of some political motivations as legitimate bases for speech and
others as illegitimate and not eligible for protection.  The intent has to focus
on the intended action:  public dissemination.  By this measure, irrespective
of the political theory underlying the investigation and publication, Horace
254 See supra notes 21–40 and accompanying text. R
255 If that was the purpose, it is hard to tell whether it was successful in the long term.
Initial public statements suggest that the response is less oriented toward limiting information
sharing, and more toward tighter controls on how easy it is to copy information, on identifying
patterns of leakage, and on identifying individuals at risk for disaffection. See, e.g., DOD
News Briefing, supra note 5.  The primary available formal action known publicly is a memo-
randum from the Office of Management and Budget detailing appropriate agency efforts that
seem to be focused on preventing leakage, both technical and human, rather than efforts to
limit information sharing.  How these will be implemented remains, of course, to be seen. See
Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, from Jacob J. Lew,
Director, Office of Management and Budget, re: Initial Assessments of Safeguarding and
Counterintelligence Postures for Classified National Security Information in Automated Sys-
tems (Jan. 3, 2011), available at http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/OMB_
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Greeley is no more and no less protected than William Randolph Hearst or
Upton Sinclair.  A reporter operating out of political conviction is every bit
as protected as a reporter out to make a buck, become a celebrity, or humbly
serve the public interest.
We come, then, to the conclusion that as a matter of First Amendment
doctrine, Wikileaks is entitled to the protection available to a wide range of
members of the fourth estate, from fringe pamphleteers to the major press
organizations of the industrial information economy.  As a matter of First
Amendment values, what is being protected by this refusal to privilege the
New York Times over Wikileaks is the continued access of the public to a
steady flow of truthful, publicly relevant information about its government’s
inner workings.  As the networked public sphere develops, as a more diverse
set of actors—from individual bloggers like Instapundit,256 to nonprofits like
the Sunlight Foundation,257 small commercial online publications like Talk-
ing Points Memo,258 and large decentralized groups of political activists like
Daily Kos or Townhall.com259—come to play an ever larger role in the con-
struction of the public sphere,260 the functional importance of divorcing the
constitutional protection from the degree to which the actor is a familiar part
of the twentieth century model of mass media increases.
We cannot afford as a polity to create classes of privileged speakers and
press agencies, and underclasses of networked information producers whose
products we take into the public sphere when convenient, but whom we treat
as susceptible to suppression when their publications become less palatable.
Doing so would severely undermine the quality of our public discourse and
the production of the function of the fourth estate in the networked informa-
tion society.  Fortunately, clarifying that this freedom extends to “every sort
of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion” and that
“[l]iberty of the press is the right of the lonely pamphleteer who uses car-
bon paper or a mimeograph just as much as of the large metropolitan pub-
lisher” is not a matter of policy discretion or moral belief.261  Our
256 INSTAPUNDIT.COM, http://pajamasmedia.com/instapundit (last visited Feb. 23, 2011).
257 SUNLIGHT F OUNDATION, http://sunlightfoundation.com (last visited Feb. 23, 2011).
258 TALKING P OINTS M EMO, http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com (last visited Feb. 23,
2011).
259 DAILY K OS, http://www.dailykos.com (last visited Feb. 23, 2011); TOWNHALL.COM,
http://townhall.com (last visited Feb. 23, 2011).  Note, however, that it appears that these kinds
of engaged, larger scale participatory platforms are more typical of the left wing of the blogo-
sphere than the right wing. See Yochai Benkler & Aaron Shaw, A Tale of Two Blogospheres:
Discursive Practices on the Left and Right 23 (Berkman Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y at Harvard
Univ., Apr. 27, 2010), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/
files/Benkler_Shaw_Tale_of_Two_Blogospheres_Mar2010.pdf.
260 See Yochai Benkler, Giving the Networked Public Sphere Time to Develop, in WILL
THE L AST R EPORTER P LEASE T URN O UT THE L IGHTS: THE C OLLAPSE OF J OURNALISM AND
WHAT C AN B E D ONE TO F IX I T (Robert McChesney & Victor Packard, eds., forthcoming
2011); BENKLER, supra note 240. R
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constitution requires it, and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has made this
clear.
C. The Prospects of Prosecution: The Espionage Act, the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act, and Conspiracy.
Senator Dianne Feinstein, Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Commit-
tee, called for Assange’s prosecution under the Espionage Act of 1917.262
News reports suggest more specifically that the Justice Department consid-
ered, and perhaps continues to consider as of this writing, conspiracy
charges associated either with the Espionage Act, the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, or a different provision pertaining to publication of classified
materials as inchoate liability predicated on the primary liability of Bradley
Manning.263  The intuition behind such an approach is fairly obvious.  Imag-
ine that a reporter suspects that the Governor of the State of Ruritania is
corrupt, and is selling mining rights in the state for large personal payments.
The reporter could not break into the house of one of the contractors, looking
for documentation of the payments, and hope to defend against a burglary
charge by claiming a journalist’s privilege.  The same would be true of vica-
rious liability if the journalist were to hire a professional burglar to do the
job.  These laws of general applicability apply to journalists as to others, and
the incidental effect on freedom of speech puts them in the more relaxed
framework of United States v. O’Brien review.264
There is little doubt that the government has the power to prosecute its
own employees, particularly those whose employment relates to national se-
curity and who have access to classified information by dint of their public
employment, for revealing classified materials.265  Specifically, one could
imagine Pfc. Manning being charged under a variety of provisions,266 rang-
ing from § 793(e) of the Espionage Act, which prohibits any person from
willfully communicating “any document . . . relating to the national defense
which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the
injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation;”267 to
18 U.S.C. § 952, which specifically prohibits disclosure of diplomatic
cables,268 to the provisions of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
262 Feinstein, supra note 128. R
263 Charlie Savage, Building Case for Conspiracy by WikiLeaks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,
2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/16/world/16wiki.html.
264 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (draft card burning case).
265 See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391
U.S. 563, 568 (1968); Stone, supra note 169, at 14–18. R
266 For an overview of sources of liability, see Stephen I. Vladeck, The Statutory Frame-
work, in GEOFFREY R. STONE, FIRST AMENDMENT CTR., GOVERNMENT SECRECY VS. FREEDOM
OF THE PRESS 35 (2006), available at http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/PDF/Govt.Secrecy
.Stone.pdf.
267 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) (2006).
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(“CFAA”), which would appear to cover Manning’s having exceeded his
authorized access to government computers willfully intending to transmit
classified information that “could be used to the injury of the United States,
or to the advantage of any foreign nation” to a person not authorized to
receive it.269  That Manning can be prosecuted, or that anyone who had
hacked in to government computers from the outside could be,270 even if the
intent is to publish and deliver the material to the press,271 is not legally
controversial.  What is controversial is the idea that this initial liability can
form the basis of liability for the journalist or publisher who publishes the
information.
It is well settled that a journalist who passively receives illegally ob-
tained information is privileged to publish it.  Both Neil Sheehan, the New
York Times reporter who received the Pentagon Papers from Daniel Ell-
sberg,272 and Fred Vopper, the radio commentator whose broadcast of illegal
telephone intercepts pertaining to local school and union negotiations was
the basis for the Supreme Court’s holding in Bartnicki v. Vopper,273 clearly
received materials from someone who violated criminal law in the acquisi-
tion and transfer of the materials.  If the “receipt of stolen goods” rationale
were applicable, or if inchoate liability (such as aiding and abetting or con-
spiracy) were triggered by such passive receipt, the journalists in these cases
would have been liable.
Passive receipt of illegally obtained materials is, then, not subject to
prosecution.274  What, then, are we to make of the space between hiring a
burglar, or bribing a public employee to breach her obligations of secrecy,
on the one hand, and passive receipt of a brown paper envelop in the mail,
on the other hand?  What are we to make of a journalist who is contacted by
a potential source, meets her in a cafe once or twice; hears her out; listens to
her complaints, fears, and anxieties; promises her anonymity, and arranges
for another meeting when the materials can be delivered?  What of the jour-
nalist who receives one set of documents in the mail, and then is required by
the source to meet that source again to receive further caches of documents?
What if the journalist sees the source wavering, believes that publication
itself would be legal and politically significant, and encourages the source:
“I know this is hard to do, but you’re doing the right thing; what you’ve
uncovered is really important and the public has a right to know”?  Casting
the shadow of potential criminal liability on these kinds of conversations
would create a significant chilling effect on journalists and journalism, and,
as Professor Stone has argued against the background of the New York Times
case concerning NSA eavesdropping, likely causes too great a loss of press
269 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1) (Supp. III 2010).
270 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5) (Supp. III 2010).
271 See United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1988).
272 See generally Sheehan, supra note 205; see also STONE, supra note 130, at 500–16. R
273 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
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freedom to justify except under extremely limited conditions that include the
journalist knowing both that the information would cause imminent harm
and that it did not have high public value.275
To build a prosecution of Assange on the foundation of this gray area
would present grave risks to press freedom.  As we have seen, distinguishing
between Assange and other journalists is not feasible without effectively ex-
cluding core pillars of the emerging networked public sphere and the
networked fourth estate.  The kind of gray area that would have to be probed
to expand liability through a conspiracy theory would cover behaviors that
are a daily part of journalists’ lives as they contact and cultivate sources.  As
Glenn Greenwald explains, it would cover contacts that New York Times
reporters developed while reporting on the NSA eavesdropping program,
during which they promised a dozen officials anonymity, as well as the
Washington Post’s communications with sources about the CIA black
sites.276  Moreover, building a conspiracy claim on the testimony of Man-
ning, who would be considered a co-conspirator, after the latter had spent
over eight months in solitary confinement, should give pause to any court
adjudicating such a case.  If journalists who cultivate sources and promise
anonymity, or who appeal to their sources that transmitting the information
they are transmitting is a public service, can be prosecuted criminally under
a conspiracy theory, on the testimony of sources held under conditions of
extreme duress, then the only real protection journalists have is the political
clout of their employers.  That is insufficient to secure the press freedom
necessary for an informed and engaged public that is at the very foundation
of the First Amendment’s distinct protection of the institution of the press.
D. Legal Responses to Extralegal Public-Private
Actions to Restrain Wikileaks
What the government could not achieve through law within the bounda-
ries of the Constitution, it arguably tried to achieve through extralegal ave-
nues,277 in particular, through pressure on skittish private companies more
concerned with preserving their public image with consumers than preserv-
ing their customers’ continued access to their facilities.  A system that de-
pends on privately-owned critical communications systems and privately-run
payment systems is clearly susceptible to an indirect violation of civil
rights.278  This is not, fundamentally, a new threat.  Blacklisting during Mc-
Carthyism was a particularly extreme form of economic persecution of polit-
ical undesirables, achieved not directly by government, but through a public-
275 Id. at 23.
276 Glenn Greenwald, Getting to Assange Through Manning, SALON (Dec. 16, 2010, 8:17
AM), http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/2010/12/16/wikileaks [hereinaf-
ter Greenwald, Getting to Assange].
277 See supra, Parts II.D.1–II.D.3 (describing the multi-system attack on Wikileaks).
278 See Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, supra note 148, at 25. R\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\46-2\HLC209.txt unknown Seq: 56  6-JUN-11 13:54
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private partnership between Senator McCarthy’s hearings, the House Un-
American Activities Committee, private list compilers, and the private em-
ployers who adhered to them.  The rest is an all-too-familiar story of repres-
sion and persecution over a decade that was not one of the finest hours in the
annals of American political freedom.  Most recently, the resort to an extra-
legal public-private partnership was used as a means to circumvent constitu-
tional privacy protections and became the subject of litigation in Hepting v.
AT&T Corporation,279 where customers sued AT&T over its collaboration
with the federal government in implementing illegal wiretaps.  The company
was given retroactive immunity by Congress in the FISA Amendments Act
of 2008,280 and the case against it was subsequently dismissed.281
The basic framework is clear.  What makes the networked public sphere
generally, and the networked fourth estate in particular, especially demo-
cratic, open, and diverse, is the relatively large role that decentralized, non-
traditional speakers and journalists can play.282  These online media and citi-
zen speakers are newly enabled by the widespread availability of low-cost
machines and platforms for speech.  The susceptibility of the basic infra-
structure, or platform providers, to public pressure of the kind we saw devel-
oping around the Wikileaks embassy cables release therefore represents a
threat not to the fourth estate in general, but specifically to the politically
weak, technically-dependent on widespread information, communications,
and payment utilities elements of the networked economy.  In the print envi-
ronment, accessibility to the mails as a common carrier was central; in the
physical, soap-box world, access to streets and parks indispensable.  What
the Wikileaks cables case emphasizes is the extent to which the networked
environment is made up of private speech spaces, and in particular the sus-
ceptibility of these kinds of spaces to a demonization attack pattern by the
opponents of the speaker—both within the government and outside it.
i. Suits against officials
Because the pressures involved in this kind of public-private partner-
ship need not be forceful or explicit, but rather can act subtly and indirectly,
it would be extremely difficult to bring action against the government or its
officials.  A Bivens action against this kind of subtle request to a third party
279 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006), superseded by statute, FISA Amendments Act
of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436, as recognized in Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 539
F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2008) (remanding in light of the FISA Amendments Act).  For a collection
of documents from the case, see Hepting v. AT&T, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., http://www.
eff.org/cases/hepting#242 (last visited Apr. 1, 2011).
280 FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261 § 802, 122 Stat. 2436, 2468–70
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1885a (Supp. III 2010)).
281 In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d 949 (N.D. Cal.
2009).
282 BENKLER, supra note 240, at ch. 7. R\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\46-2\HLC209.txt unknown Seq: 57  6-JUN-11 13:54
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provider would be all but impossible,283 particularly given the attitude that
the right wing of the Court exhibits toward the continued existence of a
private right of action against federal officials for civil rights violations.284
Moreover, the few cases that have looked at “regulation by raised eyebrow”
or “jawboning” suggest that the barrier for courts treating informal govern-
ment pressure on private actors as state action sufficient to trigger First
Amendment review, even where it is intended to achieve results that could
not be achieved directly by the regulator, is far from trivial.285  A more
likely, but still difficult, avenue might be suit for tortious interference with
contractual relations against the participating government officials them-
selves, in this case, perhaps against Senator Lieberman.286  Here, a plaintiff
must show that (1) the defendant knew of the contractual relationship, (2)
intentionally and (3) improperly interfered with the relationship, (4) that in-
tervention caused the party contracting with the plaintiff to terminate or im-
pair the contractual relations, and (5) the plaintiff suffered damage.287  It
would be trivial to establish elements one, two, and five.  Determining
whether scolding companies about their patriotic duty would be “improper,”
and whether indeed it was the intervention that “caused” EveryDNS, Ama-
zon, MasterCard, Visa, or PayPal to terminate their contracts with Wikileaks
or Assange, would be the difficult part.  However, action along these lines,
however tentative, appears to be the primary legal avenue available to dis-
rupt the extralegal avenues of enforcement that we observe in the Wikileaks
event and others like it.  Moreover, as long as the action can survive a mo-
tion to dismiss, so that the parties can reach discovery, the threat of public
disclosure of government pressure on companies to deny service to members
of the networked fourth estate could provide a measure of deterrence to im-
proper extralegal efforts to circumvent the First Amendment requirements
for obtaining an injunction by harnessing private companies to shut down
the undesirable speakers.  Nonetheless, it seems that legal avenues against
the government itself, barring a direct “smoking gun” type communication
from the Executive to the private actors, would be difficult to sustain.
ii. Suits Against the Private Partners
One potential path to temper the threat of extralegal action from service
providers of critical platform services—like DNS service, data hosting, or
payment systems—is to bring suit against the commercial firms for wrong-
ful denial of service.  Clarifying the existence of a legal duty to customers to
283 See Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007).
284 See id. at 568 (Thomas J., concurring in part).
285 See, e.g., Writers Guild of Am., W., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Co., 609 F.2d 355, 365 (9th
Cir. 1979) (describing and citing a wide range of cases on regulation by raised eyebrow, or
jawboning).
286 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF T ORTS § 766 (1979).
287 PROSSER AND K EETON ON T ORTS § 129 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984)
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continue service absent a clear contractual violation on the part of the cus-
tomer or a significant necessity on the part of the provider would give ser-
vice providers the cover they need to resist government requests for aid in
extralegal suppression of inconvenient publications, and provide an adequate
public explanation for continued service to an unpopular customer that
would avert the market pressure to comply.  A firm asked to stop pointing its
DNS server to the offending material or to remove it from its cloud hosting
service can answer both the government official and the complaining public:
“I’m sorry; I have a legal obligation to continue to provide this service un-
less I get a court order telling me to stop providing the service.”  That is an
answer that is complete and adequate legally, politically, and culturally.
Recognizing a legal duty would not mean that suits would be forthcoming
left and right; recognizing the right would by itself, in large measure, pre-
vent the harm to begin with.
The most direct path to such a cause of action would be to argue an
implied contractual obligation not to unreasonably, or without good faith,
withhold service.  The services we are speaking of are all in consumer mar-
kets, subject to standard contracts.  Amazon’s hosting service contract, for
example, includes termination provisions, both for cause and at will.  Most
pertinent here would be provisions for termination for cause, that give the
company the right to terminate service effective immediately if “(vii) we
receive notice or we otherwise determine, in our sole discretion, that you
may be using AWS Services for any illegal purpose or in a way that violates
the law or violates, infringes, or misappropriates the rights of any third
party; (viii) we determine, in our sole discretion, that our provision of any of
the Services to you is prohibited by applicable law, or has become impracti-
cal or unfeasible for any legal or regulatory reason.”288  The terms were
changed on December 6, 2010, the week following termination of
Wikileaks’s services; copies of earlier versions in the Internet Archive are
unreachable.289  The vagueness of the combination of “in our sole discre-
tion” and “impracticable or unfeasible for any legal or regulatory reason”
essentially invite the kind of government pressure that Senator Lieberman
apparently applied to Amazon.  This is precisely the kind of contract of ad-
hesion that provides room for a court to exercise its judgment as to whether
the term should be applied.  At least where the Restatement is concerned,
these terms should be construed against the drafting party,290 and are subject
to an obligation of good faith.291  It is hard to imagine a court striking this
kind of provision down as, in general, unconscionable,292 but the obligation
288 AWS Customer Agreement, AMAZON WEB SERVICES, http://aws.amazon.com/agreement
(last visited Feb. 6, 2011).  These terms were superseded by terms updated on February 8,
2011, but purported to apply to actions at the time of the events described here.
289 Attempts on Jan. 29, 2011.
290 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981).
291 Id. at § 205.
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of good faith may provide sufficient basis for a court to review and constrain
a service provider from cutting off critical services to a client, when it is
done to suppress their speech rather than because there is genuine illegal
behavior.  As a matter of public policy, it is conceivable that such a right
would be tailored to denial of service that undermines the facilities of the
press, although one suspects that such special treatment of the press under
generally applicable law, like contract law, would not be a particularly at-
tractive path.293
An alternative approach may be to develop a tort claim modeled on
tortious interference with prospective economic advantage.294  In the case of
volunteer organizations like Wikileaks, the economic advantage or contrac-
tual relation aspect may be something of a stretch in a suit against the pro-
vider, as opposed to a suit against the government official.295  The other
elements of the tort can, under the right facts, be present:  intent to bring
about an interference, a relationship (between the networked journalists and
their readers) that the provider seeks to interfere with—indeed sever—and
which is advantageous to the journalist.  For members of the networked
press who are of the small commercial type, there is no difficulty in estab-
lishing this.  It might be a mild stretch to argue that a donation-dependent
organization like Wikileaks, which depends on reaching its audience, has a
pecuniary interest in continued access to its materials and website.  Inten-
tional efforts to prevent that communication, and thus to harm the network
journalists’ pecuniary advantage, are sufficient.  No actual malice, in the
sense of ill will toward the party interfered with, is required.296  Certainly
such an effect would be trivial to establish in the case of MasterCard, Visa,
and PayPal, whose denial of service was clearly intended to prevent
Wikileaks from using their payment services to receive donations that sus-
tain the organization.  The hard part here would be to establish the intent
requirement, and that the claims of violation of terms of service were pretex-
tual.  Despite the difficulty, this kind of factual dispute would make discov-
ery necessary and, with it, the salutary effects of shining a light on back
channel communications between government and private actors aimed to
“disrupt and degrade” the operations of members of the networked fourth
estate.297
The private law solutions I offer here are small steps in the direction of
solving a basic problem:  core facilities and infrastructure necessary to com-
293 See United States v. Associated Press, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (refusing to create a special
antitrust law for the press).
294 RESTATEMENT  (SECOND) OF T ORTS § 766B (1979).
295 See supra notes 290–292. R
296 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF T ORTS § 766 cmts. r–s (1979).
297 Kristol, supra note 101. It is worth noting that organizations, like Wikileaks, that de- R
pend on bobbing and weaving between jurisdictions may not choose to employ this technique,
so as not to risk jurisdictional exposure.  On the other hand, core facilities the organization
needs—like DNS service and hosting—are subject to the jurisdiction, so bringing action may
not be seen as fundamentally increasing the organization’s exposure.\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\46-2\HLC209.txt unknown Seq: 60  6-JUN-11 13:54
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municate effectively in the networked environment can be arbitrarily denied
by their private owners.  By looking at currently available means in tort and
contract law I aim to underscore the necessity of achieving a basic out-
come—the introduction of a right to communicate and not to be unreasona-
bly excluded from services critical to achieving that end.  In the early
republic and since, basic mailing privileges over a common carrier mail sys-
tem played a foundational role in the development of the fourth estate in the
United States.298  As capital costs of production rose, carriage was trans-
posed into public interest obligations for radio and television.  But when
privately deployed cable and satellite met the neoliberal revival of the Rea-
gan era, the concept of common carriage began to fall out of favor, and “the
public interest” found itself on the defensive.  Most recently, even where the
case for common carriage of Internet service was most clearly indicated le-
gally and economically, in the last mile to the home, the FCC shied away
from treating broadband carriage to the home as common carrier service.299
The basic problem presented by the denial-of-service attacks on Wikileaks is
that some of the core facilities necessary to enable precisely those actors
who make the networked environment open, participatory, and available for
critical insight are susceptible to arbitrary denial of service by private prov-
iders.  This power that private actors have, given these actors’ incentives to
avoid offending the public at large, creates a new version of the much older
vulnerability of speech to ostracism and boycott, one that is particularly ef-
fective against the new players that depend on these critical infrastructures.
To counter this vulnerability, we need a menu of legal constraints that will
preserve the ability to communicate against unreasonable denials of service.
In an environment where light-weight, low-cost, low-return models, both
commercial and nonprofit, play an important role, we learn from this case
that private payment systems are also a core component of the new infra-
structure, alongside hosting services, logical addressing, and carriage.  Given
the range and diversity of essential facilities, it is possible that these very
humble foundations in contracts and tort law will offer a more general basis
for developing a system of legal constraints that will be robust to manipula-
tion and control by government actors in particular, and less susceptible to
shut down by skittish private actors more generally.
PART IV. FROM MASS-MEDIATED TO NETWORKED F OURTH ESTATE
The constitutional analysis of the Wikileaks case must be informed by
an understanding of the emerging shape of the networked fourth estate.  The
attack on Wikileaks, in particular the apparent fear of decentralization that it
represents, requires us to understand the current decline of the traditional
298 PAUL STARR, THE CREATION OF THE MEDIA: POLITICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN COMMU-
NICATION 88–90 (2004); ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 75–80 (1984).
299 Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905, § IV (F.C.C. 2010), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2010/db1223/FCC-10-201A1.pdf.\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\46-2\HLC209.txt unknown Seq: 61  6-JUN-11 13:54
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model of the press and the emergence of its new, networked form.  At core,
the multi-system attack on Wikileaks, including mass media coverage and
framing, is an expression of anxiety about the changes that the fourth estate
is undergoing.  This anxiety needs to be resisted, rather than acted upon, if
we are to preserve the robust, open model of news production critical to
democracy in the face of economic and technological change.
A. The Crisis of the Mass-Mediated Fourth Estate
The American fourth estate is in the midst of a profound transforma-
tion, whose roots are in the mid-1980s, but whose rate, intensity, and direc-
tion have changed in the past decade.300  The first element of this
transformation includes changes internal to the mass media—increasing
competition for both newspapers and television channels, and the resulting
lower rents to spend on newsrooms, and the fragmented markets that drove
new strategies for differentiation.  Many of the problems laid at the feet of
the Internet—fragmentation of the audience and polarization of viewpoints,
in particular—have their roots in this element of the change.  The second
element of transformation was the adoption of the Internet since the mid-
1990s.  The critical change introduced by the network was decentralized in-
formation production, including news and opinion, and the new opportuni-
ties for models based on neither markets nor the state for financing to play a
new and significant role in the production of the public sphere.301
As Paul Starr showed in The Creation of the Media, the middle of the
nineteenth century saw a fundamental shift in the cost structure of journal-
ism.302  Starr had emphasized the rise of the large, professionalized news-
room.303  James Beniger, identifying the same trend, emphasized the high
capital costs of the electric press, automated setting, and paper folding ma-
chines.304  Regardless of the relative importance and causal relations between
organizational and technical innovations, it is quite clear that a combination
of technological and organizational changes began a dynamic that, within a
few decades, came to replace the party press and postal service patronage
systems that preceded it.  The model of high physical capital and high fixed-
cost labor investments created the basis for the rise of major advertising-
supported dailies that typified the first half of the twentieth century.  These
high costs, coupled with the relatively high proportion of the cost related to
physical distribution, created significant barriers to entry in local news mar-
kets. Over the course of the twentieth century, local newspapers had become
local monopoly businesses.305  By 1984, the average market share of the top
300 See generally BENKLER, supra note 240, at chs. 6–7. R
301 See generally id. at chs. 2–4, 7.
302 See generally STARR, supra note 298. R
303 Id.
304 JAMES R. BENIGER, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION (1986).
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newspaper in small towns was close to 95%, and in medium-sized cities just
over 93%.  By 2006, the market share of the largest newspapers in such
towns was over 97%.  In large cities, that share was around 60% throughout
this period.306  The absence of competition, in turn, sustained unusually high
rents.307
This ability to extract rents and use them to subsidize newsrooms had
begun to change just before the emergence of the Internet into widespread
use.  As early as 1990, Warren Buffet’s annual letter to Berkshire Hathaway
shareholders stated with regard to his media holdings:  “While many media
businesses will remain economic marvels in comparison with American in-
dustry generally, they will prove considerably less marvelous than I, the in-
dustry, or lenders thought would be the case only a few years ago.”308  The
main cause of this change, which he saw as part of a long-term secular trend
rather than a cyclical downturn, was that “the number of both print and
electronic advertising channels has substantially increased.  As a conse-
quence, advertising dollars are more widely dispersed and the pricing power
of ad vendors has diminished.  These circumstances materially reduce the
intrinsic value of our major media investments . . . .”309  A year later he
explained further:  “The fact is that newspaper, television, and magazine
properties have begun to resemble businesses more than franchises in their
306 ELI M. NOAM, MEDIA OWNERSHIP AND CONCENTRATION IN AMERICA 377 Table 15.4
(2009).
307 Warren Buffet explained this most clearly in a letter to shareholders of Berkshire
Hathaway in 1984:
The economics of a dominant newspaper are excellent, among the very best in the
business world.  Owners, naturally, would like to believe that their wonderful profit-
ability is achieved only because they unfailingly turn out a wonderful product.  That
comfortable theory wilts before an uncomfortable fact.  While first-class newspapers
make excellent profits, the profits of third-rate papers are as good or better—as long
as either class of paper is dominant within its community.  Of course, product quality
may have been crucial to the paper in achieving dominance.  We believe this was the
case at the News, in very large part because of people such as Alfred Kirchhofer who
preceded us.
Once dominant, the newspaper itself, not the marketplace, determines just how
good or how bad the paper will be.  Good or bad, it will prosper.  That is not true of
most businesses: inferior quality generally produces inferior economics.  But even a
poor newspaper is a bargain to most citizens simply because of its “bulletin board”
value.  Other things being equal, a poor product will not achieve quite the level of
readership achieved by a first-class product.  A poor product, however, will still
remain essential to most citizens, and what commands their attention will command
the attention of advertisers.  Since high standards are not imposed by the market-
place, management must impose its own.
Letter from Warren Buffett, Chairman, Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., to Shareholders of Berkshire
Hathaway, Inc. (1984), available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/1984.html.
308 Letter from Warren Buffett, Chairman, Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., to Shareholders of
Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. (1990), available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/
1990.html.
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economic behavior.”310  What he called an “economic franchise” is what we
would sometimes call possessing market power:  being able to demand and
obtain high prices for its product, getting high rents, and being relatively free
of competitive pressures on the quality of the product or the management.311
He concluded:
Until recently, media properties possessed the three characteristics
of a franchise and consequently could both price aggressively and
be managed loosely.  Now, however, consumers looking for infor-
mation and entertainment (their primary interest being the latter)
enjoy greatly broadened choices as to where to find them. . . . The
result is that competition has intensified, markets have fragmented,
and the media industry has lost some—though far from all—of its
franchise strength.312
His conclusion foreshadows the media industry woes in the years that fol-
lowed them:  cost cutting, often at the expense of newsrooms, and failures of
management and financing deals, like those of the Tribune company.  “In
contrast,” continues Buffet,
“a business” earns exceptional profits only if it is the low-cost
operator or if supply of its product or service is tight.  Tightness in
supply usually does not last long.  With superior management, a
company may maintain its status as a low-cost operator for a much
longer time, but even then unceasingly faces the possibility of
competitive attack.  And a business, unlike a franchise, can be
killed by poor management.313
The dispersion of attention and increasing competition that Buffet ob-
served before the Internet age meant that there were more outlets that con-
sumers could go to that simply did not provide news.  The television six
o’clock news was no longer a fixture; nor was the front page of the local
paper.  The ease with which Americans need not confront news at all, to-
gether with the incentives to provide news that would attract a less informed
310 Letter from Warren Buffett, Chairman, Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., to Shareholders of
Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. (1991), available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/
1991.html
311 Buffet put it:
An economic franchise arises from a product or service that: (1) is needed or desired;
(2) is thought by its customers to have no close substitute and; (3) is not subject to
price regulation. The existence of all three conditions will be demonstrated by a
company’s ability to regularly price its product or service aggressively and thereby to
earn high rates of return on capital.  Moreover, franchises can tolerate mis-manage-
ment.  Inept managers may diminish a franchise’s profitability, but they cannot inflict
mortal damage.
Id.
312 Id.
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and politically engaged audience, likely contributed to the observed decline
in the level of knowledge of Americans exposed primarily to, say, morning
broadcast news shows or local television news about public affairs.314  Audi-
ence dispersion also meant that there was an opportunity to capture narrower
market segments than were most profitable during the more concentrated
period.  Where there is only one outlet, providing content that is highly mo-
bilizing to 30% of the audience but alienates 70% is a bad strategy.  You
gain strong commitment to 30%, but if you are a local monopoly, those 30%
have no real options and would have bought your product anyway, while the
70% who might have bought a bland informative media product will be
turned off by, say, a highly partisan screed.315  The same is not true when one
is faced with a field of, for example, seven media outlets of roughly similar
coverage.  Now, if one outlet is able to mark itself as uniquely representative
of a significant minority of the population, it can generate for itself an audi-
ence segment within which it can enjoy the kinds of franchise economics
Buffet had described the media industry as losing.  This (together with the
contemporaneous elimination of the fairness doctrine)316 is why Rush
Limbaugh’s show, launched in 1988, became not only economically viable,
but economically advantageous, a strategy followed with enormous success
by Fox News eight years later.
In combination, these changes within the industrial organization of
American mass media were leading to disinvestment in newsrooms, audi-
ence fragmentation, and the emergence of right-wing media that used polari-
zation as a differentiation strategy.  The two major criticisms of the
networked public sphere—fragmentation and polarization—are at least as
much the product of industrial structure changes internal to the commercial
mass media as they are the product of an asserted “Daily Me” Internet cul-
ture,317 the extent of whose actual empirical existence continues to be a mat-
ter for investigation, not assertion.  Both the disinvestment and the niche
targeting placed significant pressure on the will and ability of many outlets
to commit to and pursue serious journalism consistent with professional
norms.
At the same time, the Internet rapidly shifted from being primarily a
research and education platform to a core element of our communications
and information environment.  The defining characteristic of the Net was the
314 Summary of Findings, Public Knowledge of Current Affairs Little Changed by News
and Information Revolutions: What Americans Know: 1989–2007, PEW R ESEARCH C ENTER
FOR THE P EOPLE & THE P RESS (Apr. 15, 2007), http://people-press.org/report/319/public-
knowledge-of-current-affairs-little-changed-by-news-and-information-revolutions.
315 For a more detailed analysis of this phenomenon and a review of the literature, see
generally BENKLER, supra note 240, at chs. 5–6. R
316 Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations Concerning the
Gen. Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broad. Licensees, 102 F.C.C. 2d 142, 246 (1985) (de-
claring that the Fairness Doctrine was no longer in the public interest).
317 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM (2001).\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\46-2\HLC209.txt unknown Seq: 65  6-JUN-11 13:54
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decentralization of physical and human capital that it enabled.318  In 1999,
acute observers of the digital economy saw Encarta as the primary threat to
Britannica in the encyclopedia market, and the epitome of what the new
rules for the digital economy required.319  That a radically decentralized,
non-proprietary project, in which no one was paid to write or edit and that in
principle anyone could edit, would compete with the major encyclopedias
was simply an impossibility.  And yet, ten years later, Wikipedia was one of
the top six or seven sites on the net, while Encarta had closed its doors.  Peer
production and other forms of commons-based, non-market production be-
came a stable and important component of the information production sys-
tem,320 an observation not lost on business writers,321 and, increasingly,
governments.322  Just as free and open source software became an important
complement to and substitute for some proprietary software models; just as
photography,323 cookbooks,324 travel guides,325 restaurant and consumer re-
views,326 and video327 came to develop important components of their indus-
trial organization that were based on peer production and social production
more generally, so too has been the case with news reporting and opinion.  If
the first Gulf War was the moment of the twenty-four-hour news channel
and CNN, then the Iranian Reform movement of 2009 was the moment of
amateur video reportage, as videos taken by amateurs were uploaded to You-
Tube, and from there became the only significant source of video footage of
the demonstrations available to the major international news outlets.  Most
recently, the Tunisian revolt was in part aided by amateur videos of demon-
318 See generally BENKLER, supra note 240, at chs. 2–4. R
319 CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE
NETWORK ECONOMY 19–27 (1999).
320 See, e.g., BENKLER, supra note 240, at ch. 3; see generally CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES R
EVERYBODY (2008); SIVA V AIDHYANATHAN, ANARCHIST IN THE L IBRARY: HOW THE C LASH
BETWEEN FREEDOM AND CONTROL IS HACKING THE REAL WORLD AND CRASHING THE SYSTEM
(2005).
321 See, e.g., DON T APSCOTT & ANTHONY WILLIAMS, WIKINOMICS: HOW MASS COLLABO-
RATION C HANGES E VERYTHING (2006); Robert D. Hof, The Power of Us, BUSINESS W EEK,
June 20, 2005, at 74–82, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_25/
b3938601.htm.
322 For example, the peer-to-patent initiative, developed by Beth Noveck as an academic,
seeks to harness distributed knowledge to improve the quality of patents granted. See Peer-to-
Patent,  Open Government Initiative,  THE W HITE H OUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/open/
innovations/Peer-to-Patent.  On the local level, efforts range from very practical strategies to
improve services through harnessing distributed citizen reporting systems, like Boston’s New
Urban Mechanics initiative, see THE M AYOR’S O FFICE OF N EW U RBAN M ECHANICS, http://
www.newurbanmechanics.org, to a wide range of efforts to engage citizens in participatory
budgeting or planning, see Jennifer Shkabatur, Cities @ Crossroads: Digital Technology and
Local Democracy in America, 76 BROOK. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011).
323 FLICKR, http://www.flickr.com (last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
324 ALLRECIPES.COM, http://allrecipes.com (last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
325 TRIPADVISOR, http://www.tripadvisor.com (last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
326 YELP, http://www.yelp.com (last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
327 YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com (last visited Feb. 22, 2011); REVVER, http://www.
revver.com (last visited Apr. 19, 2011); METACAFE, http://www.metacafe.com (last visited Feb.
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strations, uploaded to a Facebook page of an activist, Lotfi Hajji, and then
retransmitted around the Arab world by Al Jazeera;328 and video taken by
protesters was mixed with that taken by professional journalists to depict the
revolt in Egypt.  But the networked public sphere is constructed of much
more, and more diverse, organizational forms than ad hoc bursts of fully
decentralized activity.
B. The Emerging Networked Fourth Estate
As of the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, it seems
that the networked public sphere is constructed of several intersecting mod-
els of production whose operation to some extent competes with and to some
extent complements each other.  One central component of the new environ-
ment is comprised of core players in the mass media environment.  How-
ever, these now have a global reach and have begun to incorporate
decentralized elements within their own model.  It is perhaps not surprising
that CNN, the New York Times, NBC News and MSNBC News, the Wall
Street Journal, Fox News, the Washington Post, and the Los Angeles Times
are among the top-ranked news sites on the Internet.329  But alongside these
are major international sites.  The publicly-funded BBC and the U.K. non-
profit the Guardian play a large role alongside U.S. commercial media.  The
Guardian’s editor-in-chief claimed to have 36 or 37 million readers per
month, in comparison to the paper’s daily circulation of about 283,000.330
These major players are, in turn, complemented by the online presence of
smaller traditional media platforms and sources from other countries, ac-
cessed by U.S. readers through Yahoo! and Google News, both among the
top news sites in the world.  The Wikileaks case presents quite well how
central these large, global online news organizational players are, but it also
shows how, because they are all in the same attention market, it is harder for
any one of them to control access to the news.  One of the strategically
significant moves that Assange made was precisely to harness these global
mass media to his cause by providing them with enough exclusivity in their
respective national markets to provide them with economic benefits from
publishing the materials, and enough competition in the global network to
make sure that none of them could, if they so chose, bury the story.  The
328 Robert F. Worth & David D. Kirkpatrick, Seizing a Moment, Al Jazeera Galvanizes
Arab Frustration, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/01/28/world/middleeast/28jazeera.html.
329 Top Sites, ALEXA, http://www.alexa.com/topsites/category/Top/News (last visited Jan.
28, 2011) [hereinafter ALEXA Rankings] (ranking the most popular news websites).
330 David Reid & Tania Teixeira, Are People Ready to Pay for Online News?, BBC CLICK
(Feb. 26, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/click_online/8537519.stm.  It is diffi-
cult to translate exactly from daily subscription numbers—which may include multiple readers
per household and need to be multiplied to reach a monthly figure—and to know what 36
million online readers really means.  The numbers should therefore be read for illustration
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global nature of the platform and the market made this strategy—by a small
player with a significant scoop—both powerful and hard to suppress.
Alongside the broader reach of these traditional outlets in a new me-
dium, we are seeing the emergence of other models of organization, which
were either absent or weaker in the mass media environment.  Remaining,
for a moment, within the sites visible enough to make major Internet rank-
ings lists, the Huffington Post, a commercial online collaborative blog, is
more visible in the United States than any other news outlet except for the
BBC, CNN, and the New York Times.331  There are, of course, other smaller
scale commercial sites that operate on advertising, like the Drudge Report,
Pajamas Media, or Talking Points Memo.  These form a second element in
the networked public sphere.  Talking Points Memo, for example, has an
Alexa reach and rank somewhere between the Baltimore Sun and the Atlanta
Journal Constitution,332 although it had a staff of only eleven people as of
mid-2009.333
A third model that is emerging to take advantage of the relatively low
cost of distribution, and the relatively low capital cost of production, of news
is the nonprofit sector.  Here, I do not mean the volunteer, radically decen-
tralized peer-production model, but rather the ability of more traditionally
organized nonprofits to leverage their capabilities in an environment where
the costs of doing business are sufficiently lower than they were in the print
and television era that they can sustain effective newsrooms staffed with
people who, like academic faculties, are willing to sacrifice some of the
bottom line in exchange for the freedom to pursue their professional values.
One example is ProPublica, a foundation-supported model for an otherwise
classic-style professional newsroom.334  A similar approach underlies the
journalistic award-winning local reporting work of the Center for Indepen-
dent Media, founded in 2006 and renamed in 2010 the American Indepen-
dent News Network.  This organization, as of this writing, funds a network
of local independent nonprofit media in Colorado, Iowa, Michigan, Minne-
sota, and New Mexico.335  A related model is the construction of university-
based centers that can specialize in traditional media roles.  A perfect exam-
331 ALEXA Rankings, supra note 329.  I exclude here The Weather Channel and Yahoo! R
News from what I consider to be “news outlets.”  Both are ranked ahead of the Huffington
Post, however.
332 See Talkingpointsmemo.com, ALEXA, http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/talkingpointsmem
o.com (last visited Apr. 1, 2011).  To compare Talking Points Memo with the Baltimore and
Atlanta newspapers, click on the “Traffic Stats” tab, type http://www.baltimoresun.com and
http://www.ajc.com into the “Compare” boxes, and click “Compare.”  The “Traffic Rank”
tab describes the sites’ Alexa traffic rank, and the “Reach” tab describes the percent of global
Internet users who visit the sites.
333 Noam Cohen, Now Hiring at Talking Points Memo, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2009, at B5,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/13/business/media/13marshall.html.
334 See About Us,  PROPUBLICA, http://www.propublica.org/about (last visited Apr. 3,
2011).
335 See About, THE AMERICAN INDEPENDENT, http://tainews.org/about (last visited Apr. 3,
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ple of this is FactCheck.org, based in the Annenberg Public Policy Center at
the University of Pennsylvania, which plays a crucial watchdog role in
checking the veracity of claims made by political figures and
organizations.336
Alongside these professional-journalism-focused nonprofits, we are
seeing other organizations using a combination of standard nonprofit organi-
zation with peer production to achieve significant results in the public
sphere.  An excellent example of this model is offered by the Sunlight Foun-
dation, which supports both new laws that require government data to be put
online, and the development of web-based platforms that allow people to
look at these data and explore government actions that are relevant to
them.337  Like Wikileaks did before the most recent events, Sunlight Founda-
tion focuses on making the raw data available for the many networked eyes
to read.  Unlike Wikileaks, its emphasis is on the legal and formal release of
government data and the construction of technical platforms to lower the
cost of analysis and construct collaborative practices, so as to make it feasi-
ble for distributed social practices and people with diverse motivational
profiles, embedded in diverse organizational models, to analyze the data.
In addition to the professionals based in large-scale global media,
small-scale commercial media, high-end national and local nonprofit media
outlets, and other non-media nonprofits, we also see emerging a new party
press culture.  Over 10,000 Daily Kos contributors have strong political be-
liefs, and they are looking to express them and to search for information that
will help their cause.338  So do the contributors to Townhall.com on the right,
although the left-wing of the blogosphere uses large collaborative sites at
this point in history more than the right.339  For digging up the dirt on your
opponent’s corruption, political ambition and contestation is a powerful mo-
tivator, and the platforms are available to allow thousands of volunteers to
work together, with the leadership and support of a tiny paid staff (paid,
again, through advertising to this engaged community, or through mobilized
donations, or both).
Finally, although less discretely prominent than the large collaboration
platforms like Daily Kos or Newsvine,340 and much more decentralized than
any of the other models, individuals play an absolutely critical role in this
new information ecosystem.  First, there is the sheer presence of millions of
individuals with the ability to witness and communicate what they witnessed
over systems that are woven into the normal fabric of networked life.  This is
the story of the Iranian reform videos, and it is of course the story of much
more mundane political reporting, from John McCain singing “Bomb Iran”
336 See About Us, FACTCHECK.ORG, http://factcheck.org/about (last visited Apr. 3, 2011).
337 See About Us, SUNLIGHT F OUNDATION, http://sunlightfoundation.com/about (last vis-
ited Apr. 3, 2011).
338 Benkler & Shaw, supra note 259, at 4. R
339 Id. at 23.
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to the tune of a Beach Boys song to George Allen’s Macaca.  Second, there
is the distributed force of observation and critical commentary, as we saw in
the exposure of the error in the CBS/Dan Rather expose.  Third, there are the
experts.  For instance, academic economists like Brad DeLong, on the left,
and Tyler Cowen, on the right, played a much greater role in debates over
the stimulus and bailout (which can be observed by looking at traffic pat-
terns to their individual blogs during the debates over the bailout) than they
could have a mere decade ago.  Collaborative websites by academics, like
Balkinization341 or Crooked Timber,342 provide academics with much larger
distribution platforms to communicate, expanding the scope and depth of
analysis available to policy and opinion makers.
The Wikileaks events need to be understood in the context of these
broad trends in the construction of the networked fourth estate.  Like the
Sunlight Foundation and similar transparency-focused organizations,
Wikileaks is a nonprofit focused on bringing to light direct, documentary
evidence about government behavior so that many others, professional and
otherwise, can analyze the evidence and search for instances that justify pub-
lic criticism.  Like the emerging party presses, it acts out of political convic-
tion.  And like so many other projects on the Net, it uses a combination of
volunteerism, global presence, and decentralized action to achieve its results.
As such, Wikileaks presents an integral part of the networked fourth estate—
no less than the protesters who shoot videos on the streets of Tehran, Tunis,
or Cairo and upload them to the Web, or the bloggers who exposed the
Rather/CBS story.  Whatever one thinks about the particular actions of
Wikileaks in the particular instance of the release of the embassy cables, the
organization and effort put forth by Wikileaks to bring to light actual internal
government documents bearing on questions of great public import is essen-
tially a networked version of the Pentagon Papers and Roosevelt’s Man with
the Muck-Rake.343  An attack on Wikileaks—legal or extralegal, technical or
commercial—needs to be assessed from that perspective, and allows us to
explore the limitations and strengths of the emerging networked fourth
estate.
C. Mass Media Anxiety over the New Neighbors in the
Networked Environment
In 2009–2010, the state of mass media news reporting—newspapers in
particular—and the financial future of these organizations became a matter
of substantial public debate.  The Senate held hearings on the future of jour-
nalism,344 and the Federal Trade Commission launched a series of public
341 BALKINIZATION, http://balkin.blogspot.com (last visited Apr. 3, 2011).
342 CROOKED TIMBER, http://crookedtimber.org (last visited Apr. 3, 2011).
343 See supra note 1 and accompanying text and Part III.A and accompanying text. R
344 Chris Lefkow, CORRECTED: Future of Journalism Debated in US Senate, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, May 7, 2009, available at 5/7/09 Agence Fr.-Presse 18:16:00 (Westlaw).\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\46-2\HLC209.txt unknown Seq: 70  6-JUN-11 13:54
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workshops under the title How Will Journalism Survive the Internet Age?345
A range of publications tried to understand what was happening to journal-
ism, and what its future would look like.  The New Republic, for example,
ran a thoughtful cover on the end of the age of newspapers,346 NPR’s On the
Media carefully explored the sense of crisis,347 and academics weighed in as
well.348
Many treatments, like those cited, were careful and thoughtful.  Much
of the debate, however, involved name-calling of the “guy in his pajamas,”
“echo-chamber of the blogosphere” variety.  The core of the critique of the
networked forms of the press has been the same since Klein’s memorable
quote:  the concern that the Internet and the blogosphere provide misinfor-
mation, while the traditional media are necessary to provide reliable investi-
gative reporting.  An event study that does not involve Wikileaks offers a
baseline portrayal of what is, in fact, the much more complex interaction
between the traditional and networked components of the fourth estate, and
the distribution of responsible and irresponsible journalism on both sides of
that divide.  It turns out that being part of the mass media is no guarantee of
high quality and effective journalism; nor is being online a guarantee of
falsehood and echo-chamber effects.  The new system will have high qual-
ity, effective participants of each type, and low quality rumormongers on
either side of the traditional/networked media divide.  Understanding this
fact, as well as the dynamic that seems to lead serious writers on the tradi-
tional side to discount it, provides important insight into the ways in which
the Wikileaks case, in turn, has been perceived.
On November 17, 2010 the New York Times published an op-ed by
Thomas Friedman, Too Good to Check, whose opening beautifully explains
the whole:
On Nov. 4, Anderson Cooper did the country a favor.  He
expertly deconstructed on his CNN show the bogus rumor that
President Obama’s trip to Asia would cost $200 million a day.
This was an important ‘story.’  It underscored just how far ahead of
his time Mark Twain was when he said a century before the In-
ternet, ‘A lie can travel halfway around the world while the truth is
putting on its shoes.’  But it also showed that there is an antidote to
malicious journalism—and that’s good journalism.
345 See How Will Journalism Survive the Internet Age?, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.
ftc.gov/opp/workshops/news/index.shtml (last visited Apr. 1, 2011); Fed. Trade Comm’n, Staff
Discussion Draft: Potential Policy Recommendations to Support the Reinvention of Journalism
(2010), available at www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/news/jun15/docs/new-staff-discussion.pdf.
346 Starr, supra note 233. R
347 Government Intervention to Save Journalism (WNYC radio broadcast July 16, 2010),
available at http://www.onthemedia.org/transcripts/2010/07/16/02.
348 See generally, e.g., ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY & JOHN NICHOLS, THE DEATH AND LIFE
OF A MERICAN J OURNALISM (2010); Leonard Downie, Jr. & Michael Schudson, The Recon-
struction of American Journalism,  COLUM. JOURNALISM R EV., Oct. 19, 2009, http://www.
cjr.org/reconstruction/the_reconstruction_of_american.php.\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\46-2\HLC209.txt unknown Seq: 71  6-JUN-11 13:54
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In case you missed it, a story circulated around the Web on
the eve of President Obama’s trip that it would cost U.S. taxpayers
$200 million a day . . . .349
The quote tells the whole of the story.  The villain is “the Internet,” which
enables the lie traveling halfway around the world—in this case, from India
to the U.S. public sphere—where it circulates around “the Web.”  The hero
is the expert journalist in an established news outlet who exposes the lie, airs
his expos´ e on a mass media outlet, and thereby administers the antidote.
There is only one problem with this story:  it wasn’t quite so.  The initial
source of the 200 million dollar per day story was an established media
outlet, the Press Trust of India; it was primarily followed by the right-wing
mass media in the United States, with one blogger playing a key importation
role.  “The Internet,” on the other hand, was actually the first place where
investigative journalism occurred to debunk the falsehood.
At 11:25 am EST on November 2, 2010, New Delhi Television350
posted a story with the byline of the Press Trust of India, India’s equivalent
of the AP and Reuters, entitled US to spend $200 mn a day on Obama’s
Mumbai visit.351  This story was linked to within the next two hours by the
Drudge Report,352 Michelle Malkin’s site at 1:53 pm,353 as well as three other
lower-visibility, right-wing blogs.354  The afternoon and evening belonged to
the mass media.  That afternoon, Rush Limbaugh repeated it on his radio
show.355  The story was repeated in the British Daily Mail356 at about 5:00
349 Thomas Friedman, Op-Ed., Too Good to Check, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2010, at A33,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/17/opinion/17friedman.html.
350 A major Indian news outlet that Forbes Magazine described in a 2006 article as “In-
dia’s top-rated English-language news channel.”  Naazneen Karmali, News Delhi TV,
FORBES.COM (Sept. 18, 2006), http://members.forbes.com/global/2006/0918/034.html.
351 Press Trust of India, US to Spend $200 mn a Day on Obama’s Mumbai Visit, NDTV
(Nov. 2, 2010, 8:54 PM IST), http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/us-to-spend-200-mn-a-day-
on-obama-s-mumbai-visit-64106.
352 THE D RUDGE R EPORT (Nov. 2, 2010), http://www.drudgereportarchives.com/data/
2010/11/02/20101102_155942.htm (precise timestamp unavailable).
353 Doug Powers, Obama to See India on $200 Million a Day, MICHELLE MALKIN (Nov. 2,
2010, 1:53 PM), http://michellemalkin.com/2010/11/02/india.
354 2ndUPDATE—Obama India Trip: 34 Warships & 1km-Long AC Bomb-Proof Tunnel!,
DAILY P AUL (Nov. 2, 2010, 1:21 PM), http://www.dailypaul.com/node/148219; Joe Biden
Making His Move on Obama, LAME CHERRY (Nov. 2, 2010, 11:22 AM), http://lamecherry.
blogspot.com/2010/11/joe-biden-making-his-move-on-obama.html; Obamas’ India Trip Cost-
ing USA $200 Million PER DAY, KATABLOG (Nov. 2, 2010, 12:28 PM), http://www.katablog.
com/display_blog.cfm?bid=0E0FDD3C-B83E-F4FC-82E1FA3F39F534A8.
355 Stack of Stuff Quick Hits Page, THE R USH L IMBAUGH S HOW (Nov. 2, 2010), http://
www.rushlimbaugh.com/home/daily/site_110210/content/01125104.guest.html [hereinafter
RUSH LIMBAUGH SHOW].
356 James White, ‘$200m-a-Day’ Cost of Barack Obama’s Trip to India Will Be Picked Up
by U.S. Taxpayers,  MAIL O NLINE (Nov. 2, 2010), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
1325990/Obamas-200m-day-India-visit-picked-US-taxpayers.html.\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\46-2\HLC209.txt unknown Seq: 72  6-JUN-11 13:54
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pm EST, and that evening, Mike Huckabee repeated the story on Fox News
election coverage.357
By the end of November 2nd, a story had been created by some of
India’s most respected news outlets, imported to the United States by two
highly visible right-wing blogs, and then repeated and amplified by two ma-
jor right-wing mass media outlets—Fox News and Rush Limbaugh.
Limbaugh’s story actually revived and combined the new 200-million-dol-
lars meme with an earlier one:  claiming that the president was taking 40
airplanes.358  This story was picked up two days later by the same Doug
Powers who later posted Michelle Malkin’s 200-million-dollars-a-day story
on his own blog.359  His post was picked up in an opinion column for the
Washington Times on October 29th,360 but this part of the story did not take
off until combined with the 200-million-dollars claim made by Limbaugh.
On November 3rd, the right-wing mass media propagation continued.
Fox News’ program Follow the Money created a whole segment, by Eric
Bolling, repeating the claim with vivid images and the tag “The Obamas:
The New American Royalty?”361  That same evening, Sean Hannity’s pro-
gram repeated the claim and conducted a panel discussion around its inap-
propriateness given the election results and the financial condition of the
country.362  A few hours later, Representative Michele Bachmann repeated
the accusation in an interview on Anderson Cooper 360; the interview that
ultimately led Cooper to investigate and refute the claim, on CNN twenty-
four hours later, on his November 4th show.363  But that refutation, the one to
which Friedman paid such high respects, was by no means the first.  The
initial refutation, on November 3rd, was not in mainstream media but on the
Net.  FactCheck.org provided a clear breakdown of the source and flow of
357 The Media Desk, Election Night: Live Blogging the Media Coverage, MEDIA DECODER
(N.Y. TIMES) (Nov. 2, 2010, 11:26 PM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/02/
election-night-watching-the-media-coverage/#carter-on-fox-huckabee-puts-a-price-tag-on-a-
state-visit (“On Fox News, one of the potential future Republican presidential candidates on
the network’s payroll, Mike Huckabee, said that the president was about to take a huge en-
tourage to India this week that would cost the American people $200 million a day—but that
was less than the government spent each day in the United States, so the people were probably
getting a break.”).
358 RUSH LIMBAUGH SHOW, supra note 355. R
359 Doug Powers, Details of Obama’s Big ‘Carbon Footprint Felt ‘Round the World’ Tour,
THE POWERS THAT BE (Oct. 29, 2010), http://dougpowers.com/2010/10/29/details-of-obamas-
big-carbon-footprint-felt-round-the-world-tour.
360 Robert Knight, Pulling Back the Curtain on Obama’s Audacity, WASHINGTON T IMES,
Nov. 1, 2010, at B1, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/oct/29/pulling-
back-the-curtain-on-obamas-audacity.
361 Eric Bolling, Follow the Money (FOX Business television broadcast Nov. 3, 2010),
available at http://mediamatters.org/mmtv/201011030048.
362 Hannity, (FOX NEWS television broadcast Nov. 3, 2010), available at http://media-
matters.org/mmtv/201011030052.
363 Anderson Cooper 360 (CNN television broadcast Nov. 4, 2010) [hereinafter Anderson
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the story.364  Media Matters for America posted a long story in the afternoon
of November 3rd, providing a similar flow and debunking of the story.365
Snopes.com also provided enough debunking either on November 3rd or
early November 4th366 to be linked to by a November 4th, 3:16 pm Wall
Street Journal blogpost.367  By the end of November 3rd, only Internet-based
reporting was doing the “good journalism” work; the only established media
working the story were either purposefully repeating the misstatement—in
the case of Fox News—or being used by right-wing politicians to propagate
the slander, as in Bachmann’s interview on Cooper’s show.
By November 4th, the tide of the story was turning.  Glenn Beck started
the day by repeating the slander.368  But an increasing number of blogs and
mainstream outlets were picking up the White House and Pentagon denials.
Over the course of that day, the Media Cloud database identified thirteen
blogposts within the political blogosphere that continued to support and
propagate the story, and fourteen blogposts that pointed to the critique and
refutations of the story.369  Interestingly, several of the blogposts underscor-
ing and disseminating the debunking reports were right-wing blogs:  Hot-
Air,370 Instapundit371 (although these sites framed the debunking with:  it’s
not our fault we believed this bunk given Obama’s reputation for extrava-
gance), and Outside the Beltway.372
In the mainstream, USA Today, the Washington Post, the Wall Street
Journal, and the Kansas City Star all had various versions of the refutation
364 Trip to Mumbai,  FACTCHECK.ORG (Nov. 3, 2010), http://factcheck.org/2010/11/ask-
factcheck-trip-to-mumbai.
365 Sarah Pavlus, White House Debunks “Wildly Inflated” $200M-per-Day Price Tag for
Obama’s India Trip, COUNTY FAIR (MEDIA MATTERS FOR AMERICA) (Nov. 3, 2010, 4:31 PM),
http://mediamatters.org/blog/201011030032.
366 Foreign Currency, SNOPES.COM, http://www.snopes.com/politics/obama/india.asp (last
updated Nov. 5, 2010).  The precise time of the original Snopes.com post has been obscured by
the November 5th update of that site’s analysis.
367 Jonathan Weisman, Fuzzy Math Dogs Obama’s Asia Trip, WASHINGTON W IRE (THE
WALL STREET JOURNAL) (Nov. 4, 2010, 3:16 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2010/11/04/
fuzzy-math-dogs-obamas-asia-trip.
368 Details on Obama Trip Remain Unclear, GLENN BECK (Nov. 5, 2010, 12:53 PM), http:/
/www.glennbeck.com/content/articles/article/198/47729.
369 See MEDIA CLOUD, http://www.mediacloud.org (last visited Apr. 1, 2011) (results of
analysis on file with author).  Media Cloud is a research platform developed at the Berkman
Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University.  The lead developer of the project is Hal
Roberts.  The development team includes David Larouchelle, Catherine Bracy, and associated
researchers include Ethan Zuckerman, Bruce Etling, John Palfrey, Urs Gasser, Rob Faris, and
Yochai Benkler.
370 No, Obama’s Not Taking 34 Navy Ships to India with Him, HOT AIR (Nov. 4, 2010,
7:02 PM), http://hotair.com/archives/2010/11/04/no-obamas-not-taking-34-navy-ships-to-
india-with-him.
371 Glenn Reynolds, Debunking: No, Obama’s Not Taking 34 Navy Ships to India with
Him,  INSTAPUNDIT.COM (Nov. 4, 2010, 8:21 PM), http://pajamasmedia.com/instapundit/109
224.
372 Doug Mataconis, Obama’s India Trip Costing $ 200 Million A Day? Don’t Believe It,
OUTSIDE THE BELTWAY (Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/obamas-india-trip-
costing-200-million-a-day-dont-believe-it.\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\46-2\HLC209.txt unknown Seq: 74  6-JUN-11 13:54
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in their web-based versions.  At 10:00 pm that night, Anderson Cooper aired
a long segment that specifically emphasized the vacuity of the sources, and
the central role that the right-wing conservatives—Limbaugh, Beck, Don
Imus, and Michael Savage— played in repeating and amplifying the lie.373  It
was indeed a good piece of journalism.  Its story captured the right tone of
how the story emerged, why it was unreliable, and who repeated the lie.
Cooper then went to his “data board” and explained how the 200-million-
dollar claim could not possibly be true, given what we know from public
sources about the daily cost of the war in Afghanistan and what we know
based on an old GAO report about the costs of Bill Clinton’s Africa trip in
1999.  All of these pieces of evidence, down to the comparison to the 190-
million-dollar-a-day cost of the Afghan war and the GAO report on Clinton’s
trip, had already been reported over twenty-four hours earlier by FactCh-
eck.org.  Cooper played an enormously important role in giving voice to and
amplifying the excellent research that was done by FactCheck.  Given the
continued importance of mass media outlets in reaching very large audi-
ences, that is indeed an important role for someone with a mass media voice
to play.  It is certainly a necessary counterweight to the kind of propagandist
reportage that Fox News and talk radio employ to solidify their brand and
retain their franchise, as well as perhaps to support the owner’s politics.  But
the story is emphatically not one where “the Internet” spreads lies and pro-
fessional journalism combats them.
The story of these three days in November 2010 offers some insight
into the emerging structure of the global, networked fourth estate.  It identi-
fies a more complex relationship than simply either “good professionals vs.
bad amateurs” or “pure-hearted, net-based journalists vs. a corrupt main-
stream media.”  It reveals a networked alternative to the more traditional
model of media checks and balances.  Here, publication by an Indian outlet
was globally visible; “the Internet,” or rather one entrepreneurial right-wing
blogger, moved that information quickly, and the network and its relation-
ship to mass media created and elevated the memes.  But the networked
environment also included nonprofit academic and professional groups
(FactCheck.org; Media Matters), as well as a small commercial professional
publisher (Snopes), all of whom were able to check the reporting and criti-
cize it.  And the Net included over two dozen sites that sifted through the
original and the refutation.  The mass media, in turn, took both the false and
the correct story lines, and in each case amplified them to their respective
audiences.
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D. Mass Media Anxiety Played out in the Wikileaks Case Endangers the
Networked Fourth Estate vis-a-vis the State, and Makes
Cooperative Ventures Across the Divide Challenging
The concern that the incumbent news industry has exhibited in the past
two years over the emerging competitors in the networked information envi-
ronment, played out in the way Friedman ascribed blame for the 200-mil-
lion-dollar-a-day story, was also on display in the way that American
newspapers dealt with Wikileaks after the release of the embassy cables.
This anxiety has two practical consequences.  The first is that the kind of
cooperative venture that Wikileaks entered into with the major newspapers
was clearly difficult to manage.  The cultural divide between established me-
dia players and the scrappy networked organizations that make up important
parts of the networked fourth estate makes working together difficult, as the
published reports from the media partners in this enterprise clearly reveal.
The second practical consequence is that, in seeking to preserve their
uniqueness and identity, the traditional media are painting their networked
counterparts into a corner that exposes them to greater risk of legal and ex-
tralegal attack.  As we saw in the analysis of the legal framework, from a
constitutional law perspective, the way in which the traditional media re-
spond to, and frame, Wikileaks or other actors in the networked fourth estate
does not matter a great deal.  But from the practical perspective of what is
politically and socially feasible for a government to do, given the constraints
of public opinion and the internalized norms of well-socialized elites in dem-
ocratic countries, the more that newspapermen, in their effort to preserve
their own identity, vilify and segregate the individuals and nontraditional
components of the networked fourth estate, the more they put those elements
at risk of suppression and attack through both legal and extralegal systems.
i. A Difficult Relationship
Two major pieces in the New York Times exemplify the effort to assert
the identity of the traditional media as highly professional, well organized,
and responsible by denigrating the networked alternative.  The first was a
Tom Friedman op-ed piece published on December 14, 2010.  In it, Fried-
man wrote:
The world system is currently being challenged by two new forces:
a rising superpower, called China, and a rising collection of super-
empowered individuals, as represented by the WikiLeakers,
among others.  What globalization, technological integration and
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individuals to such a degree that they can actually challenge any
hierarchy—from a global bank to a nation state—as individuals.374
He explains:
As for the superempowered individuals—some are constructive,
some are destructive.  I read many WikiLeaks and learned some
useful things.  But their release also raises some troubling ques-
tions.  I don’t want to live in a country where they throw whistle-
blowers in jail.  That’s China.  But I also don’t want to live in a
country where any individual feels entitled to just dump out all the
internal communications of a government or a bank in a way that
undermines the ability to have private, confidential communica-
tions that are vital to the functioning of any society.  That’s
anarchy.375
As a factual matter, “a country where they throw whistleblowers in jail” is,
in fact, the United States.376  “They,” read “we Americans,” have been
keeping Bradley Manning, the only whistleblower involved in this case, in
solitary confinement for months.377  But the important insight from this op-
ed is the expressed fear of anarchy and the fear that the decentralized net-
work, with its capacity to empower individuals to challenge their govern-
ments or global banks, is not democracy, but anarchy.  The fact that the
individual in question did not in fact “dump out all the internal communica-
tions of a government,” but rather partnered with major traditional news
outlets, including the Times, to do so, is eliminated from the op-ed.  By mis-
characterizing what Wikileaks in fact did and labeling those imagined ac-
tions “anarchy,” Friedman is able to paint it as the dangerous “other”; just
like China, a decentralized, open network is a dangerous threat to what he
concludes is the only thing standing between us and either anarchy or au-
thoritarianism:  “a strong America.”378
More revealing yet is an 8,000-word essay by New York Times execu-
tive editor Bill Keller in a New York Times Magazine cover story on January
26, 2011.379  Parts of the essay, particularly around its middle, seem intended
to emphasize and legitimate the fourth estate function of the Times itself
against critics who argue that the Times should not have published the mater-
ials.  Keller writes, for example:
A free press in a democracy can be messy.  But the alternative is to
give the government a veto over what its citizens are allowed to
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know.  Anyone who has worked in countries where the news diet
is controlled by the government can sympathize with Thomas Jef-
ferson’s oft-quoted remark that he would rather have newspapers
without government than government without newspapers.380
But any close reading of the essay makes crystal clear that a central
purpose it serves is to separate Wikileaks from the Times, and to emphasize
the Times’ professionalism, care, and organizational rationality while deni-
grating the contribution and reliability of Wikileaks.  Immediately in the first
paragraph, Keller refers to “an organization called WikiLeaks, a secretive
cadre of antisecrecy vigilantes.”381  Compare this to the Times’ own charac-
terization of Wikileaks a mere ten months earlier as “a tiny online source of
information and documents that governments and corporations around the
world would prefer to keep secret,”382 or to the 2008 Pentagon Report’s de-
tailed analysis of Wikileaks as a website dedicated to “expos[ing] unethical
practices, illegal behavior, and wrongdoing within corrupt corporations and
oppressive regimes,” or the Pentagon Report’s claim that “Wikileaks.org
supports the US Supreme Court ruling regarding the unauthorized release of
the Pentagon Papers by Daniel Ellsberg, which stated that—‘only a free and
unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government.’”383  A
few paragraphs later, Keller then emphasizes Wikileaks’ mistake in releasing
the edited version of the Collateral Murder video, writing:  “[I]n its zeal to
make the video a work of antiwar propaganda, WikiLeaks also released a
version that didn’t call attention to an Iraqi who was toting a rocket-pro-
pelled grenade and packaged the manipulated version under the tendentious
rubric ‘Collateral Murder.’”384  This sentence repeats the Fox News accusa-
tion against the edited version, ignoring the fact that the opening slide of the
edited footage states, “Although some of the men appear to have been
armed, the behavior of nearly everyone was relaxed[,]”385 and the interpre-
tive disagreement at the time about whether what the pilots thought was an
RPG was in fact so.386  Later, Keller writes:  “The Times was never asked to
sign anything or to pay anything.  For WikiLeaks, at least in this first big
venture, exposure was its own reward[,]” implying that perhaps, in the long
term, Wikileaks’ intentions were to profit from its relationships with the
380 Id.
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press.  At a different point, Keller implies, without pointing to any evidence,
that Wikileaks volunteers hacked into the Times’ computers during a rocky
period of the relationship.387
Beyond Wikileaks as an organization, it is clear that Assange and the
Times had a very bad relationship, and Keller peppers the essay with a range
of what reads more like gratuitous name-calling than substantive criticism.
In the first paragraph, Keller introduces Assange as “an eccentric former
computer hacker of Australian birth and no fixed residence.”388  Keller then
introduces and frames Assange by describing the impressions of the first
Times reporter who met him:
Assange slouched into The Guardian office, a day late. . . . “He
was alert but disheveled, like a bag lady walking in off the street,
wearing a dingy, light-colored sport coat and cargo pants, dirty
white shirt, beat-up sneakers and filthy white socks that collapsed
around his ankles.  He smelled as if he hadn’t bathed in days.”389
A few paragraphs later, Keller recounts:
Schmitt told me that for all Assange’s bombast and dark conspir-
acy theories, he had a bit of Peter Pan in him.  One night, when
they were all walking down the street after dinner, Assange sud-
denly started skipping ahead of the group.  Schmitt and Goetz
stared, speechless.  Then, just as suddenly, Assange stopped, got
back in step with them and returned to the conversation he had
interrupted.390
By comparison, the Guardian, which had as difficult and stormy a relation-
ship with Assange as did the Times, introduced Assange in its editor’s
equivalent of Keller’s overview essay very differently:  “Unnoticed by most
of the world, Julian Assange was developing into a most interesting and
unusual pioneer in using digital technologies to challenge corrupt and au-
thoritarian states.”391  As Der Spiegel put it, in reporting on Keller’s essay:
“For some time now, Julian Assange has been sparring with New York Times
Executive Editor Bill Keller.  Assange claims the paper didn’t publish the
387 Keller, supra note 54 (“At a point when relations between the news organizations and R
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material in its entirety and made too many concessions to the White House
before going to print.  Now, Keller is fighting back.”392
These kinds of jabs make separating out the personal animosity from
aspects of the essay that reflect structural, systemic concerns difficult.
Nonetheless, it is possible to observe in the piece a clear core theme:  assert-
ing a categorical distinction between the New York Times as an institution
and organizational form and the decentralized, networked form represented
by Wikileaks.  Keller says, “We regarded Assange throughout as a source,
not as a partner or collaborator.”393  He later concludes by repeating what
appears to be a central argument of the essay:  “Throughout this experience
we have treated Assange as a source.  I will not say ‘a source, pure and
simple,’ because as any reporter or editor can attest, sources are rarely pure
or simple, and Assange was no exception.”394  Further, even when asserting
that First Amendment values require that Wikileaks not be suppressed, Kel-
ler prefaces by restating:  “I do not regard Assange as a partner, and I would
hesitate to describe what WikiLeaks does as journalism.”395  By contrast, the
Guardian frames its own account of its relationship quite differently:
“[T]he fruit of Davies’ eager pursuit of Assange would result in an ex-
traordinary, if sometimes strained, partnership between a mainstream news-
paper and WikiLeaks: a new model of co-operation aimed at publishing the
world’s biggest leak.”396  It is certainly possible that the difference in fram-
ing reflects jurisdictional susceptibility and the advice of counsel; the Times
may be trying to preempt possible co-conspirator charges against it should
the Department of Justice decide to proceed against Assange and Wikileaks
on such a theory.  It seems more likely, however, that the difference reflects
the Guardian’s strategic embrace of the networked models of journalism, on
the one hand, and the Times’ continued rejection of the model.
The professional/reliable vs. unprofessional/unreliable dichotomy is re-
peated throughout Keller’s essay in more context-specific instances.  At one
point he describes a certain problem the Times reporters had with displaying
the data:  “Assange, slipping naturally into the role of office geek, explained
392 Rosenbach & Stark, supra note 78.  Assange, in his annotations to this article, ex- R
plained that the disagreement with Keller was over Keller’s decision to kill a piece on Task
Force 373, the targeted assassination squad, authored by national security reporter Eric
Schmitt, and widely considered by other papers to be one of the most important revelations in
the Afghan War logs.  Assange Annotations, supra note 24.  A Lexis-Nexis search of the New R
York Times suggests that, indeed, Task Force 373 is mentioned only once, in a brief, highly
sanitized version:  “Secret commando units like Task Force 373—a classified group of Army
and Navy special operatives—work from a ‘capture/kill list’ of about 70 top insurgent com-
manders.  These missions, which have been stepped up under the Obama administration, claim
notable successes, but have sometimes gone wrong, killing civilians and stoking Afghan re-
sentment.”  C. J. Chivers et al., The Afghan Struggle: A Secret Archive, N.Y. TIMES, July 26,
2010, at A1.
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that they had hit the limits of Excel.”397  By contrast to Assange, who was
merely like “the office geek,” Keller later describes the challenge of or-
ganizing the data and explains how, “[w]ith help from two of The Times’s
best computer minds [the lead reporters] figured out how to assemble the
material into a conveniently searchable and secure database.”398  When dis-
cussing the redaction efforts, Keller writes of the Times’ efforts:
Guided by reporters with extensive experience in the field, we re-
dacted the names of ordinary citizens, local officials, activists, aca-
demics and others who had spoken to American soldiers or
diplomats.  We edited out any details that might reveal ongoing
intelligence-gathering operations, military tactics or locations of
material that could be used to fashion terrorist weapons.399
Keller does recognize Wikileaks’ efforts to avoid harming innocents, but the
tone is quite different.  He writes:  “In the case of the Iraq war documents,
WikiLeaks applied a kind of robo-redaction software that stripped away
names (and rendered the documents almost illegible),” and
there were instances in which WikiLeaks volunteers suggested
measures to enhance the protection of innocents. . . . WikiLeaks
advised everyone to substitute a dozen uppercase X’s for each re-
dacted passage, no matter how long or short. . . . Whether
WikiLeaks’s ‘harm minimization’ is adequate, and whether it will
continue, is beyond my power to predict or influence.  WikiLeaks
does not take guidance from The New York Times.400
When writing about responsible journalism, Keller again focuses on
differentiating between the traditional media participants in the disclosure,
and the networked elements, this time explicitly using Wikileaks as an
anchor for denigrating the networked fourth estate more generally:
[W]e felt an enormous moral and ethical obligation to use the
material responsibly. While we assumed we had little or no ability
to influence what WikiLeaks did, let alone what would happen
once this material was loosed in the echo chamber of the blogo-
sphere, that did not free us from the need to exercise care in our
own journalism.401
The essay was written two months after the initial release.  Keller, by this
point, knew full well that Wikileaks in fact did not release materials irre-
sponsibly.  Nor did anyone else in what he calls “the echo chamber of the
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blogosphere.”  The assertion of difference does not reflect an actual differ-
ence in kind relative to what was disclosed by one or another of the tradi-
tional media players.  Instead, the aside largely seems to express the Times’
own anxieties about Wikileaks and the more general genre that it represents
for Keller.
This sense of self appears to have been complemented and reinforced
by the Obama Administration.  Comparing the Obama Administration’s re-
sponse to Wikileaks to that of the Bush Administration’s response to the
NSA eavesdropping story, Keller recounts:
[T]he Obama administration’s reaction was different.  It was, for
the most part, sober and professional.  The Obama White House,
while strongly condemning WikiLeaks for making the documents
public, did not seek an injunction to halt publication.  There was
no Oval Office lecture.  On the contrary, in our discussions before
publication of our articles, White House officials, while challeng-
ing some of the conclusions we drew from the material, thanked us
for handling the documents with care.402
This basic story line repeats itself in the Der Spiegel recounting.  In describ-
ing their meetings with the Administration, Rosenbach and Stark state quite
clearly:  “The official fury of the US government was directed at the pre-
sumed source, Bradley Manning, and, most of all, WikiLeaks.  The govern-
ment was not interested in quarreling with the media organizations
involved.”403  It appears as though the Administration either really did not
fear disclosure, as long as it was by organizations it felt were within its
comfort zone, or it was using the distinction and relative social-cultural
weakness of Wikileaks to keep the established media players at the table
and, perhaps, more cooperative with the Administration’s needs.
It is precisely in these descriptions of the relationship with the Adminis-
tration, from both the Times and Der Spiegel, that we see the danger that
mixing the press’ own identity anxiety with reporting on the press presents
for the networked fourth estate.  As one observes the multi-system nature of
the attacks on Wikileaks, as well as its defenses, it becomes obvious that law
is but one dimension in this multidimensional system of freedom and con-
straint.  As we saw in Part III, law, at least First Amendment law, is largely
on the side of Wikileaks; no less so than it is on the side of the New York
Times or Der Spiegel. Law, however, is not the only operative dimension.
The social-political framing of the situation, alongside the potential con-
straints the government feels on its legal chances and political implications
of attempting to prosecute, as well as the possibility of using the various
extralegal avenues we saw used in this case, have a real effect on how vul-
nerable an entity is to all these various forms of attack.  Keller writes:
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As one of my colleagues asks: If Assange were an understated
professorial type rather than a character from a missing Stieg Lar-
sson novel, and if WikiLeaks were not suffused with such glib
antipathy toward the United States, would the reaction to the leaks
be quite so ferocious?  And would more Americans be speaking up
against the threat of reprisals?404
The question, of course, is what role traditional media players in the United
States played in creating that perception of Assange, and with it the license
for what Keller described as the “ferocious” responses.  Compare Keller’s
“dirty white shirt” or “filthy white socks” description to Der Spiegel’s
description of Assange as “wearing a white shirt and jacket and sporting a
three-day beard, was even paler than usual and had a hacking cough.
‘Stress,’ he said, by way of apology.”405  Similarly, Rosenbach and Stark
describe Assange as a man who is very difficult to work with but one with
whom, after extensive interactions involving lawyers, dinner, and long nego-
tiations over wine, a deal could be, and was, reached.  Keller’s vignettes
describe someone who was only marginally sane and certainly malevolent.
El Pa´ ıs  editor Javier Moreno claimed that the many hours of a meeting with
Assange were insufficient to form a rigorously-researched profile, but he
could attest that the discussion was purely focused on a common publication
calendar and on how critical it was to protect names, sources, and dates that
could put people at risk.406  Keller and the Times, then, are not innocent by-
standers in the perceptions of Assange that made the response to him so
ferocious, but primary movers.  It was the Times, after all, that chose to run a
front page profile of Assange a day after it began publishing the Iraq war
logs in which it described him as “a hunted man” who “demands that his
dwindling number of loyalists use expensive encrypted cellphones and
swaps his own the way other men change shirts,” and “checks into hotels
under false names, dyes his hair, sleeps on sofas and floors, and uses cash
instead of credit cards, often borrowed from friends.”407
What responsibility does the established press have toward the new-
comers in the networked fourth estate not to paint them in such terms that
they become fair game for aggressive, possibly life-threatening, and cer-
tainly deeply troubling pressures and threats of prosecution?  There is a di-
rect intellectual line connecting Klein’s “you couldn’t have a starker contrast
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between the multiple layers of checks and balances, and a guy sitting in his
living room in his pajamas writing what he thinks”408 to Keller’s “bag lady
walking in off the street,”409 twice denied as “a source, not as a partner.”410
In combination with the Administration’s clear deference to the traditional
media, on the one hand, and its repeated denunciations of, threats to, and
multi-systems attacks on Wikileaks and Assange on the other, the need of
the incumbent media organizations to assert their identity and shore up their
own continued vitality threatens emerging elements of the networked fourth
estate.  “Multiple layers of checks and balances” are merely one way of
creating accountability; the social relations among elite players that make
these meetings feasible and that allow Keller to present cables to the admin-
istration are central aspects of what both the government and the incumbents
of the fourth estate value, and it is the absence of such relations in the new
organizational forms run by social outsiders that is so threatening.  The risk
is that the government will support its preferred media models, and that the
incumbent mass media players will, in turn, vilify and denigrate the newer
models in ways that make them more vulnerable to attack and shore up the
privileged position of those incumbents in their role as a more reliable ally-
watchdog.  This threat is particularly worrisome because it comes as the eco-
nomics of incumbent media force us to look for new and creative networked
structures to fill the vacuum left by the industrial decline of mid-twentieth
century media models.
ii. Collaboration Between Networked and Incumbent Models of
Journalism
The events surrounding Wikileaks mark the difficulties with what will
inevitably become a more broadly applicable organizational model for the
fourth estate.  This new model will require increased integration between
decentralized networked and traditional professional models of information
production, and concentration of attention.
On the production side, even looking narrowly at the question of leaks,
whatever else happens, spinoffs from Wikileaks—OpenLeaks or Brussels-
Leaks, efforts by established news organizations like Al-Jazeera and the New
York Times to create their own versions of secure, online leaked document
repositories—mark a transition away from the model of the leak to one
trusted journalist employed by a well-established news organization.  The
advantages of this model to the person leaking the documents are obvious.
A leak to one responsible organization may lead to non-publication and sup-
pression of the story.  The New York Times famously delayed publication of
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its story on the NSA domestic eavesdropping program for a year.411
Wikileaks has shown that by leaking to an international networked organiza-
tion able to deliver the documents to several outlets in parallel,
whistleblowers can reduce the concern that the personal risk they take in
leaking the document will be in vain.  Major news organizations that want to
receive these leaks will have to learn to partner with organizations that, like
Wikileaks, can perform that function.
Leaking is, of course, but one of many ways in which news reporting
can benefit from the same distributed economics that drive open source de-
velopment or Wikipedia.  The user-created images from the London Under-
ground bombing in 2005 broke ground for this model.  They were the only
source of images.  During the Iranian reform movement protests in 2009,
videos and images created by users on the ground became the sole video
feed for international news outlets, and by the time of the Tunisian and
Egyptian uprisings in early 2011, the integration of these feeds into mainline
reporting had become all but standard.  Just as in open source software
“given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow,”412 a distributed population
armed with cameras and video recorders, and a distributed population of
experts and insiders who can bring more expertise and direct experience to
bear on the substance of any given story, will provide tremendous benefits of
quality, depth, and context to any story.
But the benefits are very clearly not only on the side of traditional me-
dia integrating distributed inputs into their own model.  Looking specifically
at Wikileaks and the embassy cables shows that responsible disclosure was
the problem created by these documents that was uniquely difficult to solve
in an open networked model.  The problem was not how to release them
indiscriminately; that is trivial to do in the network.  The problem was not
how to construct a system for sifting through these documents and identify-
ing useful insights.  Protestations of the professional press that simply sifting
through thousands of documents and identifying interesting stories cannot be
done by amateurs sound largely like protestations from Britannica editors
that Wikipedia will never be an acceptable substitute for Britannica.  At this
stage of our understanding of the networked information economy, we know
full well that distributed solutions can solve complex information production
problems.  It was the decision to preserve confidentiality that made the usual
approach to achieving large-scale tasks in the networked environment—peer
production, large-scale distributed collaboration—unavailable.  One cannot
harness thousands of volunteers on an open networked platform to identify
what information needs to be kept secret.  To get around that problem,
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Wikileaks needed the partnership with major players in the incumbent media
system, however rocky and difficult to sustain it turned out to be.
Another central aspect of the partnership between Wikileaks and its me-
dia partners was achieving salience and attention.  There is little doubt that
mass media continues to be the major pathway to public attention in the
United States, even as the role of Internet news consumption rises.413  De-
bates continue as to the extent to which the agenda set through those organi-
zations can, or cannot, be more broadly influenced today through non-
mainstream media action.414  Both the Wikileaks case and the brief event
study of the 200-million-dollar-a-day story suggest that, at a minimum, ulti-
mate transmission to the main agenda of the population requires transmis-
sion through mass media.  However important a subject, if it cannot
ultimately make its way to mainstream media, it will remain peripheral to
the mainstream of public discourse, at least for the intermediate future.415
Networked organizations need a partnership model with traditional organiza-
tions in large part to achieve salience.
As more mature sectors in which collaboration across the boundary be-
tween traditional organizational models and new networked models show,
creating these collaborations is feasible but not trivial.  Open source
software is the most mature of these, and it shows both the feasibility and
complexity of the interface between more hierarchical and tightly structured
models and flat, networked, informal structures.416  The informality of loose
networks and the safety of incumbent organizations draw different people,
with different personalities and values; working across these differences is
not always easy.  In looking at the Wikileaks case, it is difficult to separate
out how much of the difficulties in the interface were systemic and how
much a function of interpersonal antipathy, Assange’s personality, and the
413 See Internet Gains on Television as Public’s Main News Source,  PEW R ESEARCH
CENTER FOR THE P EOPLE & THE P RESS (Jan. 4, 2011), http://people-press.org/2011/01/04/
internet-gains-on-television-as-publics-main-news-source.  Although the Internet is gaining as
a delivery vehicle, much of what is used on the Net is the online version of major traditional
media outlets. See MATTHEW HINDMAN, THE MYTH OF DIGITAL DEMOCRACY 58–67 (2009).
414 See generally BENKLER, supra note 240, at 212–73; Daniel W. Drezner & Henry Far- R
rel, The Power and Politics of Blogs, 134 PUB. CHOICE 15 (2007); Kevin Wallsten, Agenda
Setting and the Blogosphere: An Analysis of the Relationship between Mainstream Media and
Political Blogs, 24 REV. POL’Y RES. 567 (2007); Kevin Wallsten, Political Blogs: Transmission
Belts, Soapboxes, Mobilizers, or Conversation Starters?, 4 J. INFO. TECH. & POL. 19 (2008).
415 See, e.g., Ethan Zuckerman, Tunisia, Egypt, Gabon? Our Responsibility to Witness, MY
HEART’S IN ACCRA (Feb. 9, 2011, 1:40 PM), http://www.ethanzuckerman.com/blog/2011/02/
09/tunisia-egypt-gabon-our-responsibility-to-witness (discussing difficulty of getting Gabon’s
revolution covered by Global Voices, through the media focus on Egypt and Tunisia); Ethan
Zuckerman, The Attention Deficit: Plenty of Content, Yet an Absence of Interest, NIEMAN REP.
(Fall 2010), http://www.nieman.harvard.edu/reports/article/102448/The-Attention-Deficit-
Plenty-of-Content-Yet-an-Absence-of-Interest.aspx (describing more generally the difficulties
faced by Global Voices in translating the excellent on-the-ground reporting its journalists were
performing throughout Africa into attention in U.S. media outlets).
416 See generally Siobahn O’Mahony & Beth A. Bechky, Boundary Organizations: Ena-
bling Collaboration Among Unexpected Allies, 53 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 422 (2008).\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\46-2\HLC209.txt unknown Seq: 86  6-JUN-11 13:54
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Times’ ambivalence about working with Wikileaks.417  In thinking of the
events as a case study, it is important not to allow these factors to obscure
the basic insights:  collaboration is necessary, it is mutually beneficial, and it
is hard.
The networked fourth estate will be made up of such interaction and
collaboration, however difficult it may be initially.  The major incumbents
will continue to play an important role as highly visible, relatively closed
organizations capable of delivering much wider attention to any given reve-
lation, and to carry on their operations under relatively controlled conditions.
The networked entrants, not individually, but as a network of diverse indi-
viduals and organizations, will have an agility, scope, and diversity of
sources and pathways such that they will, collectively, be able to collect and
capture information on a global scale that would be impossible for any sin-
gle traditional organization to replicate by itself.  Established news outlets
find this partnership difficult to adjust to.  Bloggers have been complaining
for years that journalists pick up their stories or ideas without giving the kind
of attribution they would normally give to journalists in other established
organizations.  But just as software companies had to learn to collaborate
with open source software developers, so too will this industry have to de-
velop its interactions.  We already see outlets like the Guardian well ahead
of the curve, integrating what are effective expert blogs into their online
platform as part of their menu of offerings.  We see the BBC successfully
integrating requests for photographs and stories from people on the ground
in fast-moving news situations—although not quite yet solving the problem
of giving the sources a personality and voice of a collaborative contributor.
One would assume that the networked components of the fourth estate will
follow the same arc that Wikipedia has followed: from something that sim-
ply isn’t acknowledged, to a joke, to a threat, to an indispensable part of life.
CONCLUSION
A study of the events surrounding the Wikileaks document releases in
2010 provides a rich set of insights about the weaknesses and sources of
resilience of the emerging networked fourth estate.  It marks the emergence
of a new model of watchdog function, one that is neither purely networked
nor purely traditional, but is rather a mutualistic interaction between the two.
It identifies the peculiar risks to, and sources of resilience of, the networked
fourth estate in a multidimensional system of expression and restraint, and
suggests the need to resolve a major potential vulnerability—the ability of
private infrastructure companies to restrict speech without being bound by
417 Assange notes that Wikileaks had been working with individual Times reporters since
2007.  Assange Annotations, supra note 24.  This is, perhaps, not surprising, at a time when R
Wikileaks was less well known and played a role that fit much more closely the traditional
perception of “source.”  By the time of the embassy cables, Wikileaks was no longer playing
that role, and the relationship was no longer up to the individual reporter writing the story.\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\46-2\HLC209.txt unknown Seq: 87  6-JUN-11 13:54
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the constraints of legality, and the possibility that government actors will
take advantage of this affordance in an extralegal public-private partnership
for censorship.  Finally, it offers a richly detailed event study of the com-
plexity of the emerging networked fourth estate, and the interaction, both
constructive and destructive, between the surviving elements of the tradi-
tional model and the emerging elements of the new.  It teaches us that the
traditional, managerial-professional sources of responsibility in a free press
function imperfectly under present market conditions, while the distributed
models of mutual criticism and universal skeptical reading, so typical of the
Net, are far from powerless to deliver effective criticism and self-correction
where necessary.  The future likely is, as the Guardian put it, “a new model
of co-operation” between surviving elements of the traditional, mass-medi-
ated fourth estate, and its emerging networked models.418  The transition to
this new model will likely be anything but smooth.
418 Leigh & Harding, supra note 54. R\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\46-2\HLC209.txt unknown Seq: 88  6-JUN-11 13:54